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PROPERLY ACCOUNTING FOR DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES: AN
EVIDENCE-BASED ANALYSIS AND REFORM
PROPOSAL
Debra Pogrund Stark*
Jessica M. Choplin, Ph.D.**
Sarah Elizabeth Wellard***
Abstract
Promoting the best interests of children and protecting their
safety and well-being in the context of a divorce or parentage case
where domestic violence has been alleged has become highly
politicized and highly gendered. There are claims by fathers’
rights groups that mothers often falsely accuse fathers of domestic
violence to alienate the fathers from their children and to
improve their financial position. They also claim that children
do better when fathers are equally involved in their children’s
lives, but that judges favor mothers over fathers in custody cases.
As a consequence, fathers’ rights groups have engaged in a
nationwide effort to reform the custody laws to create a
presumption of equal parenting time, with no exception when
one of the parents has engaged in domestic violence. Domestic
violence survivors and their advocates, however, claim that the
needs of survivors of domestic violence and their children to be
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safe and free from further abuse are not being met in custody
cases, that their claims of abuse are not being believed, and that
the harm when a parent commits domestic violence against the
other parent is not being recognized and addressed by judges and
the family law professional upon whom they rely.
This Article first presents a literature review, with articulated scientific standards applied to each of the pieces of research cited in this review, on what is happening outside of court and in
court relating to domestic violence and best practices for taking
domestic violence into account in these child custody cases.
Among the key findings from this literature review are: (1) when
a parent commits domestic violence against the other parent, this
can cause serious long-term harm to children, (2) custody judgments tend to favor fathers over mothers because greater weight is
placed on claims of alienation than on domestic violence claims,
(3) long-term harms can be mitigated by evidence-based best
practices, most notably, supporting non-abusive parents in their
efforts to protect themselves and their children from further domestic violence, (4) family law judges and professionals must be
trained on domestic violence and its nuances, as well as how to
screen for domestic violence, to adequately support them, and (5)
a component of this training is learning how to distinguish mutual “situational couple violence” for which “parallel parenting”
custody arrangements might be feasible, from a pattern of “coercive abuse,” where sole decision-making and primary parenting
time should be ordered to the non-abusive parent, and protective
restrictions on parenting time should be ordered to the abusive
parent.
The Article then reports on a fifty-state review of custodyrelated laws (laws determining which parent makes major decisions relating to the child, who is allocated primary parenting
time, and whether protective restrictions shall be placed on the
parenting time of a parent who has engaged in domestic violence). This review found serious gaps between what evidencebased best practices suggest, and what is currently required by
law in many states. These gaps in the law, including the failure
of the law to require domestic violence screening and training for
judges and other family law professionals, contribute to poor custody decision-making by them that compromises the safety and
welfare of domestic violence survivors and their children.
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The Article then proposes nuanced law reforms that would
align custody-related laws with evidence-based best practices for
taking domestic violence into account in custody cases, including
creating rebuttable presumptions, burdens of proof, and definitions of domestic violence that conform with these evidence-based
best practices.
Table of Contents
Introduction 4
I.
A Review of the Literature on “Domestic Violence” in
Child Custody Cases 9
A. Exposure to Domestic Violence Can Cause Serious, Long-Term
Harm to Children, but Can Be Mitigated When Protective
Factors are Present or Pursued 11
1. Scientific Standards for Inclusion of Articles in this
Literature Review 20
2. The Effects of Child Exposure to Domestic Violence 22
B. Professionals Involved in Child Custody Decision-Making Need
Special Training to Recognize, Understand, and Properly
Evaluate Evidence of Domestic Violence and Claims of
Alienation 26
C. Proper Screening for Domestic Violence Is Necessary to Prevent
Children from Continued Exposure to Domestic Violence or
Direct Abuse and Neglect 35
D. Evidence of Domestic Violence Requires Protective Features
Relating to Custody 42
E. Importance of Appropriately Assessing and Addressing Mental
Health Issues and Seeking Appropriate
Intervention Programs 45
F. An Evidence-Based Analysis of Fathers’ Rights Group Claims
Relating to Domestic Violence and Custody Issues 53
II. An Examination of the Extent That Identified Best
Practices Are Required by Law 64
A. To What Extent Do States Require Family Law Judges to Receive
Training on Domestic Violence? 65
B. To What Extent Do States Require Guardians ad litem, Child
Representatives, or Other Custody Evaluators to Receive Training
on Domestic Violence and to Screen for Domestic Violence in
Their Child Custody Cases? 70

4

michigan journal of gender & law

[Vol. 26:1

C. To What Extent Do State Laws Relating to Child Custody Cases
Take Domestic Violence Into Account Consistent with EvidenceBased Best Practices? 77
1. A Survey of the States 78
2. Illinois: A Case Study 98
a. “the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his
custody” 103
b. “the wishes of the child as to his custodian” 103
c. “the interaction and interrelationship of the child with
his parent, his siblings and any other person who may
significantly affect the child’s best interests” 104
d. “the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and
community” 104
e. “the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved” 104
f. “the physical violence or threat of physical violence by
the child’s potential custodian, whether directed
against the child or directed against another person
but witnessed by the child” 105
3. Arizona: A Case Study 109
III. Necessary Law Reforms to Implement Evidence-Based Best
Practices 111
Conclusion 116

Introduction
There is substantial evidence that family law judges, child representatives, guardians ad litem, and other family law professionals are not
adequately taking domestic violence into account in child custody de1
terminations. Survivors of domestic violence are often either not believed or are viewed as being alienating rather than protective of their
2
children. When a father claims that the mother is alienating him from
his children, that father is much more likely to obtain the custody order
they are seeking (joint or sole custody of their children), even when the
courts are aware that the father has committed domestic violence or di-

1. See infra Section I.
2. Joan S. Meier & Sean Dickson, Mapping Gender: Shedding Empirical Light on Family
Courts’ Treatment of Cases Involving Abuse and Alienation, 35 LAW & INEQ. 311, 332
(2017).
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3

rect abuse of the children. Mothers are much less likely to obtain the
custody order they are seeking (sole custody and protective restrictions
on the parenting time of the other parent) when they allege domestic
violence or direct abuse of their children and the father alleges aliena4
tion. An estimated 58,000 children a year in the United States are
court ordered into unsupervised contact with physically or sexually abu5
sive parents following divorce. The failure to protect children and domestic violence survivors continues even when one parent has been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt of domestic violence against the other
parent. According to one study, joint legal custody orders (for shared
decision-making by the parents) are the most common custody outcome—primary physical custody (physical placement) is given to the
6
domestic abuse victim in only 60 percent of the cases. There are no explicit provisions for the safety of the victim or children (such as ordering
that placement exchange occur in a protected setting) in 70 percent of
7
these cases. These results are particularly problematic since there is
strong evidence that exposure to domestic violence often causes longterm, serious harm to children, but can be mitigated when protective
8
factors are present or pursued.
As discussed in Section I, to reduce the harms to children from further exposure to domestic violence, courts need to grant custody orders
that empower the non-abusive parent to protect their children from further harm. As explained in Sections I and II, when the domestic violence is based upon a pattern of coercive abuse, the custody orders
should provide sole legal custody (i.e., decision-making) and primary
physical custody (i.e., parenting time) to the non-abusive parent, unless
that parent is not fit to parent. In addition, the custody orders should
contain other protective measures, such as supervised exchanges of the
children, attending and completing partner abuse intervention pro9
grams, and, in some cases, supervision or suspension of parenting time.

3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 320.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 313.
See Adrienne Roach, Will Data Drive Change? Research Shines a Light on the Family
Law System, COALITION CHRONICLES (End Domestic Abuse WI, Madison, Wis.),
June 2018, at 9; Tony Wilkin-Gibart, Wisconsin Family Law and Domestic Abuse:
Summary of Research Findings, COALITION CHRONICLES (End Domestic Abuse WI,
Madison, Wis.), June 2018, at 11.
7. See Wilkin-Gibart, supra note 6, at 11.
8. See infra Section I.A.
9. See infra Section I.
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So why are guardians ad litem and child representatives
recommending, and courts ordering, sole or joint custody and
unrestricted parenting time to parents when there is evidence those
parents have been engaging in a pattern of coercive abuse of the other
parent that seriously endangers their children’s health, safety, and wellbeing? To what extent is this due to gender bias and a lack of training
on the dynamics of domestic violence? To what extent are judges failing
to order protective conditions on parenting time because they are
unaware of the danger of serious harm to children when one parent
engages in domestic violence against the other parent? To what extent is
it due to a failure to screen for and make findings on domestic violence?
How do the various custody laws among the fifty states contribute to
judges failing to order necessary protections?
As discussed in Section II, the presence of domestic violence is a
factor in determining the “best interests of the child” in virtually every
10
state’s custody laws. In addition, in 21 states and the District of Columbia, there is a rebuttable presumption against sole custody or joint
11
legal custody to a parent who has engaged in “domestic violence.”
And, 34 states expressly and clearly provide that domestic violence is a
12
basis to order conditions and restrictions on parenting time. To what
extent are the statutory pre-conditions in these laws hindering a judge’s
ability to grant custody orders that adequately protect children and the
parent victim of domestic violence? This question, along with those
above, are key questions and problems that this Article will address.
Fathers’ rights groups, on the other hand, view the situation very
13
differently. They claim that courts favor mothers over fathers, that
mothers routinely falsely allege domestic violence or child abuse as part
14
of a “gamesmanship of divorce” to gain an economic advantage in the
15
16
divorce or parentage case, to get custody, or to alienate the father

10. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE,
CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY STATE (hereinafter “ABA 50 STATE
REVIEW”), http://www.ambar.org/cdsv; see also discussion infra Section II.
11. See notes 446–467 infra.
12. See notes 513–546 infra.
13. STOP ABUSIVE AND VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, UNEQUAL JUSTICE IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, 2 (2013), http://www.saveservices.org/wp-content/uploads/
SAVE-Criminal-Justice-System.pdf.
14. STOP ABUSIVE AND VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, INCENTIVES TO MAKE FALSE
ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1, 2 (2010), http://www.saveservices.org/pdf/
SAVE-Incentives-for-False-Allegations.pdf [hereinafter INCENTIVES TO MAKE FALSE
ALLEGATIONS].
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id. at 4.
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from the child. Fathers’ rights groups also claim that children are
18
harmed when they are separated from their father. Furthermore, over
the past few years, fathers’ rights groups such as the National Parents
19
20
Organization and Stop Abusive and Violent Environments have used
these arguments to mount a national push for law reform that would
create rebuttable presumptions of equal or shared parenting time and
shared decision-making, without adding an exception for situations
where one parent has engaged in domestic violence or direct child
21
abuse. To what extent are these claims valid and these policy proscriptions prudent or reckless?

17. Richard Gardner argues that “when bona fide abuse is present, the [parental alienation syndrome] diagnosis is not applicable,” but his concept has been applied even in
situations where there has been abuse. Compare Richard A. Gardner, Family Therapy
of the Moderate Type of Parental Alienation Syndrome, 27 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 195,
201 (1999), with Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 316–18 (2017) (“In some cases,
even expert validations of child abuse and comprehensive guardian ad litem confirmations of the validity of the abuse claims have been insufficient to overcome the seemingly irrebuttable presumption of falsity that flows from the label ‘alienator.’”).
18. STOP ABUSIVE AND VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, WHAT IS THE COST OF FALSE
ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE? 1, 4 (2010), http://www.saveservices.org/
downloads/False-DV-Allegations-Cost-20-Billion.
19. About NPO: Who We Are, NATIONAL PARENTS ORGANIZATION,
https://nationalparentsorganization.org/about-npo (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
20. About SAVE, STOP ABUSIVE AND VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS,
http://www.saveservices.org/info/about (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
21. Michael Alison Chandler, More Than 20 States in 2017 Considered Laws to Promote
Shared Custody of Children after Divorce, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/more-than-20-states-in-2017considered-laws-to-promote-shared-custody-of-children-after-divorce/2017/12/11/
d924b938-c4b7-11e7-84bc-5e285c7f4512_story.html?utm_term=.dfe444c72175.
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (creating a “presumption, rebuttable by a preponderance of evidence, that joint custody
and equally shared parenting time is in the best interest of the child,” although domestic violence is still listed as one of a number of factors that the court shall consider). A bill was introduced in 2017 in Illinois to create a rebuttable presumption for
equal parenting time with no exception for domestic violence. H.R. 4113, 100th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017). Although it was adjourned sine die, another bill
was introduced in 2019, amending the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act by “recognizing that the involvement of each parent for equal time is presumptively in the children’s best interests.” H.R. 185, 101st Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill.
2019). No definite exception is listed for domestic violence, but the bill requires the
court to “acknowledge that the determination of children’s best interests, and the allocation of parenting time and significant decision-making responsibilities, are among
the paramount responsibilities of our system of justice, and to that end . . . recognize
that, in the absence of domestic violence or any other factor that the court expressly
finds to be relevant, proximity to, and frequent contact with, both parents promotes
healthy development of children.” H.R. 185. In 2016, although the bill was ultimate-
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The goal of this Article is to present the highest-quality, objective,
22
scientific research available to propose law reforms to the process of
how child custody decisions are made. The term “child custody,” as
used throughout this Article, refers to a court order on whether one parent will be granted the primary parenting time and decision-making of
their child, or whether instead, the court orders that the parents will
have more of a shared arrangement on parenting time and decisionmaking. The term “child custody” also sometimes refers to court orders
on whether there should be any conditions or restrictions ordered on a
parent’s parenting time to protect the child and other parent from the
danger of serious harm that could occur without these protections in
place.
23
Section I of this Article contains a literature review of the harms
to children when one parent engages in domestic violence against the
other parent; ways to mitigate this harm and reduce the likelihood of
co-occurrence of domestic violence and child abuse; and other best practices for taking domestic violence into account in child custody cases.
Section I also includes an evidence-based analysis of fathers’ rights
groups’ claims relating to domestic violence and child custody decisions.
Section II explores the extent to which best practices have been implemented by state legislatures and state supreme courts. It also identifies
gaps in mandating such best practices. In Section III, this Article proposes specific reforms to the laws among the 50 states and the District
of Columbia relating to child custody that implement evidence-based
best practices to better protect children and survivors of domestic violence from the danger of further serious harm. Among these best practices would be distinguishing “situational couple violence” from a “patly vetoed by the governor and did not become law, a proposal for equal time sharing
was approved overwhelmingly by Florida’s state legislature. S. 668, 118th Leg. (Fla.
2016).
22. We describe, in footnotes to each cited study, the limitations of the study to put the
conclusions into proper context. In some cases, the results have been used in misleading ways and we indicate this issue in the text or footnote citing it.
23. Various forms of research have been included: meta-analyses (which statistically combine the results of many studies and are often considered to be the gold-standard in
research), qualitative literature reviews (which describe the research that is reported in
the literature, but do not combine results together as meta-analyses do), empirical results of original studies such as experiments (studies in which variables are manipulated to see how those manipulations affect measured outcomes), correlational research
(studies that take data from a variety of measures and statistically parses the relationships between the measures) with regression analyses (statistical analyses that look at
the relationships between measured variables), and structural equation modeling (a
statistical analysis technique that is used to analyze the structural relationships between measured variables and latent constructs).
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tern of coercive abuse,” with different kinds and levels of protections
to be put in place for each.
I. A Review of the Literature on “Domestic Violence” in
Child Custody Cases
First, it is important to be clear on the definition of “domestic violence.” The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) notes
the importance of applying a uniform definition when studying domes25
tic violence and taking steps to prevent it. We adopt the CDC defini26
tion: “The term ‘intimate partner violence’ describes physical vio27
28
29
lence, sexual violence, stalking and psychological aggression
30
(including coercive acts) by a current or former intimate partner.” This
CDC definition of intimate partner violence is gender neutral, and domestic violence happens to men as well as women, but statistics reflect
that women are primarily the victims of domestic violence and men are
31
primarily the abusers. In addition to this precise definition of domestic
violence, the CDC classifies domestic violence as a “serious, preventable

24. See discussion of these terms infra Section I.
25. The CDC actually uses the term “intimate partner violence” rather than “domestic
violence,” but in this Article we refer to the phenomenon as “domestic violence” unless quoting from a source that uses another phrase such as “intimate partner violence.”
26. Intimate Partner Violence: Definitions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/definitions.html
(last updated Oct. 23, 2018) [hereinafter “CDC Definition of DV/Intimate Partner
Violence”].
27. “Physical violence includes a range of behaviors from slapping, pushing or shoving to
severe acts that include hit with a fist or something hard, kicked, hurt by pulling hair,
slammed against something, tried to hurt by choking or suffocating, beaten, burned
on purpose, used a knife or gun.” Id.
28. “Sexual violence: includes rape, being made to penetrate someone else, sexual coercion (non-physically pressured sex), unwanted sexual contact (such as groping), and
noncontact unwanted sexual experiences (such as verbal harassment). Contact sexual
violence is a combined measure that includes rape, being made to penetrate someone
else, sexual coercion, and/or unwanted sexual contact.” Id.
29. “Stalking: victimization involves a pattern of harassing or threatening tactics used by
a perpetrator that is both unwanted and causes fear or safety concerns in the victim.”
Id.
30. “Psychological Aggression: includes expressive aggression (such as name calling, insulting or humiliating an intimate partner) and coercive control, which includes behaviors that are intended to monitor and control or threaten an intimate partner.” Id.
31. See infra Section I.F.
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public health problem that affects millions of Americans.” Legislators,
judges, and other family law professionals need to be aware of this
statement from a highly regarded government agency and research center.
Second, the scientific literature distinguishes different types or pat33
terns of domestic violence. Several taxonomies have been proposed,
but we will primarily distinguish between two types: “situational couple
violence” and “coercive abuse.” “Situational couple violence” can be a
dangerous type of violence that happens by and between both intimate
partners (i.e., it is mutual) that does not involve pervasive power and
34
control. It is often used to influence or even coerce the partner to do
35
something in particular situations, but coercion does not pervade the
36
entire relationship. Some believe it is the type of violence most fre37
quently observed in the population at large, but, as explained later in
this Article, this belief is based upon certain general surveys of the popu38
lation that have methodological flaws. “Coercive abuse,” by contrast,
involves one intimate partner engaging in patterns of controlling behavior that are not limited to particular situations; and instead, the coercion
39
is pervasive in the relationship. Coercive abuse involves violence, but
extends beyond violence to include at least some of the following behaviors: intimidation; emotional abuse; isolation; minimizing, denying, and
blaming; use of children; asserting male privilege; economic abuse; and

32. CDC Definition of DV/Intimate Partner Violence, supra note 26.
33. Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner
Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476
(2008) (conducting a literature review on the distinctions between different types of
domestic violence and how differentiating among the different patterns of domestic
violence clarifies apparent paradoxes in the field); see also GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON
DOMESTIC ABUSE & END DOMESTIC ABUSE WIS., DOMESTIC ABUSE GUIDEBOOK
FOR WISCONSIN GUARDIANS AD LITEM: ADDRESSING CUSTODY, PLACEMENT, AND
SAFETY ISSUES (2017), https://www.wicourts.gov/publications/guides/docs/
galguidebook.pdf.
34. Kelly & Johnson, supra note 33, at 481.
35. Evan Stark, Commentary on Johnson’s ”Conflict and Control: Gender Symmetry and
Asymmetry in Domestic Violence, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1024 (2006) [hereinafter Stark, Commentary on Johnson] (conducting a literature review on the distinctions between different types of domestic violence and how domestic violence cannot
be viewed as simply a combination of discrete acts, but as a pattern of abuse).
36. Kelly & Johnson, supra note 33, at 479.
37. Id. at 485.
38. See infra Section I.F.
39. Kelly & Johnson, supra note 33, at 481.
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coercion and threats. Both situational couple violence and coercive
abuse are harmful to children, but as we discuss in this Article, these two
different types of domestic violence can have different implications for
the kinds of protections courts should order in child custody cases.
A. Exposure to Domestic Violence Can Cause Serious, Long-Term Harm to
Children, but Can Be Mitigated When Protective Factors are
Present or Pursued
Based upon our review of the evidence-based literature, we con41
clude that the professionals involved in making “custody” related deci42
sions must be better educated as to how exposure to domestic violence
and granting custody to abusive parents can cause serious, long-term
40. ELLEN PENCE & MICHAEL PAYMAR, EDUCATION GROUPS FOR MEN WHO BATTER:
THE DULUTH MODEL 3 (1993).
41. We use the term “custody” to refer to parenting time and decision-making during the
legal process of separation and divorce and thereafter.
42. See Peter G. Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions in Addressing Domestic Violence in
Child Custody Disputes, 60 JUV. & FAM. CT. 57, 62 (2003) [hereinafter Jaffe et al.,
Common Misconceptions] (presenting qualitative case studies of 62 adult female victims and 95 child victims of domestic violence, defined by separation from an abuser). Although the sample in this study was not chosen at random, it is representative
of the population at hand and adds depth to ideas addressed in the literature; see also
MICHAEL S. DAVIS ET AL., N.Y. LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP, CUSTODY EVALUATIONS
WHEN THERE ARE ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PRACTICES, BELIEFS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
OF
PROFESSIONAL
EVALUATORS
84–85
(2010),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234465.pdf (describing multivariate regression analysis of 69 cases). Generalizability may be an issue in that all cases were
from one state (New York), and all individuals studied were represented by informed
counsel specializing in domestic violence, which may exemplify best-case scenarios).
DANIEL G. SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS ABOUT
DOMESTIC ABUSE ALLEGATIONS: THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO EVALUATOR
DEMOGRAPHICS, BACKGROUND, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE KNOWLEDGE AND CUSTODYVISITATION RECOMMENDATIONS 116–35 (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/238891.pdf [hereinafter SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’
BELIEFS] (discussing a two-part study, including multivariate analysis of surveys of
1187 professionals in fields related to custody cases—for example, judges, attorneys,
and custody evaluators—and qualitative, semi-structured case-study interviews of 24
domestic violence survivors). Extensive analysis of findings showed robust statistical
power and strong validity of measures used. ELLEN PENCE ET AL., BATTERED
WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, MIND THE GAP: ACCOUNTING FOR DOMESTIC ABUSE
IN CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS 37 (2012), http://www.bwjp.org/resourcecenter/
resource-results/mind-the-gap-accounting-for-domestic-abuse-in-childcustodyevaluations.html (detailing qualitative case analysis of 18 domestic violence-related
custody evaluation reports from five states). Although sample size may limit generalizability of findings, the inquiry nevertheless provides useful insight.
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harm to children. Common misconceptions include the notions (1)
that domestic violence is typically not an issue for couples who are in
the process of divorce and are disputing child custody because once they
are separated the violence will not continue; (2) that amongst women
who are victims, domestic violence results in eventual separation; (3)
that children exposed to domestic violence are not harmed so long as
they are not directly injured; (4) that domestic violence is exclusively between adults and should not play a role in deciding child custody; (5)
that assessment of needs of abused women and their children, and the
effects caused by the perpetrator, can be satisfactorily conducted by family courts, attorneys, and mediation or other court services; (6) that legal
and mental health services for female victims and their children who are
separating from the perpetrator are readily available; and (7) that solutions and community assistance when separating from the perpetrator
44
are limited for victims of domestic violence and their children.
A thorough understanding of domestic violence and an appreciation for its importance in child custody determinations are necessary to
45
produce better and safer determinations for children’s welfare. Additionally, professionals need better education on the protective factors

43. See generally AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, ADVERSE CHILDHOOD
EXPERIENCES AND THE LIFELONG CONSEQUENCES OF TRAUMA (2014),
https://www.aap.org/en-us/Documents/ttb_aces_consequences.pdf (analyzing research supporting conclusions from a 1998 study by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention documenting the negative long-term physiological and psychological
effects of adverse childhood experiences on more than 17,000 middle-class Americans). Analysis suggests that adverse childhood experiences can “contribute significantly to negative adult physical and mental health outcomes and affect more than 60
[percent] of adults.” Id. at 1.
44. Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions, supra note 42, at 58–64.
45. See Megan L. Haselschwerdt et al., Custody Evaluators’ Beliefs about Domestic Violence
Allegations During Divorce: Feminist and Family Violence Perspectives, 26 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1694, 1695–97 (2011) (discussing an experiment in
which 23 custody evaluators were interviewed, and answers were coded for analysis to
determine potential variables related to outcomes of evaluations and recommendations). Although the study is insightful, concerns arise based on ambiguous operational definitions, unclear criteria, and unexplored, potentially confounding, third
variables; see also Nancy S. Erickson & Chris S. O’Sullivan, Doing Our Best for New
York’s Children: Custody Evaluations When Domestic Violence is Alleged, 23 N.Y. ST.
PSYCHOLOGIST 9, 10–11 (2011) (analyzing a meta-analysis of three recent studies,
each of which found to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that an evaluator’s
lack of knowledge can lead to harm of the child or children involved in the dispute,
and that domestic violence training is essential for custody evaluators to prevent this
kind of lasting damage); SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS,
supra note 42, at 116–25.
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46

that can mitigate these harms. Having a protective parent is particular47
48
ly important, but too often protective parents lose custody, while

46. See, e.g., Norman Garmezy & Ann Masten, Chronic Adversities, in CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 191, 194 (Michael Rutter et al. eds., 1994); Sandra A.
Graham-Bermann et al., Factors Discriminating Among Profiles of Resilience and Psychopathology in Children Exposed to Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), 33 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT 648 (2009) (presenting findings from multivariate cluster analysis of
scores obtained from a sample of 219 children exposed to intimate partner violence
within the last year). The study used validated measures of functioning and demonstrated statistical reliability. Ashley E. Owen et al., Family Variables that Mediate the
Relation Between Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) and Child Adjustment, 24 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 433, 434 (2009) (detailing results of a study of 129 low-income, AfricanAmerican mothers and children). While valuable, findings should be considered in
limited context as data were collected from a single demographic group, results have
an unclear direction of causality, and study authors warn of the potential for an inflated Type I Error rate; Emmy E. Werner, High-Risk Children in Young Adulthood: A
Longitudinal Study from Birth to 32 Years, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 72 (1989)
(discussing longitudinal case studies of 698 individuals born on the island of Kauai,
Hawaii in 1955.) Findings may be limited in terms of generalizability outside of this
cohort. EMMY E. WERNER & RUTH S. SMITH, OVERCOMING THE ODDS: HIGH RISK
CHILDREN FROM BIRTH TO ADULTHOOD 173–87 (1992) (further analyzing Werner,
supra).
47. Jack P. Shonkoff & Andrew S. Garner, The Lifelong Effects of Early Childhood Adversity and Toxic Stress, 129 PEDIATRICS e236 (2012),
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/early/2011/12/21/peds.20112663.full.pdf (exploring a review of the literature, drawing conclusions from 99
sources regarding the long-term consequences of psychological and physiological
wellbeing).
48. Family courts are too often denying custody to protective mothers. See INTER-AM.
COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, PETITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS at ¶¶ 6–33, 444 (2007),
http://www.protectiveparents.com/Petition-on-Human-Rights.pdf (petitioning for
consideration based on reviews of academic literature and research studies finding
that current child-custody practices are inherently biased against women/mothers to
the extent that they constitute violation of the Charter of the Organization of
American States, a Pan-American treaty); AMY NEUSTEIN & MICHAEL LESHER,
FROM MADNESS TO MUTINY: WHY WOMEN ARE RUNNING FROM THE FAMILY
COURTS-AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2005) (examining cases in which
mothers who believed that their children had experienced sexual abuse at the hands
of their fathers were doubted, distrusted, or punished for reporting their concerns to
the court); NEUSTEIN & LESHER, supra, at xiii–xix; Joan S. Meier, Getting Real about
Abuse and Alienation: A Critique of Drozd and Olesen’s Decision Tree, 7 J. CHILD
CUSTODY 219, 228–29 (2010) (presenting anecdotes from five cases in different state
court systems in which mothers and children were not believed by the courts, with
the children being removed in three of the five cases); Joan S. Meier, A Historical
Perspective on Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation, 6 J. CHILD
CUSTODY 232, 244 (2009) [hereinafter Meier, A Historical Perspective] (presenting
criticisms of both Parental Alienation Syndrome and non-syndrome feelings of
alienation in light of historical evidence of the resilient nature of parent-child
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49

abusive parents receive custody, because courts do a poor job of evalu50
ating evidence. In this section, we review and assess the scientific rigor

relationships and studies showing a lack of empirical basis for alienation claims);
Joaquin Sapien, Call in Congress for Family Court Reform, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 13,
2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/call-in-congress-for-family-court-reform
(calling for family court reform after court-appointed psychologist failed to recognize
a father’s potential for dangerousness and failed to limit unsupervised visitation,
despite the mother’s pleas to the contrary and allegations of abuse, and the father
drowned all three children during an unsupervised custody visit); Joaquin Sapien, For
New York Families in Custody Fights, a ‘Black Hole’ of Oversight, PROPUBLICA (Mar.
17, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/for-new-york-families-in-custodyfights-a-black-hole-of-oversight (detailing an individual case study example in which
injustice and a destructive aftermath arose from a court-appointed evaluator’s lack of
professional oversight or established professional standards for making custody
determinations); Laurie Udesky, Custody in Crisis: How Family Courts Nationwide Put
Children in Danger, 100REPORTERS (Dec. 1, 2016), https://100r.org/2016/12/
custody-2 (describing three cases wherein abusers gained custody over mothers
despite objective evidence of child sexual and child abuse); GERALDINE B. STAHLY ET
AL., ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY DISPUTES: THE EXPERIENCE OF PROTECTIVE
MOTHERS (2011), https://www.caprotectiveparents.org/research (follow hyperlink
under “California Protective Parents Association” section) (last visited Apr. 28, 2017)
(examining survey of 66 mothers and one father, self-selected as “protective parents,”
of whom 98 [percent] felt discredited for trying to protect their children, and over 60
[percent] lost custody); Jennifer Backer, The Strange Advocacy for “Parental Alienation
Syndrome,” PSYCHOL. TODAY: FOR THE LOVE OF WISDOM (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-love-wisdom/201512/the-strangeadvocacy-parental-alienation-syndrome (expounding on the idea that courts’
consideration of so-called Parental Alienation Syndrome poses a risk to children as it
lacks sufficient basis for reliability and there are “no studies that test the effectiveness
of their recommended treatments”).
49. See Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection:
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL. & L. 657, 668–71 (2002) [hereinafter Meier, Domestic Violence]
(examining two case studies in the context of current literature). Courts are too often
awarding custody to abusive fathers. See Sharon K. Araji & Rebecca L. Bosek,
Domestic Violence, Contested Child Custody and the Courts: Findings from Five Studies,
in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD CUSTODY: LEGAL STRATEGIES AND
POLICY ISSUES 6-2 to 6-31 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010)
(exploring ideas garnered from small-scale survey experiment involving 34 victims of
domestic violence from the Alaska court systems and meta-analysis of similar, related
studies conducted in other states; alone, each study’s generalizability may be limited,
but in considered in conjunction they provide useful qualitative insight); SALLY F.
GOLDFARB, UNITED NATIONS DIV. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, THE
LEGAL RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: RECENT REFORMS AND CONTINUING CHALLENGES 9 (2008),
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw_legislation_2008/expertpapers/
EGMGPLVAW%20Paper%20(Sally%20Goldfarb).pdf (“[I]t remains extremely rare
for a court to deny a father access to his children, even when he has committed
domestic violence.”); LUNDY BANCROFT ET AL., THE BATTERER AS PARENT:
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of the studies and data and discuss how to implement measures that
protect children.
The American Academy of Pediatrics has documented that a parent
committing domestic violence against the other parent in front of the
51
child is a form of child abuse that significantly contributes to negative
52
physical and mental health outcomes in adulthood. A home with daily
violence wherein one partner (most commonly a man in cases of coer53
cive abuse) physically or verbally assaults the other partner (most
54
commonly a woman) in front of his or her children turns those chil55
dren into victims of that violence as well. Such environments negative56
ly affect children who grow up in them, and children who witness
57
more family violence tend to suffer as a result. However, child adjustment to domestic violence depends on factors associated with the child,

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.

57.

ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 189–90
(2nd ed. 2012); Evan Stark, Rethinking Custody Evaluation in Cases Involving
Domestic Violence, 6 J. CHILD CUSTODY 287, 296–99 (2009) [hereinafter Stark,
Rethinking Custody] (reviewing literature analyzing outcomes and responses of family
courts in domestic violence cases).
See Stark, Rethinking Custody, supra note 49, at 290 (noting that victims and children
are not believed, even when police corroborate abuse).
See generally AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 43, at 1–5.
Id.
See infra Section I.F. for analyses of this gender difference.
According to statistics from 2015, in the United States, one out of every four women
and one out of every ten men experienced “sexual violence, physical violence, and/or
stalking by an intimate partner and reported an intimate partner violence-related impact during their lifetime.” CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2015 DATA BRIEF UPDATED RELEASE 7 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/2015databrief508.pdf (detailing findings from the National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NISVS) obtained from 10,081 completed random-digit-dial telephone
surveys conducted in 2015). Although statistical validity analyses were performed to
evaluate findings and reported data were found to be reliable, the findings should be
considered in light of the self-selective nature of telephone surveys and the likelihood
of a lowered response-rate or non-response bias due to factors such as stigma, current
or continuing instances of abuse and trauma, and/or extant concerns related to safety.
Id. at 12–14. Approximately 36.4 percent of women, or 43.6 million women, have
experienced some type of intimate partner violence in their lifetime, with physical violence by an intimate partner being the most common type. Id. at 8. More than 36.4
percent of women reported “experienc[ing] psychological aggression by an intimate
partner during their lifetime.” Id. at 7.
See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 43.
See Roberta Hibbard et al., Psychological Maltreatment, 130 PEDIATRICS 372, 373–74
(2012) (reviewing the literature from 49 sources, placing emphasis on the recognition
and identification of psychological maltreatment as a form of ACE, and the potential
negative consequences it can have on child development).
Graham-Bermann et al., supra note 46.
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the mother, and the family as a whole, as parental functioning is critical
58
to the child’s well-being. Children who are more resilient tend to experience less violence, have fewer worries and fears, and tend to have
59
mothers with more stable emotional health and better parenting skills.
At the other extreme, devastatingly, sometimes these children are mur60
61
dered by the abusive parent. As a result, contrary to current practices,
reducing children’s exposure to domestic violence within a home needs
to be one of the most important goals in determining custody. In determining what is in the best interests of the child, this should come first
when considering whether to require protective measures that restrict or
deny parenting time based upon a judgment that it would cause “serious
endangerment” to the child’s welfare. Courts are not doing this well
62
63
within the United States or internationally. These circumstances
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See R. Dianne Bartlow, Judicial Response to Court-Assisted Child Murders, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD CUSTODY: LEGAL STRATEGIES AND
POLICY ISSUES 12-1 to 12-42 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2016)
(presenting interviews with family court judges across 21 states, with emphasis on jurisdictions that had experienced child homicide at the hand of a parent who had been
accused of domestic violence); Barry Goldstein, What Can Be Learned From CourtAssisted Murder Cases?, 5 FAM. & INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 369, 370 (2013)
(analyzing errors in management and consideration of family court cases and the potential for this mishandling to have devastating consequences for the children whom
the process is intended to protect); U.S. Divorce Child Murder Data, CTR. FOR
JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, http://www.centerforjudicialexcellence.org/cje-projectsinitiatives/child-murder-data (last visited Jan. 12, 2019) (reviewing archival data collected by the Center for Judicial Excellence, finding that at least 665 children have
been murdered by a parent since 2008). Cases were included based on news coverage
mention of “divorce,” “separation,” “custody,” “visitation,” and/or “child support.”
Id; see also 12/5/16 Press Release: 58 Children Murdered by a Parent Who Could Have
FOR
JUD.
EXCELLENCE
(Dec.
5,
2016),
Been
Saved,
CTR.
http://www.centerforjudicialexcellence.org/2016/12/05/12516-press-release-58children-murdered-by-a-parent-who-could-have-been-saved (recounting 44 cases, including 58 children from across the United States between 2008 and 2016 in which
the children were killed during court-ordered unsupervised contact with a parent,
when the court had been made aware of allegations of that parent’s dangerousness).
61. How Many Children are Court-Ordered into Unsupervised Contact with an Abusive
Parent after Divorce?, LEADERSHIP COUNCIL ON CHILD ABUSE & INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.leadershipcouncil.org/1/med/PR3.html (estimating that each year, 58,500 children are put at risk of physical or psychological
harm during court-ordered unsupervised visitation with an abusive parent). While
useful for illustrative purposes, the report uses a formula of estimations to reach a
best-guess. STAHLY, supra note 48.
62. Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions, supra note 42, at 57–58.
63. International Association of Victims of Parental Alienation, FACEBOOK (last visited
Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/groups/249283921943335.
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highlight the dire need to support parents who are making efforts to
64
protect their children.
In addition to seeking to reduce future domestic violence, courts
need to consider protective factors that can reduce the harm to children
who have already been exposed to domestic violence. Children tend to
be harmed less when they are protected by a supportive, non-abusive
65
66
parent or have parents with good parenting skills. Other factors such
as family support; secure attachment to other caregivers; living in a sup67
portive, safe, and close community; and not experiencing other forms
68
of trauma contribute to children enduring less harm. These protective
factors need to be considered in custody evaluations and evaluator recommendations.
Judges and other professionals (child representatives, guardians ad
litem, or custody evaluators) cannot rely on intuition in these cases, as
69
many aspects of domestic violence are counterintuitive. Instead, those

64. See Stark, Rethinking Custody, supra note 49, at 297–98; Lundy Bancroft, Organizing
in Defense of Protective Mothers: The Custody Rights Movement, in DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD CUSTODY: LEGAL STRATEGIES AND POLICY ISSUES 171 to 17-13 (Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010) (qualitatively investigating the underpinnings of the parents’ rights/custody rights movement which undermine women’s success in obtaining favorable outcomes in family court determinations).
65. Shonkoff & Garner, supra note 47.
66. Abigail H. Gewirtz, David S. DeGarmo & Amanuel Medhanie, Effects of Mother’s
Parenting Practices on Child Internalizing Trajectories Following Partner Violence, 25 J.
FAM. PSYCHOL. 29 (2011) (detailing correlational research with regression analyses of
findings from a short-term, longitudinal study of 35 mother-child pairs—with eligibility defined as mother’s exposure to physical intimate partner violence within the
past one to three weeks, where her child witnessed the incident—including interviews
and parent-child observational task). Constructs were measured with validated instruments and results of prediction models use estimates with robust standard errors
giving confidence to the reliability of findings. Graham-Bermann et al., supra note
46.
67. Garmezy & Masten, supra note 46; Graham-Bermann et al., supra note 46; Owen et
al., supra note 46; Werner, supra note 46; Werner & Smith, supra note 46.
68. Graham-Bermann et al., supra note 46.
69. See Alana Bowman, A Matter of Justice: Overcoming Juror Bias in Prosecutions of
Batterers through Expert Witness Testimony of the Common Experiences of Battered
Women, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 219, 242–50 (1992); see generally
Laurie S. Kohn, Barriers to Reliable Credibility Assessments: Domestic Violence VictimWitnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 733 (2002) (documenting
situations in which incorrect intuitions on the dynamics of domestic violence, its
causes, and impacts, affect judicial decisions on orders of protection and other legal
decisions involving domestic violence); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin,
Seeing the Wrecking Ball in Motion: Ex Parte Protection Orders and the Realities of
Domestic Violence, 32 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 13 (2017) (review of how incorrect
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in charge of making custody decisions need to rely upon well-designed,
validated research. They need to be educated and trained on practices
informed by this greater depth of validated understanding, rather than
70
practices from poor intuition. Thus, these professionals must be able
to determine whether studies have been well-designed. For example,
professionals should understand how science accumulates knowledge
over time and give particular attention to meta-analyses that synopsize
and assemble evidence accumulated by many scientific studies. They
should also examine the definitions used in studies and how those definitions can impact policy implications; they must be aware when previ71
ous research has been invalidated (i.e., Parent Alienation Syndrome)
and must reject incorrect assumptions that are often held by the public
72
at large (such as the belief that courts favor mothers). Finally, they
intuitions about domestic violence affect decisions on whether to grant emergency
orders of protection and the cognitive psychology behind this).
70. There are many misconceptualizations and misunderstandings of domestic violence
that lead to poor decision-making by courts. See Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions,
supra note 42 (finding that domestic violence is often overlooked by family courts in
the decision-making process); Stark, Rethinking Custody, supra note 49, at 290.
71. DIANE M. PRANZO, CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION DISPUTES IN SWEDEN AND
THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF LOVE, JUSTICE, AND KNOWLEDGE 67–83 (2013)
(comparing the effects of cultural and social settings of the U.S. and Sweden, which
use comparable legal standards in contested family court cases, on the perception of
cases involving child custody and/or visitation rights); Rita Berg, Parental Alienation
Analysis, Domestic Violence, and Gender Bias in Minnesota Courts, 29 L. & INEQ. 5,
24–25 (2011) (exploring archival data from Minnesota courts to determine the effect
of consideration of the concept of Parental Alienation Syndrome on family court cases decided by Minnesota court systems). Analysis of data reflects an “anti-mother
gender bias.” However, it appears that the sample size is low, and data have not been
analyzed to determine validity, reliability, or general applicability. Meier & Dickson,
supra note 2, at 311 (reviewing literature on the concept of “Parental Alienation,”
and exploring a multivariate empirical-mapping analysis of the ways in which family
court systems have used it in custody determination cases). Study authors caution,
however, that cases analyzed were selected because they had all progressed to the appeals process, which often does not occur in child custody cases, and thus the research
may not be representative of the majority of family court cases (for example, these
cases tend to skew towards the party with the financial resources to mount appeals
and thus favor men). Additionally, findings were derived from coding of variables
and conclusions completed by a single researcher rather than from a composite of
scores by two or more independent researchers, potentially skewing results towards
that lone researcher’s inevitable biases.
72. In fact, courts tend to favor fathers. See BATTERED MOTHERS’ TESTIMONY PROJECT,
WELLESLEY CENTERS FOR WOMEN, BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: A HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD CUSTODY IN THE
MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY COURTS 3 (2002), https://www.wcwonline.org/vmfiles/
execsumm4.pdf. This report discusses a four-part study of one-to-one interviews of
40 battered mothers who had experienced family court litigation; analysis of written

2019]

DOMESTIC

VIOLENCE

IN

CHILD CUSTODY CASES

19

73

must look beyond veneers of friendliness. Knowing how to correctly
evaluate studies ensures that professionals are relying on validated bodies
of knowledge. There have been a great number of previous psychological research studies on the effects of domestic violence, child well-being,
and child custody; however, not all of that research has equal validity.
For instance, retrospective self-report studies are often conducted in this
field of research, but findings must be taken in light of concerns about

surveys completed by 31 advocates for battered women; five focus groups, comprising
a total of 23 advocates and survivors of domestic violence, exploring the possible effects of demographic considerations on outcomes; and one-hour interviews of 16 individual state actors selected based on either identification by the women and/or advocates, or on the fact that they possessed specific knowledge of the family court
system. Id. at 4. The study examined incidents in which the Massachusetts family
courts violated basic human rights standards, and found that fathers who seek custody are favored over women because “mothers are held to a different and higher standard than fathers.” Id. at 3. Although the study is valuable, its authors note that the results are not corroborated for statistical validity, and also may not be generalizable
outside of the state of Massachusetts. Id. at 5. Mary A. Kernic et al., Children in the
Crossfire: Child Custody Determinations among Couples with a History of Intimate Partner Violence, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 991, 1017 (2005) (detailing a retrospective cohort study of 324 cases with intimate partner violence and 532 cases without intimate partner violence that examined the effects of a history of intimate
partner violence and determination of child custody agreements, as moderated by
substantiation of the history of intimate partner violence (defined by a history of police reports, court records related to protection orders filed prior to the dissolution,
and/or a notation of allegations or substantiation in the dissolution case file)). The
ability to generalize findings, however, may be limited based on the fact that the
study population consisted of individuals specifically from Seattle, where the male
partner was the perpetrator of intimate partner violence and the female partner was
the victim. MASS. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE COURT
SYSTEM IN MASSACHUSETTS, reprinted in 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745, 748, 825 (1990)
(reporting on The Gender Bias Study of the Court System in Massachusetts, an official report from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which found that, despite
the pervasive belief that mothers are favored in custody disputes, “[f]athers who actively seek custody obtain either primary or joint physical custody over 70 [percent]
of the time”) (emphasis in original).
73. Allison C. Morrill et al., Child Custody and Visitation Decisions When the Father has
Perpetrated Violence Against the Mother, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1076, 1092,
1101 (2005) (discussing correlational research with regression analysis, finding that
the presumption against custody to batterers was superseded by a heuristic in favor of
the “friendly parent”). Scores were obtained from examination of 393 custody and
visitation orders across six states in situations where the father had perpetrated intimate partner violence against the mother, as well as from a survey of 60 judges selected for having entered those orders. Id. at 1076. Extensive analysis of the relationships
suggests statistical significance, although several of the measures used to survey the
judges in this study have yet to be empirically validated.
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74

the accuracy of the individual’s report. The goal of this Section is to
identify the best available information about issues related to custody in
cases that involve domestic violence, and analyze the policy implications
and best practices for professionals suggested by that research.
1. Scientific Standards for Inclusion of Articles in this
Literature Review
This Article presents the highest-quality objective, scientific research available. There are a few instances, however, where there are insufficient objective scientific studies on a topic, and we rely on preliminary scientific evidence or expert opinion gained over many years of
working in the field. To address concerns over the robustness of the research, we have included notes on its quality in our footnotes. The best
evidence for conclusions comes from meta-analyses that mathematically
capture the results of many experiments and represent the gold standard
in the field of psychology. This is followed by qualitative literature re75
views.
We also cite the empirical results of original studies such as exper76
77
78
iments, correlational research with regression analyses, and structur79
al equation modeling. For every study cited, we note whether it is (1) a
meta-analysis; (2) a qualitative literature review; (3) an experiment; (4)

74. Retrospective study designs are those in which “participants are required to evaluate
exposure variables retrospectively using a self-reporting method, such as selfadministered questionnaires.” Alaa Althubaiti, Information Bias in Health Research:
Definition, Pitfalls, and Adjustment Methods, 9 J. MULTIDISCIPLINARY HEALTHCARE
211, 213 (2016).
75. Anthony Petrosino & Julia Lavenberg, Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: Best Evidence on “What Works” for Criminal Justice Decision Makers, 8 W. CRIMINOLOGY
REV. 1 (2007).
76. Experiments are studies in which variables are manipulated to see how those manipulations affect measured outcomes. See C. JAMES GOODWIN, RESEARCH IN
PSYCHOLOGY: METHODS AND DESIGN 522 (4th ed. 2005).
77. Correlational research involves taking two or more variables and statistically parsing
the relationships between them. KENNETH BORDENS & BRUCE ABBOTT, RESEARCH
DESIGN AND METHODS: A PROCESS APPROACH 28 (8th ed. 2013).
78. Regression analysis is a statistical analysis that looks at the relationships between
measured variables. GOODWIN, supra note 76, at 527.
79. Structural equation modeling is a method of multivariate statistical analysis which
uses multiple regression analyses and factor analyses to analyze structural relationships
between measured and latent variables, and to evaluate the dependencies between,
and independent of, the factors. See TENKO RAYKOV & GEORGE A. MARCOULIDES, A
FIRST COURSE IN STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING 1–2 (2000).
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correlational research with regression analyses or structural equation
80
81
modeling; or (5) a case study.
For literature reviews, we identify the number of studies evaluated.
For original research such as experiments, correlational research, and
case studies, we note the sample size and characteristics of the sample.
We assess whether the sample is appropriate for the research question.
We note operational definitions where appropriate. For example, if our
analysis relied upon a study of victims/survivors, we note whether this
classification was based upon self-identification or was there external
verification (i.e., police calls to 911). If our analysis relied upon correlational research with all of the well-known shortcomings of correlational
research, we note these shortcomings and whether the researchers col82
lected the data themselves or whether it was archival, as well as the
source of the archival information (i.e., court cases). We note odd operational definitions, especially if they might have biased the conclusions.
For example, we would be particularly skeptical of research that would
classify cases where accusations of abuse could not be verified by independent, objective evidence as instances where the accused abuser was
exonerated. We note any violations of established research design standards, confounding variables in experiments, obvious third variable issues
in correlational research for which the researchers did not control, and
83
84
85
validity issues (internal validity, external validity, face validity, con86
87
struct validity, study mortality issues, etc.). Lastly, we note any con88
cerns over statistical significance and reliability.

80. Structural equation modeling is a statistical analysis technique used to analyze the
structural relationships between measured variables and latent constructs. Id. at 1.
81. A case study discusses a specific instance of something or a small subset. These studies
often serve to demonstrate the existence of a phenomenon without necessarily generalizing that phenomenon to the broader population. GOODWIN, supra note 76, at
520.
82. Both researcher-collected and archival data have benefits. When researchers collect
their own data, often more is known and reported about the data collection processes,
which can affect how data are interpreted. Archival data sets are often larger, which
by the law of large numbers should produce more accurate means. Id. at 336–39.
83. Internal validity is a measure indicating that an experiment successfully isolated the
factor of interest, meaning that no other variables could have created the observed effects on the dependent measures. Id. at 524.
84. External validity means that the study results apply broadly to the general population
of interest, not just to the particular circumstances of that study. Id. at 522.
85. Face validity “occurs when a measure appears to be a reasonable measure of some
trait.” Id.
86. Construct validity “occurs when the measure being used accurately assesses some hypothetical construct” and “refers to whether the operational definition used for independent and dependent variables are valid.” Id. at 520–21.
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2. The Effects of Child Exposure to Domestic Violence

Emotional effects. A common myth associated with domestic violence is that if children are merely exposed to domestic violence, and not
physically harmed, there will be no serious, long-term adverse effects on
these children. This notion is false. Children who witness domestic violence can suffer serious emotional symptoms including internalizing
symptoms (e.g., anxiety, depression, fear, shame, social withdrawal, somatic complaints, bedwetting, poor concentration) and externalizing
89
symptoms (e.g., aggression, impulsivity, bullying, criminal behaviors).
Several meta-analyses have been conducted that discuss the effects on
90
children who witness domestic violence between parents. Two studies
led by CDC researchers found long-term negative effects on people who
had adverse childhood experiences. The first, a study by Shanta R.
Dube, found that there is a greater likelihood of adolescent substance
91
use. The second, a study led by Daniel P. Chapman, found a greater
87. Sometimes participants leave a study early, and results can be explained by which participants left rather than any differences in independent or predictor variables.
KENNETH S. BORDENS & BRUCE B. ABBOTT, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS: A
PROCESS APPROACH 265–66 (4th ed. 1999).
88. Sometimes results can happen by chance. Statistical analyses measure the likelihood
that the obtained results were due to chance; if it is unlikely that the results are due to
chance, then it is likely that they were due to differences in the independent or predictor variables. Id. at 442–44.
89. Jacquelyn C. Campbell & Linda A. Lewandowski, Mental and Physical Health Effects
of Intimate Partner Violence on Women and Children, 20 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N.
AM. 353, 361–62 (1997), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0193-953X(05)70317-8.
90. See, e.g., Sarah E. Evans et al., Exposure to Domestic Violence: A Meta-Analysis of Child
and Adolescent Outcomes, 13 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 131, 131 (2008) (analyzing the results of six studies demonstrating a significant relationship between a
child’s exposure to domestic violence and his or her internalizing and externalizing of
trauma symptoms); Stephanie Holt et al., The Impact of Exposure to Domestic Violence
on Children and Young People: A Review of the Literature, 32 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 797, 797 (2008) (reviewing findings from 11 years of studies indicating
that children exposed to domestic violence in the home are at greater risk for behavioral and emotional problems); Katherine M. Kitzmann et al., Child Witnesses to Domestic Violence: A Meta-Analytic Review, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
339, 339 (2003) (discussing findings from 118 studies demonstrating a significant relationship between exposure to domestic violence and harm to children); David A.
Wolfe et al., The Effects of Children’s Exposure to Domestic Violence: A Meta-Analysis
and Critique, 6 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 171, 171 (2003) (detailing
indications from 41 studies finding that children’s exposure to domestic violence is
significantly correlated with emotional and behavioral problems).
91. Shanta R. Dube et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences and the Association with Ever
Using Alcohol and Initiating Alcohol Use during Adolescence, 38 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 444, 444 (2006) (examining a retrospective self-report cohort-study of
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risk of depression among adults who reported witnessing their mother
92
being abused as children.
Studies have found a relationship between adverse childhood expe93
riences and emotional and physical health problems in adulthood. Adverse childhood experiences include events such as children witnessing
their mother being treated violently. This can result in physical and
emotional consequences for the child when the body’s stress response is
repeatedly triggered by such events, and there is an absence of availabil94
ity of adult protection. For example, adverse childhood experiences
have been associated with health concerns and lower life satisfaction,
more frequent symptoms of depression and anxiety, tobacco product
95
use, problematic alcohol use, behaviors that place adults at risk for
HIV infection, disabilities caused by health problems, as well as diabe96
tes, heart attack, stroke, and heart disease.
Physiological effects. Biological responses to stress caused by domestic violence are not only immediately harmful to the child’s health,

92.

93.

94.
95.
96.

8,417 adults across California who completed surveys about adverse childhood experiences). While the results seem to indicate a negative correlation between the number of adverse childhood experiences experienced and the age at which the individual
first consumed alcohol, the study fails to account for confounding third variables outside of the family environment which may influence early introduction to alcohol.
Daniel P. Chapman et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences and the Risk of Depressive
Disorders in Adulthood, 82 J. OF AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 217, 221 (2004) (examining
a retrospective self-report cohort-study of 9,508 adults in California and found an increased risk of depressive disorders among those whose mothers had been battered).
Jennifer A. Campbell et al., Associations Between Adverse Childhood Experiences, HighRisk Behaviors, and Morbidity in Adulthood, 50 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 344, 344–
46 (2016) (analyzing data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, a telephone survey of 48,526 adults across five states, conducted by the CDC). Relationships between scores measuring ACE and risky behavior or comorbidity in adulthood
were analyzed using multiple logistic regression analysis, controlling for covariates
and relevant confounding variables. Id. at 344. Joshua Patrick Mersky et al., Impacts
of Adverse Childhood Experiences on Health, Mental Health, and Substance Use in Early
Adulthood: A Cohort Study of an Urban, Minority Sample in the U.S., 37 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 917, 917–20, 923 (2013) (reviewing adult survey data obtained
from 1,142 participants (74.2% of all participants) from the Chicago Longitudinal
Study, which tracks development of a cohort of individuals from low-income, urban
families, born between 1979-1980). The main effects were analyzed with multivariate
logistic regression and OLS regression, and the findings are statistically robust. Id. at
917. However, despite the longitudinal nature of the CLS study, adverse childhood
experiences and outcomes were measured cross-sectionally for each individual, which
means that results are “more safely interpreted as correlational than as causal.” Id. at
923.
Campbell et al., supra note 93 at 344; Mersky et al., supra note 93, at 917.
Mersky et al., supra note 93, at 917.
Campbell et al., supra note 93, at 345.
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97

but the effects can also become chronic. Adult health conditions, such
as heart disease, obesity, and substance use disorders have been linked to
98
adverse childhood experiences. The release of the stress hormone, cortisol, is associated with adverse health effects among children who wit99
ness domestic violence. The “fight or flight” response can be activated
97. Shonkoff & Garner, supra note 47, at 235.
98. Id. at 237.
99. See Leah C. Hibel et al., Maternal Sensitivity Buffers the Adrenocortical Implications of
Intimate Partner Violence Exposure During Early Childhood, 23 DEV. & PSYCHOL. 689
(2011) (detailing a longitudinal study of 1,102 mother-infant pairs to examine children’s levels of cortisol (measured from saliva samples collected after an activity intended to stimulate an emotional response) between infancy and early childhood,
with relation to intimate partner violence exposure). Findings indicate that children
exposed to domestic violence did not have a normal decrease in cortisol reactivity after exposure to a stressful event and were not able to recover as quickly as compared
to children who had not been exposed to violence in the home. Id. at 689. Limitations include the fact that this study examines only the epidemiological impact without relation to other potential extant psychobiological or psychological factors, and
therefore many not afford a look at the whole picture. Id. at 698–99. On the other
hand, the sample used in this study was representative of the population from which
it was drawn, a lack of which presents a concern for generalizability in similar studies.
Id. at 691. Melissa Sturge-Apple et al., Interparental Violence, Maternal Emotional
Unavailability, and Children’s Cortisol Functioning in Family Contexts, 48 DEV.
PSYCHOL. 237 (2012) (discussing findings from a study of 201 sets of mother-toddler
dyads who had been exposed to domestic violence, in order to explore the relationships between the child’s adrenocortical response stimulated by emotional stress (as
measured by salivary tests on three separate occasions), domestic violence (as measured by maternal report), and the mother’s emotional availability to the child (as
measured by maternal report and objective observer evaluation)). Findings indicate
that domestic violence and maternal emotional unavailability are both correlated with
a child’s experienced adrenocortical response. Id. at 237. However, since the present
inquiry only examined the mother-child relationship and does not take into account
mediating or moderating effects of the child’s relationship with his or her father, conclusions cannot be generalized to instances where the father is the victim of domestic
violence. Jennifer H. Suor et al., Tracing Differential Pathways of Risk: Associations
Among Family, Adversity, Cortisol, and Cognitive Functioning in Childhood, 86 CHILD
DEV. 1142 (2015) (discussing continued assessment of Sturge-Apple et al., supra, in
the context of a prospective longitudinal study of 201 mother-child pairs where data
were collected at 3 annual intervals). Findings suggest that exposure to greater
amounts of domestic violence and maternal emotional unavailability are both predictive factors of cortisol reactivity, which is in turn correlated with lower levels of cognitive functioning by the time the child reaches the age of four. Id. at 1142. Nissa R.
Towe-Goodman et al., Interparental Aggression and Infant Patterns of Adrenocortical
and Behavioral Stress Responses, 54 DEV. PSYCHOL. 685 (2012) (examining a study
and latent profile analysis of 735 infants from low socioeconomic status circumstances (selected from an already ongoing longitudinal research study of family dynamics
and child development in low-income communities) exploring the relationships between physiological cortical stress responses and domestic violence from both physiological and behavioral perspectives). Statistical analysis using a latent profile model
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as the child experiences stressors throughout his or her life, causing the
100
nervous system to overreact to any future stressful event. This inhibits
the child’s ability to process their environment clearly and respond
adaptively to minor, everyday stressors, as any environmental stressor is
101
likely to trigger the child’s stress response.
Transmission of Domestic Violence Trauma. Childhood exposure
to domestic violence can result in the transmission of trauma- and
102
stress-related symptoms. Several reviews and meta-analyses have
discussed the fact that domestic violence can become normalized and
lead to intergenerational transmission of domestic violence as the child
103
grows into adulthood and has a family of his or her own. Behavioral

100.
101.
102.

103.

showed that children who had been exposed to greater levels of domestic violence
were more likely to have a greater cortical stress response. Id. at 685. Nevertheless,
study authors caution that methods used were both “exploratory and sample dependent.” Id. at 695.
See Hibel et al., supra note 99; Sturge-Apple et al., supra note 99; Suor et al., supra
note 99; Towe-Goodman et al., supra note 99.
See Hibel et al., supra note 99; Sturge-Apple et al., supra note 99; Suor et al., supra
note 99; Towe-Goodman et al., supra note 99.
See generally Constance L. Chapple, Examining Intergenerational Violence: Violent Role
Modeling or Weak Parental Controls?, 18 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 143 (2003) (examining data from a 200-question self-report survey of 980 students in grades nine
through eleven in Southerntown, Arkansas, who reported prior dating experience).
Multivariate and bivariate analyses were performed to evaluate the relationships between parental violence, parental control, and dating violence. Id. at 151. See also
Amy R. Murrell et al., Characteristic of Domestic Violence Offenders: Associations with
Childhood Exposure to Violence, 22 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 523 (2007) (detailing a study of
1,099 adult male batterers ordered for assessment at a center for domestic violence to
assess the correlation between type, severity, frequency of violent behavior perpetrated, and the amount of exposure to violence experiences during childhood (measured
through retrospective self-report)). Although the results obtained in this study are
congruent with findings from previous studies (positive correlation between experiencing violence as a child and perpetrating domestic violence as an adult), a shortcoming of this study is a lack of comparison/control group of non-violent individuals
who had been exposed to violence as a child. Id. at 528–29. See also Kimberly A.
Rhoades, Children’s Responses to Interparental Conflict: A Meta-Analysis of Their Associations with Child Adjustment, 79 CHILD DEV. 1942 (2008) (expounding upon a
meta-analysis of 71 studies coded to examine the relationship between scores obtained from measures of children’s responses to interparental conflict and scores from
measures of children’s adjustment). Study authors note, however, that interpretation
of the results is constrained by unclear direction of causality, and some methods of
data collection used have not been empirically evaluated for accuracy. Id. at 11.
See generally Sandra M. Stith et al., The Intergenerational Transmission of Spouse
Abuse: A Meta-Analysis, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 640 (2000) (detailing meta-analysis
of 39 studies, totaling 12,981 individuals, examining the relationship between growing up in a home with violence and becoming part of a violent heterosexual marital
relationship as an adult).
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modeling is a type of intergenerational transmission whereby children
who witness or experience violence engage in abusive behaviors
104
themselves and may develop future psychopathology. A study led by
Amy R. Murrell, a member of the Clinical Psychology faculty at the
University of North Texas in Denton, Texas, found that males who
witness domestic violence in childhood tend to commit domestic
violence later on in their lives in the same way that males who were
abused during their own childhoods tend to abuse children in
105
adulthood and commit more acts of general violence. Similarly,
offenders of dating violence tend to have a history of witnessing parental
106
violence.
These issues affect juvenile delinquency. Female juvenile delinquents are more frequently victims of physical and sexual abuse, neglect,
107
and maltreatment as compared to males. Male juvenile offenders,
however, tend to commit more sexual and felony offenses against others,
and the association between childhood victimization and later offending
108
was found to be stronger among males.
B. Professionals Involved in Child Custody Decision-Making Need Special
Training to Recognize, Understand, and Properly Evaluate Evidence of
Domestic Violence and Claims of Alienation
The counterintuitive aspects of domestic violence not only make it
critical that scientific evidence—rather than intuition—is used in these
child custody cases, but also that professionals use well-designed scientific research to set policy and to identify and follow best practices.
Thus, professionals need to be educated and trained on topics related to
domestic violence because untrained evaluators often make unwarranted

104.
105.
106.
107.

Murrell et al., supra note 102, at 525.
Id.
Chapple, supra note 102, at 151–52.
Jessica J. Asscher et al., Gender Differences in the Impact of Abuse and Neglect Victimization on Adolescent Offending Behavior, 30 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 215, 215 (2015) (examining hierarchical logistic regression analysis of scores obtained on the Washington
State Juvenile Court Assessment instrument by 10,111 minors ages 12 to 18 who had
been found guilty of a criminal act by a juvenile court and were self-reported victims
of abuse). Based on the nature of the study, findings must be considered in light of
the fact that each individual in the sample was selected based on having committed a
criminal offense, which may result in inflated apparent strength of the relationship
between having experienced abuse and engaging in criminal behavior. Id. at 216.
108. Id. at 215.
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assumptions, misinterpret evidence, and make poor decisions. For example, untrained evaluators often assume that divorce will solve the
domestic violence problem when, in fact, the purpose of domestic violence is often a desire for control, and separation from the abuser can
110
actually exacerbate the problem. Not understanding the long-term effects of exposure to domestic violence, these untrained evaluators assume that an abuser’s relationship with children is separate from the relationship with the spouse and that domestic violence should not play a
111
role in deciding child custody. They may be unaware of the complexities of domestic violence that make family court, attorneys, and mediation or other court services inadequate assessors of the needs of abused
112
women and their children.
Untrained evaluators will also often overlook evidence due to erroneous beliefs about the nature of domestic violence incidences and their
113
underlying causes. Evaluators and judges tend to believe that survivors
of domestic violence make false allegations, and this belief is correlated
114
with these professionals holding other erroneous beliefs. For example,
a belief in false allegations of child abuse and/or domestic violence tends
to vary based on a person’s professional role. Judges, private attorneys,
and custody evaluators are inclined to believe that mothers make false
allegations, while professionals such as domestic violence workers and
115
legal aid attorneys tend to believe that fathers make false allegations.
Likewise, Michael S. Davis, Ph.D., Chris S. O’Sullivan, Ph.D.,
Kim Susser, JD, and Hon. Marjory D. Fields, JD, investigated the beliefs, the custody assessment process, and the recommendations of
court-appointed psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers who
116
evaluated cases where allegations of domestic violence were present.

109. Erickson & O’Sullivan, supra note 45, at 10–11 (stating evaluators in the latter category tend to have “patriarchal” beliefs, which dictate their interpretations of the information they acquire); Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45, at 1695–97; see also
SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42.
110. Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45, at 1712.
111. Id. at 1708–09.
112. See Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions, supra note 42, at 62.
113. Id. at 59–62.
114. See SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42, at 8
(finding that examples of these inaccurate beliefs include the ideas that survivors of
domestic violence wish to alienate children from the other parent; that domestic violence is not important in custody decisions; and that the child is affected when domestic violence survivors do not wish to co-parent).
115. LEORA N. ROSEN & MICHELLE ETLIN, THE HOSTAGE CHILD: SEX ABUSE
ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY DISPUTES 99–119 (1996).
116. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 42, at iii.
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The Davis et al. study found that evaluators’ assessments were predicted
by knowledge of domestic violence, and the parenting plans developed
by evaluators did not reflect greater safety in cases where there was more
117
severe physical, emotional, and social abuse between the couple. Custody and visitation conclusions were influenced more by the evaluator’s
knowledge of domestic violence than the facts of the individual cases.
This indicated that the outcome in court is largely dependent upon the
118
evaluator rather than the circumstances of the case.
Other investigations found that custody evaluators fail to determine whether domestic violence occurs as a result of a pattern of inflict119
ing control and abuse by the perpetrator. Custody evaluators then
minimize the effects of domestic violence on children and are unable to
gauge whether the perpetrator had the ability to engage in a parenting
120
or co-parenting role. This context can contribute to scenarios in
which the best interests of the child are not adequately assessed. Instead,
custody is recommended based on the presence of domestic violence,
121
rather than on how children were affected by the violence. All of these
unwarranted assumptions, misinterpretations, poor decisions, and overlooked evidence can cause untrained evaluators to fail to believe victims.
Perhaps the most problematic of these erroneous beliefs is the nowinvalidated Parental Alienation Syndrome framework, which posits that
mothers invent allegations of abuse for the purpose of alienating chil122
dren from their fathers and gaining custody. This theory has been re-

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at vii.
See id. at vii–viii.
See id. at vii.
PENCE ET AL., supra note 42, at 33.
See id. A number of studies have found that many custody evaluators lack meaningful
expertise in domestic violence and child abuse, and often make recommendations
that fail to fully take the abuse into account. See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 42, at i;
PENCE ET AL., supra note 42, at 6; SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’
BELIEFS supra note 42, at 120–21. Several other studies have found that custody evaluators tend to fall into two distinct groups: those who understand domestic violence
and believe it is important in the custody context, and those who lack such understanding, are skeptical of abuse allegations, and believe the allegations are evidence of
alienation. See also SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra
note 42, at 6 (finding that professional roles affected these judgments); Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45, at 1967–69 (finding a difference between feminist
custody evaluators and family violence custody evaluators); Erickson & O’Sullivan,
supra note 45, at 10–11 (presenting evidence for the importance of expertise among
custody evaluators).
122. See PRANZO, supra note 71, at 67, 69; Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 311; Berg,
supra note 71, at 5.
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123

peatedly discredited, yet it continues to affect judicial decision124
making. An analysis of the outcomes of 238 cases of custody disputes
that involved allegations of domestic violence and child abuse found
that alienation claims were more likely to be raised by fathers than by
125
mothers. Proof of domestic violence and child abuse by the father did
126
not improve a mother’s chances of winning. Claims of alienation were
much more likely to lead to successful outcomes for fathers than proof
of domestic violence and child abuse were likely to lead to successful
127
outcomes for mothers. Even today, the discredited Parental Alienation
Syndrome framework causes courts to label the survivor parent as unco128
operative or emotionally unstable. As a result, the evaluator may erroneously conclude that the survivor will not establish a positive relationship with the other parent (i.e., the perpetrator) and may recommend
that the abusive parent obtain custody or unsupervised visitation with
129
the children despite a known history of violence. These circumstances
can occur particularly in situations where the evaluator minimizes the
effect that violence can have on the children involved or believes that
the survivor’s behaviors and responses during the evaluation are a result
of psychopathology, rather than an expected response by a person who
130
has endured domestic violence. There appears to be a heuristic bias in
favor of the “nice,” “friendly” parent who cooperates and does not “bad
mouth” the other parent, even when the facts presented in such “bad
131
mouthing” are demonstrated to be true.
In addition to this heuristic bias, other counterintuitive features of
domestic violence create situations wherein courts fail to recognize the
dangers that victims experience and the dangers that persist even after
separation. Courts also fail to see how children are harmed by exposure
to domestic violence. Examples of the counterintuitive aspects of domestic violence include that domestic violence can happen to anyone

123. CLARE DALTON ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES,
NAVIGATING CUSTODY & VISITATION EVALUATIONS IN CASES WITH DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: A JUDGE’S GUIDE 14 n.28 (2006), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/
files/navigating_cust.pdf; see also Meier, A Historical Perspective, supra note 48, at
239; Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 317.
124. Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 317.
125. Id. at 321, 323.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. DALTON ET AL., supra note 123, at 25.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Morrill et al., supra note 73, at 1101 (finding that the presumption against custody to batterers was superseded by a provision that favors the “friendly parent”).
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from any socioeconomic status and is often not due to the perpetrator
having anger management problems, but rather a need for coercive con132
trol. Not all domestic violence is physical, as there are several forms of
abuse. A typical pattern of violence occurs in a cyclical trend where tension builds, abuse takes place, and the perpetrator makes apolo133
gies/excuses or amends to the victim. The passage of time between instances of domestic violence does not indicate an end to danger for the
victim and the notion that the victim has the choice to leave his/her
134
spouse/partner or to call the police is a common misconception.
Counterintuitively, victims of domestic violence often have numerous barriers that prevent them from fleeing abuse or ending the relationship, even when it is in order to ensure their safety. Women who
have recently separated from an intimate partner report experiencing violent episodes at a rate 40 times greater than those who are still mar135
ried. Separation assault is a threat that keeps many victims from seeking safety.
Also counterintuitively, in addition to direct harms inflicted on victims, children can be severely harmed from exposure to domestic violence. It is unfortunately common for people to be uninformed about
the numerous counterintuitive facts about domestic violence, which can
cause them to fail to believe victims; underestimate the danger that victims endure, especially after having separated from their spouse/partner;
and fail to understand the ways in which children can be harmed by exposure to domestic violence.
Untrained evaluators are also at risk of misinterpreting self-defense
on the part of the victim as mutual fighting. Women in domestic violence situations tend to use violence as a form of self-defense more often
136
than men need to use violence in self-defense. Women report primary

132. See Shannon Catalano, Intimate Partner Violence in the United States, U.S. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf
(demonstrating that domestic violence can happen to anyone by presenting information compiled by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, including data from the National Crime Victimization Survey interviews with victims
of crimes and the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports on the income of victims);
see also GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC ABUSE & END DOMESTIC ABUSE WIS.,
supra note 33, at 27.
133. See Catalano, supra note 132.
134. Catalano, supra note 132.
135. Id.
136. L. Kevin Hamberger & Sadie E. Larsen, Men’s and Women’s Experience of Intimate
Partner Violence: A Review of Ten Years of Comparative Studies in Clinical Samples:
Part I, 30 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 699 (2015) (discussing a systematic qualitative review of
literature from 2002-2013 related to gender differences in intimate partner violence
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reasons for intimate partner violence as being for the purposes of selfdefense and retaliation, while both genders report emotional deregula137
tion as a reason for intimate partner violence. Many female perpetrators of domestic violence have experienced violence by their male part138
ner in the past. In domestic violence situations, women have a greater
likelihood of being injured even if the male partner uses violence that
contributes to a lesser likelihood for injury, such as slapping or push139
ing. Female perpetrators are not necessarily more violent than male
domestic violence perpetrators, but one study found that female perpetrators tend to use weapons against male victims more so than do male
140
perpetrators. Evaluators must be careful not to misinterpret selfdefense on the part of the victim as mutual fighting.
Gender bias often takes place in custody dispute resolutions due to
the belief that women are more likely to make false allegations of child
abuse and domestic violence in order to alienate children from their
141
fathers. These stereotypes are associated with sexist beliefs, the notion
142
that the world is a just place, and the tendency to disbelieve,

137.

138.

139.
140.
141.

142.

as measured in clinical samples). Study authors note that, since their research focused
only on clinical samples, the findings may not be generalizable to the overall, nonclinical population. Id. at 715.
Jody M. Ross, Personality and Situational Correlates of Self-Reported Reasons for Intimate Partner Violence Among Women Versus Men Referred for Batterers’ Intervention,
29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 711 (2011) (examining results from a study of 30 women and
56 men referred for intervention after having committed an intimate partner violence
offense). Results were obtained from a 45-minute computer survey and individual interview regarding relationship conflict. Id. at 714. Although findings afford useful insight, authors of this study warn that, because the sample of individuals studied were
selected based on involvement in the criminal legal system, they may not be generalizable to the greater population of intimate partner violence offenders. Id. at 725.
Caroletta A. Shuler, Male Victims of Intimate Partner Violence in the United States: An
Examination of the Review of Literature Through the Critical Perspective, 5 INT’L J.
CRIM. JUST. 163, 166 (2010) (recounting a review of literature related to male victims of intimate partner violence perpetrated by female partners).
Id. at 166.
Id. at 169.
Daniel G. Saunders et al., The Inventory of Beliefs About Wife-Beating: The Construction and Initial Validation of a Measure of Beliefs and Attitudes, 2 VIOLENCE &
VICTIMS 39 (1987) (reporting on stages of development and evaluation of validity,
reliability, and scale dimensionality of an assessment measuring attitudes about “wife
beating” (intimate partner violence) using data from 675 participants). Although five
of the subscales constructed had sufficient internal reliability, three scales did not
demonstrate robust internal reliability. Id. at 52.
Zick Rubin & Letitia Anne Peplau, Who Believes in a Just World?, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES
65 (1975) (reflecting on the concept of “Belief in a Just World” and findings which
suggest that subscribers to the idea of a Just World are more likely to admire fortunate persons and disparage victims to preserve the internal consistency of the belief in
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143

minimize, or disregard evidence of abuse. As a result of these beliefs,
evaluators often recommend that abusive fathers be given sole or joint
144
custody or unsupervised visits with the children. Mothers are often
punished for reporting abuse and are held to stricter standards than are
145
fathers.
To accurately perform assessments to evaluate the best interests of
the child and potential serious endangerment, evaluators must be aware
of several factors: gender bias and domestic violence is an important issue in custody evaluations; post-separation violence occurs; screening
and assessment can be dangerous; false allegations by a parent are rare;
gender and personal biases can exist when investigating false allegations
or when making recommendations; children’s safety must be a priority
emphasized over co-parenting; and coercive-controlling violence is a
146
form of domestic violence. It is critical to utilize evaluators that satisfy
147
a representative sample of professionals to reduce any effects of bias.
Naïve evaluators of child custody tend to believe that parents falsely
claim abuse. To avoid this error, evaluators need to be knowledgeable
about domestic violence, and they need to be selected by appropriate

143.

144.
145.

146.

147.

that Just World); Janet K. Swim, Wayne S. Hall & Barbara A. Hunter, Sexism and
Racism: Old-Fashioned and Modern Prejudices, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
199 (1995) (discussing confirmatory factor analyses and subsequent replication study
evaluating measures of gender and racial prejudice). Generalizability may be limited,
as study participants were 683 and 788 (respectively) individuals who received extra
credit in college courses for their participation in the study, and therefore their attitudes may not accurately reflect those of the general population. Id. at 201, 205.
Daniel G. Saunders, Richard M. Tolman & Kathleen C. Faller, Factors Associated
with Child Custody Evaluators’ Recommendations in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence,
27 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 473, 477 (2013) (detailing a multivariate statistical analysis of
responses to surveys completed by 465 child custody evaluators, used to assess the relationships between evaluators’ background, beliefs, knowledge, and custody recommendations). Limitations of generalizability should be noted in terms of the fact that
it is not known whether the sample provides a reasonable estimate of representativeness, and as a result of uncertainties regarding the direction of causality of results.
Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 313.
Rosen & Etlin, supra note 115 (detailing information on 206 cases (with a focus on
five representative examples) of child maltreatment after courts acted with bias
against the mother); Molly Dragiewicz, A Left Realist Approach to Antifeminist Fathers’
Rights Groups, 54 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 197, 201 (2010) (reviewing the Left
Realist Approach to criminology, feminist criticisms of the approach, and Left Realist
responses to those criticisms); Meier, Domestic Violence, supra note 49; SAUNDERS, ET
AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42.
Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45; SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY
EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42; see also GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC
ABUSE & END DOMESTIC ABUSE WIS., supra note 33.
SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42.
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148

means. Evaluators should also understand the concept of the two
types of violence (controlling and conflict-based) in order to make adequate recommendations, since they can often vary depending on the
149
perspective of the evaluator. Awareness can increase an assessor’s focus
on safety or can minimize the evaluator’s perspective of the danger of
150
domestic violence in custody cases. Abuse allegations during custody
evaluations should be investigated thoroughly. If credible testimony or
other credible evidence supports allegations—taking into account the
dynamics of domestic violence—the allegations should be afforded substantial weight in determining and pursuing the best interests of the
child.
While it appears that many family law practitioners and custody
evaluators falsely believe that fabricated allegations of domestic violence
151
are common, it is estimated that 35 percent of fathers and 18 percent
of mothers make false allegations of domestic violence during custody
152
cases. In addition, evaluators often confuse an unsubstantiated allegation with a false allegation. An unsubstantiated allegation occurs when
an accusing party cannot provide documentation of domestic violence
153
as required by courts, and there is evidence to believe that the child
154
has not been abused or mistreated. False allegations, on the other
hand, include alleging domestic violence in order to gain an unfair advantage in a custody case or to alienate the other parent from the
155
child/children. In these cases, the person making the false claim does
156
so maliciously and knowingly. Regardless of the distinction, a requirement for substantiation of an abuse claim is contrary to the dy157
namics of domestic violence. Survivors of domestic violence, specifically women, often do not report domestic violence to law enforcement
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

155.
156.
157.

Id.
Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45, at 1712.
Id. at 1707.
See id.; SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42, at
14.
Id.
Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45.
Nico M. Trocmé, Major Findings from the Canadian Incidence Study of Reported Child
Abuse and Neglect, 27 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1427, 1430 (2003) (presenting
findings from the Canadian Incidence Study of Reported Maltreatment, focusing on
a subsample of 3,786 cases in which maltreatment was substantiated). The study provides enormous insight, but it should be noted that information was gathered from
administrative reports, which, though they constitute records kept in the regular
course of business, cannot be independently substantiated. Id. at 1433.
See Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45, at 1698.
See Trocmé et al., supra note 154, at 1430.
See Haselschwerdt et al., supra note 45, at 1698.
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or healthcare professionals before separating from their partner, as
159
they correctly fear that the report could be used against them.
It is also important for the evaluator to be educated in the ways
that coercively abusive intimate partners can often project a non-abusive
image, can express denial, deflect blame, or minimize the abuse, and can
resort to making false allegations (i.e., Parental Alienation Syndrome or
160
child abuse/neglect) in order to undermine the victim’s credibility.
Evaluators should also be cautious to not make unwarranted assumptions regarding a survivor’s presentation, as not all victims will appear as
scared or weak. Instead, they may demonstrate characteristics such as
161
anger, irritability, strength of character, or even impassivity. In cases
where a couple reports to the evaluator that there has been fighting by
both partners, the evaluator should assess for patterns of abuse from the
interview and from legal records. Additionally, the evaluator should
look for evidence of “defensive wounds,” which are injuries sustained by
a victim of a violent attack due to attempts at defending themselves
162
against a perpetrator and are often found on the hands and forearms.
The evaluator should determine each partner’s level of fear as well as any
163
presence of post-traumatic stress symptoms.

158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42, at 21.
Meier, Getting Real About Abuse and Alienation, supra note 48, at 228–30.
LEIGH S. GOODMARK, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROMOTING COMMUNITY
CHILD PROTECTION: A LEGISLATIVE AGENDA (2002); Meier, Domestic Violence, supra
note 49; Morrill et al., supra note 73; SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY
EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42, at 1, 116–35; BATTERED MOTHERS’
TESTIMONY PROJECT, supra note 72.
162. LESTER ADELSON, THE PATHOLOGY OF HOMICIDE: A VADE MECUM FOR
PATHOLOGIST, PROSECUTOR AND DEFENSE COUNSEL 490 (1974); KATHLEEN M.
BROWN & MARY E. MUSCARI, QUICK REFERENCE TO ADULT AND OLDER ADULT
FORENSICS: A GUIDE FOR NURSES AND OTHER HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS 28
(2010); BARRY A. J. FISHER & DAVID R. FISHER, TECHNIQUES OF CRIME SCENE
INVESTIGATION 387 (2004); JOHN J. MILETICH & TIA LAURA LINDSTROM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE WORK OF A MEDICAL EXAMINER: FROM DEATH SCENE TO
AUTOPSY SUITE 26 (2010)..
163. See Daniel G. Saunders, Evaluating the Evaluators: Research-Based Guidance for Attorneys Regarding Custody Evaluations in Cases Involving Domestic Abuse, 47 MICH. FAM.
L.J. 8, 10 (2017).
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C. Proper Screening for Domestic Violence Is Necessary to Prevent Children
from Continued Exposure to Domestic Violence or
Direct Abuse and Neglect
The first step toward protecting children who have been exposed to
domestic violence is to identify when it has occurred. To identify these
cases, allegations must be taken seriously. Statistics have demonstrated
that a parent making intentionally false allegations of child maltreat164
ment is a rare occurrence. Based on countrywide data compiled annually by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, there were an estimated 135,573 investigations into child maltreatment conducted in Canada
165
in 1998. In this study, information about alleged mistreatment was
gathered from a random sample of child welfare service jurisdictions
across Canada. Of the 7,672 cases analyzed, only four percent were
judged by child welfare service workers to be intentionally false
166
claims.
In addition, allegations of domestic violence should be carefully
evaluated and considered since there is a strong co-occurrence of child
abuse/neglect and domestic violence; it has been found that among approximately 30 percent to 60 percent of families where domestic violence or child maltreatment has been identified, there is a significant
167
likelihood that both forms of abuse occur. Taking allegations seriously
is critical to reducing harm to both the children and the non-abusive
parent. Due to the dynamics of domestic violence, however, victims
may not report incidences of abuse and violence even when they are
168
questioned during an evaluation.

164. Trocmé et al., supra note 154, at 1435.
165. Id. at 1430.
166. Id. It is important to note that statistics on marital status and divorce rates were not
considered in this study.
167. H. LIEN BRAGG, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD PROTECTION IN
FAMILIES EXPERIENCING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2003),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/domesticviolence.pdf.
168. Chris O’Sullivan, Estimating the Population at Risk for Violence During Child Visitation, 5 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 65 (2000) (reporting findings from a study of archival custody (n=1692) and visitation cases (n=222), counselors’ case records in felony domestic violence cases (n=97), and interviews with attorneys (n=20) who
represented victims of domestic violence in the same jurisdictions); RICHARD B.
FELSON & PAUL-PHILIPPE PARÉ, THE REPORTING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT BY NONSTRANGERS TO THE POLICE 15 (2005) (examining trends of
survey data from the National Violence Against Women Survey conducted by computer-assisted telephone interview, with a sample of 6,291 persons who had experienced physical assaults and 1,787 who had experienced sexual assaults, to examine the
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Domestic violence survivors often correctly fear that they will not
169
be believed and will be seen as alienating parents. As in cases of childhood sexual assault, many children are hesitant to report or refrain from
reporting altogether, but when asked directly about any abuse, children
170
are more likely to disclose this information. Often, reporting domestic
violence can be dangerous, harmful, or used against the victim. At times
the victim’s attorney or mediator may advise him or her to refrain from
171
disclosing domestic violence. It is also common for victims to lack insight into how damaging child exposure to domestic violence is and be172
lieve that family separation is more damaging. Thus, routine screening
should be conducted. Appropriate screening for domestic violence in
custody cases can help prevent further harm to the child, as intimate
partners may use parenting time to abuse, neglect, or otherwise adversely affect the child and use the time spent in the exchange of the children
as an opportunity to abuse their ex-spouse/partner.
According to recent findings, households in which domestic violence occurs have a 41 percent correlation with households also experi173
encing critical injuries or deaths due to child abuse and neglect. To
screen for domestic violence and assess the risk of future domestic vio174
lence, it is often necessary to employ diverse methods. Interviews and
observations can be conducted with children, parents, and other signifi-

169.
170.

171.
172.
173.

174.

effects that the genders of perpetrator and victim, as well as their relationship to one
another, have on likelihood of reporting the incident to the police); see also Michael
A. Rodriguez et al., Implications for Health Care Professionals, 169, 337, 339 W.J.
MED. (1998) (detailing results from a qualitative study of 51 women, divided into
eight focus groups, who had been victims of domestic violence within the prior two
years, where information about attitudes was elicited in the form of semi-structured,
open-ended discussion questions posed to focus groups).
See Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 328–32.
Kamala London et al., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: What Does the Research Tell
Us About the Ways That Children Tell?, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 194, 197
(2005) (reviewing recent empirical data and literature related to patterns of abuse disclosure among adults, as compared to children’s abuse disclosure patterns).
Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 328–32.
Rodriguez et al., supra note 168, at 339.
SUSAN SCHECHTER & JEFFREY L. EDLESTON, IN THE BEST INTEREST OF WOMEN
AND CHILDREN: A CALL FOR COLLABORATION BETWEEN CHILD WELFARE AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONSTITUENCIES 5 (1994); WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT
GENDER & JUSTICE COMM’N., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL FOR JUDGES 2-49
https://www.courts.wa.gov/index.cfm?fa=home.contentDisplay&
(rev. ed. 2016),
location=manuals/domViol/index (follow the hyperlink for Chapter 2).
American Psychological Association, Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Family Law Proceedings, 65 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 863, 866 (2010).

2019]

DOMESTIC

VIOLENCE

IN

CHILD CUSTODY CASES

37

175

cant figures in the children’s lives. In addition, screening and assessment should involve reviewing criminal and civil court records, examining child protective service records, and using validated screening tools
176
to determine risk. Reports of abuse are significantly more likely in
court settings where self-report intake questionnaires are adminis177
tered. Professionals in healthcare settings only need information from
178
a few screening questions to detect domestic violence, and normalizing statements are often effective in helping patients disclose any prob179
lems with domestic violence. For example, healthcare professionals
can ask a normalizing question in the following way: “I don’t know if
this is (or ever has been) a problem for you, but many of the clients I see
are dealing with abusive relationships. Some are too afraid or uncomfortable to bring it up themselves, so I’ve started asking about it routine180
ly.” These questions can lower an interviewee’s defenses and allow the
individual to tell evaluators what is really taking place.
Validated screening instruments should also be regularly and systematically employed to help detect domestic violence. The Spouse As181
182
sault Risk Assessment and the Danger Assessment are assessment
175. See KATHLEEN C. BASILE ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION ASSESSMENT
INSTRUMENTS FOR USE IN HEALTHCARE SETTINGS: VERSION 1.0 (2007),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ipv/ipvandsvscreening.pdf (detailing
available instruments and tools for assessing intimate partner violence and sexual violence victimization in clinical and healthcare settings); but see Miriam K. Ehrensaft &
Dina Vivian, Is Partner Aggression Related to Appraisals of Coercive Control by a Partner?, 14 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 251 (1999) (addressing the idea that asking questions
about coercive control, rather than physical assault, may produce inconsistent results
based on the subjective nature of the perception of coercion and relationship control). While this study is useful, concerns about the external validity/generalizability
of its results arise based on the fact that its sample exclusively included young college
students in dating relationships, and findings may not apply to different demographic
populations. Id. at 251.
176. SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42, at 107–10.
177. See Robin H. Ballard, Amy Holtzworth-Munroe, Amy G. Applegate, and Connie J.
A. Beck, Detecting Intimate Partner Violence in Family and Divorce Mediation: A Randomized Trial of Intimate Partner Violence Screening, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y L. 1,
20 (2011).
178. See, e.g., BASILE, supra note 175, at 66, 108.
179. See Daniel G. Saunders, Research Based Recommendations for Child Custody Evaluation
Practices and Policies in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 12 J. CHILD CUSTODY 71,
73 (2015) [hereinafter Saunders, Research Based Recommendations].
180. Id.
181. P. Randall Kropp,, Intimate Partner Risk Assessment, in VIOLENT AND SEXUAL
OFFENDERS: ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 36, 44 (Jane L. Ireland
et al., eds., 2009) (reviewing literature on measures of Intimate Partner Violence risk
assessments).
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protocols developed for front-line workers and provide specific, standardized questions to detect past occurrences of domestic violence or degree of risk for future abuse. Lethality potential is measured with the
183
validated Danger Risk Assessment, while the validated Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (ODARA) measures non-lethal domes184
tic violence and the Spousal Assault Risk Assessment is a validated in185
strument used to measure assault risk.
Coercive control can be evaluated by asking questions such as:
What happens when you try to make decisions that seem like
your personal/private matters (like what to wear, how to
handle something at work)? How does your spouse react? . . . What kind of freedom does your husband/wife give
you to decide for yourself the things that you want to do, or
places you want to go? . . . [and] in general, do you feel your
186
husband/wife tries to control you? Please explain.
Non-validated measures should not be used to screen for domestic
violence. An example of such a non-validated measure includes the “5
P” model, which can incorrectly find that victims were making false
statements or were too pathological to care for their own children. Using non-validated measures can lead to sole or joint custody being
187
granted to abusers. Certain questions on this measure (i.e., questions
182. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide,
NAT’L INST. JUST. J., NOV. 2003 at 14, 15, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
jr000250e.pdf (discussing the Danger Assessment Tool and its abilities and limitations). Scores should be interpreted with caution: “83 percent of the women who
were killed had scores of 4 or higher, but so did almost 40 percent of the women who
were not killed. This finding indicates that practitioners can use the Danger Assessment (like all intimate partner violence risk assessment tools) as a guide in the process
rather than as a precise actuarial tool.” Id. at 16.
183. Id.
184. See N. Zoe Hilton & Grant T. Harris, How Nonrecidivism Affects Predictive Accuracy:
Evidence from a Cross-Validation of the Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment
(ODARA), 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 326, 330–35 (2008) (detailing methods
and measures of accuracy for the ODARA, as re-tested on a sample of 391 individuals drawn from police incident archives in Canada). Results from this study demonstrate statistically significant cross-validation of the ability for results to differentiate
domestic violence recidivists from non-recidivists. Id. at 334.
185. Kropp, supra note 180, at 44.
186. Saunders, Research Based Recommendations, supra note 179, at 75.
187. JANET JOHNSTON, VIVIENNE ROSEBY & KATHRYN KUEHNLE, IN THE NAME OF THE
CHILD: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AND HELPING
CHILDREN OF CONFLICTED AND VIOLENT DIVORCE 317 (2009); see also SAUNDERS
ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42.
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relating to being followed) have improperly led evaluators to conclude
that victims were suffering from personality disorders or other psychopathology (i.e., paranoia that someone is following her) when she is, in
fact, not pathological, but is instead dealing with the reality and trauma
188
of the abuse (i.e., abuser actually is stalking her). Thus, because the
results can make it appear as if the victim is suffering from pathology
189
when she is not, it may give her abuser an inappropriate advantage in
190
court.
As another important evidence-based recommendation in assessing
whether a family suffers from domestic violence, evaluators should look
for patterns of controlling and coercive behavior, rather than emphasiz191
ing isolated incidences of physical violence. Studies have documented
the fact that when evaluators conduct assessments that place particular
focus on coercive-controlling violence, the parenting plans that result
from those assessments provide a higher level of safety against domestic
192
violence. In addition, such emphasis typically results in a grant of cus193
tody to domestic violence-surviving mothers.

188. See KENNETH S. POPE, JAMES N. BUTCHER & JOYCE SEELEN, THE MMPI, MMPI-2,
& MMPI-A IN COURT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR EXPERT WITNESSES AND
ATTORNEYS (3d ed. 2006).
189. See Fariha I. Khan, Toni L. Welch & Eric A. Zillmer, MMPI-2 Profiles of Battered
Women in Transition, 60 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 100, 100 (1993) (examining a
study in which the scores of 31 women residing in a domestic violence shelter in
Pennsylvania obtained on an MMPI-2 protocol were compared and found to be significantly elevated on a number of particular scales). This may provide a good indication of psychological distress related to intimate partner violence, but may also provide the basis for misdiagnosis of pathology. The study authors caution that the
sample size was too small to conduct meaningful statistical analysis on results and did
not control for all considered confounding variables. Id. at 109–10. See also Lynne
Bravo Rosewater, A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Self-Defeating Personality Disorder,
J. PERSONALITY DISORDERS 190 (1987) (reviewing literature as to the importance of
differentiating between the experience of situational distress and the existence of an
enduring personality disorder).
190. Kay Bathurst, et al., Normative Data for the MMPI-2 in Child Custody Litigation, 9
PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 205, 209-10 (1997) (examining a study in which normative
data were derived from archival records of child custody litigants in California to
whom the MMPI-2 had been administered during the course of child custody determinations); POPE ET AL., supra note 188.
191. SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42, at 8–11.
192. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 42.
193. SAUNDERS ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS, supra note 42.
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Experts in the field recommend that evaluators meet with each par194
ent separately on different interview days and times. They recommend
that parents should be asked pointed questions, including:
1) whether they would feel safe if the other parent was in the
room;
2) whether they can recall the last time they and their partner were able to sit down together and have a conversation about the children;
3) how the relationship ended;
4) how well the child gets along with the other parent;
5) the types of activities in which the child enjoys participating with the other parent;
6) whether they would feel comfortable participating in a
joint meeting at the child’s school;
7) whether there have been any incidences of physical or
verbal abuse;
8) whether there has ever been an order of protection filed;
and
9) whether there are any restrictions from access to joint
195
money/finances.
Additionally, these experts recommend that the evaluator begin by
developing a rapport with the child by discussing issues unrelated to the
196
family discord. After establishing a rapport with the child, the evaluator should explain to the child the evaluator’s role and extent of confidentiality and emphasize that his or her main role is to help the child
197
feel safe and protected. In addition, the evaluator should ask the child
several open-ended questions to gauge certain behavior patterns of the
parents including: (1) what the child’s favorite aspects are of going to
their mom/dad’s house; (2) how the child would feel if they were in the
same room with their mom and dad; and, (3) if the child could have
198
three wishes, what they would be. It is also important for the evaluator to assess the child for any obvious signs of abuse, such as visible

194. E-mail from Nicole Centracchio, Owner & Managing Partner, Reed Centracchio &
Associates, LLC (Feb. 12, 2018) (on file with author). This information should be
considered expert opinion without scientific verification. Future research should scientifically investigate the merit of these recommended practices.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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bruises, torn clothing, or presenting as withdrawn and refusing to
199
speak. Research indicates that drawing may facilitate young children’s
ability to talk about emotional experiences in clinical and legal con200
texts. Drawings can help the child to communicate with the evaluator,
meaning that having paper and crayons available can be helpful during
201
the interview process.
While screening children for domestic violence, child representatives must obtain the child’s permission to share specifics of what is dis202
closed; in the event that the evaluator is unable to obtain consent
from the child, the evaluator must still advocate on the child’s behalf
203
and present a report to the court regarding ways to keep the child safe.
204
The only exceptions to this are cases that involve Rule 1.6. In such
cases, if a child representative reasonably believes that disclosure could
prevent death or substantial bodily harm, disclosure is thereby neces205
sary. If the evaluator is a guardian ad litem, then he or she has an absolute right to tell attorneys and the court exactly what the child has
stated during the evaluation. However, as a child representative or
guardian ad litem, the evaluator has no duty of confidentiality for what
206
is said by the parents during an evaluation.

199. Amy Swerdlin, Carol Berkowitz & Noah Craft, Cutaneous Signs of Child Abuse, 57 J.
AM. ACAD. DERMATOLOGY 371, 373, 383 (2007) (reviewing literature relevant to
“differentiating cutaneous signs of child abuse, including physical and sexual abuse,
from mimickers of inflicted injury”); Centracchio, supra note 194.
200. Centracchio, supra note 194. See generally CATHY A. MALCHIODI, BREAKING THE
SILENCE: ART THERAPY WITH CHILDREN FROM VIOLENT HOMES (2d. ed. 2004)
(presenting art therapy techniques for children who have witnessed violence in their
homes); Julien Gross & Harlene Hayne, Drawing Facilitates Children’s Verbal Reports
of Emotionally Laden Events, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 163 (1998). The
work details a two-part study of New Zealanders of European descent, results of
which indicated that engaging in the act of drawing increases a child’s tendency to
verbalize and facilitates communication of information about their own past experiences. Id. at 174–76. However, as authors note, subjects in the present study were
from a non-clinical population. Id. Therefore, the findings cannot be generalized to
situations in which a child has experienced or witnessed a traumatic event.
201. Id.
202. Centracchio, supra note 194.
203. Id.
204. Id.; see also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (Am. Bar Ass’n, 1983).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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D. Evidence of Domestic Violence Requires Protective Features
Relating to Custody
Well-designed research on domestic violence also has important
implications for best practices that judges and other professionals should
follow in how they react to allegations of domestic violence in child
custody cases. When allegations of domestic violence or other evidence
of domestic violence exist that are consistent with the dynamics of
domestic violence, custody evaluators should determine the extent to
which children have already been harmed by exposure to domestic
violence or harmed by direct abuse and neglect by the abusive parent,
the likelihood of it continuing, and which of the following protective
custody-related measures to recommend: (i) allocation of primary
parenting time to the non-abusive parent; (ii) allocation of sole decisionmaking to the non-abusive parent; (iii) supervised parenting time and
payment for supervision; (iv) supervised exchanges; (v) requiring
exchanges to occur in protected settings; (vi) treatment programs,
possibly including substance abuse programs, and requiring parents to
not be under the influence of drugs or alcohol when children are placed
with them; (vii) prohibitions on overnight physical placement of the
child with the abusive parent; and (viii) requiring abusers to post bond
for the safe return of the child, and other conditions the court
determines necessary for the safety and well-being of the child and the
207
victim.
Using these protective measures is critical because of the strong evidence that coercively abusive intimate partners often use court proceedings over parenting time and decision-making, not to look out for the
welfare of their children, but rather to further abuse or punish the other
parent, or to induce their ex-spouse/partner to return to the relationship. As Brittany E. Hayes, an Associate Professor in the Department of
Criminal Justice and Present Criminology at Sam Houston State University, pointed out, “in relationships where the abusive partner has
children with his victim, the children can serve as tools for the abuser to
208
continue his abusive behavior.” Because the goal is to control and

207. GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC ABUSE & END DOMESTIC ABUSE WIS., supra
note 33, at 91, 98, 131, 137, 140.
208. Brittany E. Hayes, Abusive Men’s Indirect Control of Their Partner During the Process
of Separation, 27 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 333, 333 (2012) (reviewing a study and logistical
regression analysis of 168 women in New York City who were involved in the family
court system and had at least one child with a person against whom she had obtained
an order of protection).
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manipulate the mother, rather than to parent, abusers will use legal
means to harass and manipulate. This starts as a bid for parenting time
and involvement in decisions that they often ignore during the relationship. An example of this was pointed out by Rita Smith and Pamela
Coukos in an article they co-authored while at the National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence: “An abusive partner will often threaten to
take the children in order to keep the mother in the relationship. If she
leaves, he may continue efforts to harass and control her by manipulat209
ing custody litigation.” This is why coercively abusive fathers are significantly more likely to seek sole custody of their children than noncoercively abusive fathers. They seek joint custody and more parenting
time, not because they want to spend more time with the children, but
rather, to perpetuate contact with the mother, monitor the mother’s actions, and exert control over. Thus, as Smith and Coukos reported, “Fathers who batter the mother are twice as likely to seek sole custody of
210
their children than are nonviolent fathers.” And they are often successful, because as Smith and Coukos also noted, “Despite a perception
that the courts disproportionately favor mothers, one study has shown
that fathers who fight for custody win sole or joint custody in 70 per211
cent of these contests.”
The manipulative behavior does not end with the court battle for
the order of custody. Joint decision-making power gives the abuser a
never-ending means to further the abuse and harassment. Both parents
cannot provide authentic input into decisions under such circumstances,
212
because equality between them is rare. As Dana Harrington Conner,
Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Delaware Civil Law
Clinic, Widener University School of Law, noted, “The rarity of equality in decision-making between an abuser and his victim renders joint
213
decision-making [on behalf of the child] unworkable.” Under such
conditions, the decision-making process is shaped more by the abuser’s

209. Rita Smith & Pamela Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations of Domestic Violence and Child Abuse in Custody Determinations, 36 JUDGES’ J. 38, 40 (1997) (reviewing the literature on this phenomenon, including government reports and reports
from the American Psychological Association).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Dana Harrington Conner, Back to the Drawing Board: Barriers to Joint DecisionMaking in Custody Cases Involving Intimate Partner Violence, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL’Y 223, 227 (2011).
213. Id. at 227.
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attempts at control than by the welfare of the child, because abusers can
214
use decisions as leverage. As Conner noted:
When that joint custodian craves control, as batterers often
do, the non-residential batterer may use his legal custodial
power to exert control over the most ordinary decisions. Further, if he is not consulted about these commonplace issues a
batterer may intimidate the victim, threaten her with legal action, or file with the court in an attempt to harass her
215
through the legal process.
Thus, an abuser may withhold consent for the child to receive
counseling or medical procedures or for the child to participate in extracurricular school activities until the victim concedes to his demands.
And the manipulative behavior does not end with the mother, because
as experts Lundy Bancroft, Jay G. Silverman, and Daniel Ritchie noted,
batterers tend to be controlling and coercive in their direct interactions
216
with children. Likewise, abusers will frequently seek modifications to
custody arrangements, and often fail to comply with court orders just to
217
get at the mother. As Smith and Coukos noted, an abusive parent is
“likely to disrupt court-ordered visitation schedules as a way to continue
the abuse of his former partner” and is “three times as likely to be arrears
218
in child support.” In short, when abusers are granted decision-making
powers, decisions are not based on the child’s best interest, but are rather focused on perpetuating the abuse. Abusers can use courtroom con219
flicts over parenting decisions as a forum to do so.
It is also a bad idea to involve abusive intimate partners in the decision-making process. As Conner pointed out:
A grant of joint legal custody assumes that both parents will
make good choices about the welfare of their children. Such
an assumption, however, is ill advised in cases involving batterers. A parent who makes poor decisions with regard to his
own life is also likely to make poor decisions about his children . . . . Batterers often engage in other risky behavior, including abuse of drugs and alcohol, criminal behavior and
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 227, 258.
Id. at 258.
BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 49, at 8.
Smith & Coukos, supra note 209, at 40.
Id.
Id.
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abuse of children. They fail to comply with court orders and
220
have a general disregard for the law.
Consequently, to protect children and the non-abusive parent from
further harm in custody cases where one parent has been engaging in
coercive abuse, the non-abusive parent should be granted the sole right
to make decisions relating to their children, and courts should order appropriate protective measures to be placed on the parenting time of the
coercively abusive parent.
E. Importance of Appropriately Assessing and Addressing
Mental Health Issues and Seeking Appropriate Intervention Programs
Well-designed research has important implications for determining
best approaches to handling mental health issues of domestic violence
survivors and their children, as well as recommending various types of
intervention programs for abusive parents. When domestic violence is
detected, an evaluator should recognize that the survivor has
experienced trauma and will be more likely to display symptoms of
221
depression and anxiety. These symptoms may be reactions to violence
222
and controlling behavior by the perpetrator. Survivors of domestic
violence endure abuse, harassment, and threats of abuse, which often
223
continue after the couple has separated. In addition to the trauma
associated with domestic violence, the survivor must also cope with the
overwhelming stress and accompanying emotional symptoms related to
the idea that they could potentially lose their children to the
224
perpetrator. Many times, a survivor’s symptoms can be severe enough
to meet criteria for complex PTSD: a severe form of PTSD
characterized by symptoms such as difficulty regulating emotion,
explosive anger, episodes of dissociation, negative self-perception,
perception of the perpetrator as having total power over the survivor,
220. Conner, supra note 212, at 256.
221. Nancy S. Erickson, Use of the MMPI-2 in Child Custody Evaluations Involving Battered Women: What Does Psychological Research Tell Us?, 39 FAM. L.Q. 87, 97 (2006)
(finding women who have experienced intimate partner violence have elevated scores
on the 2 and 7 scales, depression and anxiety, respectively).
222. Id. at 89 (“[R]esearch tends to support the hypothesis that a battered woman’s
MMPI-2 profile often is a result of the abuse she has suffered.”).
223. Smith & Coukos, supra note 209, at 38–40.
224. Erickson, supra note 221, at 89 (“[The MMPI-2 profile] should not be viewed by
child custody evaluators as evidence that [the mother] has personality traits indicating
that she would not be a fit parent.”).
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isolation and distrust of others, feelings of hopelessness, and a sense of
225
despair. These symptoms can overlap with Borderline Personality
Disorder and Paranoid Personality Disorder traits, which may in turn
be triggered or exacerbated by domestic violence experiences, as well as
226
the survivor’s own history of childhood abuse. It is common for
survivors of domestic violence to have a childhood history of abuse and
227
trauma. When they are able to achieve some measure of security in
their lives, the symptoms of PTSD and depression often diminish,
adding further support to the idea that symptoms are related to the
228
trauma as opposed to underlying psychosis.
Recognizing that the survivor has experienced trauma will help
professionals avoid making tragic mistakes. For example, perhaps due to
the failure to recognize the trauma that survivors have endured, evaluators are much more likely to recommend sole custody to the perpetrator
if the survivor is portrayed as hostile and are also more likely to refer the
survivor to counseling, parenting classes, and anger management clas229
ses. During evaluations, when the survivor presents as guarded and
engages with the evaluator in a negative manner, evaluators and judges
often interpret this behavior as personality dysfunction even when the
behaviors are a result of the survivor’s fears and other symptoms of be230
ing victimized.
When mothers struggle with depression, trauma symptoms, and
other psychopathology, children also tend to have more problems them231
selves, but attending to mental health needs can enhance protective
factors. Children who have been exposed to domestic violence do better
232
when they are protected by a supportive, healthy, non-abusive parent
233
with good parenting skills. Situational factors such as family support
and secure attachment to other caregivers, living in a supportive, safe,

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 104–08.
Id. at 88.
See generally Stith et al., supra note 103, at 640, 648–49.
Saunders, Research Based Recommendations, supra note 179, at 71, 73.
Jennifer L. Hardesty et al., The Influence of Divorcing Mothers’ Demeanor on Custody
Evaluators’ Assessment of Their Domestic Violence Allegations, 12 J. CHILD CUSTODY
47, 55 tbl.1 (2015).
PRANZO, supra note 71, at 48.
Gewirtz et al., supra note 66, at 36; Graham-Bermann et al., supra note 46, at 649;
Owen et al., supra note 46, at 434.
Shonkoff & Garner, supra note 47, at 237.
Gewirtz et al., supra note 66, at 30; Graham-Bermann et al., supra note 46, at 650.
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and close community, and not experiencing other forms of trauma
contribute to greater resiliency in children.
In addition to allocating primary parenting time to the non-abusive
parent, the non-abusive parent can be referred to appropriate treatment
if he or she is suffering from depression, PTSD, or other struggles that
can impact parenting. Appropriate interventions can also be recommended for the children and the abusive parent; therapies such as
Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (TF-CBT) appear to be
236
the most effective.
It is also important for evaluators to assess the typologies of
perpetrators who commit intimate partner violence in order to identify
237
appropriate interventions. For example, an evaluator should examine
234. Garmezy & Masten, supra note 46, at 194; Gewirtz et al., supra note 66, at 36; Owen
et al., supra note 46, at 438; Werner, supra note 46, at 74.
235. Graham-Bermann et al., supra note 46, at 658.
236. Colleen E. Cary & J. Curtis McMillen, The Data behind the Dissemination: A Systematic Review of Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Use with Children and
Youth, 34 CHILD & SERVS. REV. 748 (2012) (detailing findings of three metaanalyses of 10 studies to determine if Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
(TF-CBT) was effective in reducing symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD), depression, and behavioral problems). Findings were consistent amongst
meta-analyses: although immediately after the completion of treatment it appeared
that TF-CBT was efficacious for reducing symptoms of all three conditions, only
symptoms of PTSD continued to be ameliorated a year after treatment completion.
Study authors caution that limitations include the fact that both the number of studies included in the meta-analysis and number of subjects in each study sample were
relatively small, as well as the fact that none of the studies examined the effect of the
length of time spent in treatment, on treatment outcome. Id.; Judith A. Cohen, Anthony P. Mannarino & Satish Iyengar, Community Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder for Children Exposed to Intimate Partner Violence: A Randomized Controlled
Trial, 165 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 16, (2011) (reviewing randomized double-blind control trial of 124 7-14 year-old children with five or more
intimate partner violence-related PTSD symptoms and whose mother was the victim
of intimate partner violence, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of TF-CBT as
compared to standard treatment for children with intimate partner violence-related
PTSD). Although the findings indicate that TF-CBT is more effective in reducing
symptoms, they are limited in terms of internal validity as a result of a significantly
high (39.5 percent) rate of attrition. Id.
.
237 Amy Holtzworth-Munroe & Gregory L. Stuart, Typologies of Male Batterers: Three
Subtypes and the Differences Among Them, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 476 (1994)
(reviewing available literature and studies on domestic violence to determine via
factor analysis if batterers can be typified). Although corroboration exists to support
the notion that there are three main batterer typologies, these findings cannot be
empirically validated, and their value lies primarily in the qualitative analysis they
provide. Id. Olga Cunha & Rui Abrunhosa Gonçalves, Intimate Partner Violence
Offenders: Generating A Data-Based Typology of Batterers and Implications for
Treatment, 5 EUR. J. PSYCHOL. APPLIED TO LEGAL CONTEXT 131 (2013) (discussing
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whether an abusing parent is only committing the abuse within the
family or whether he or she is violent in all of their relationships,
238
including those outside of the home (i.e., engaging in road rage).
Abuse of an intimate partner is often correlated with alcohol or
substance abuse behaviors and disorders, and is also associated with an
239
escalation of violence. By knowing the typology of the abuser, an

a study in which data were obtained from the self-reports of 187 adult males
criminally sentenced for intimate partner violence-related offenses.) Concurrent with
Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra, cluster analysis (Ward’s method) indicated the
presence of three empirical subtypes; nevertheless, as with the imprecise nature of
cluster analysis conclusions are subject to the clustering methods used. Id. Charlie
Stoops et al., Development and Predictive Ability of a Behavior-Based Typology of Men
Who Batter, 25 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 325, (2009) (examining a study in which
information was gathered from a biopsychosocial assessment and from archival
records from offender databases maintained by both the county and the state for 671
men who had been convicted of crimes related to battering their female partners).
Similarly, and in accord with Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra, cluster analysis
signaled the existence of three typologies of batterers; however, authors note that the
sample examined is not typical of the intimate partner violence perpetrator, and that
data were collected by a number of different probation officers, and a lack of
uniformity of and/or control over the process may have influenced the results. Id.
238. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 237, at 481–93.
239. Kenneth E. Leonard, Domestic Violence and Alcohol: What is Known and What Do We
Need to Know to Encourage Environmental Interventions?, 6 J. SUBSTANCE USE 235
(2001) at 235 (reviewing a comprehensive analysis of available literature, surveys, and
research studies related to the effect of alcohol on domestic violence). While this
study makes a compelling case for the positive correlation between alcohol use and
domestic violence, conclusions rest on the premise that there is a causal or even facilitative relationship. Id. The study’s author concedes that it is not actually established
by stating “[t]he case for this rests on whether alcohol has any causal of facilitative effects on domestic violence.” Id. Additionally, operational definitions are somewhat
muddled in that differentiation is not made between alcohol use, amount of alcohol
consumed, the presence of alcohol abuse disorders, intoxication, and/or other potentially confounding factors. Id. Nevertheless, the analysis provides significant benefit
in identifying critical areas for future research. Id. See also Gregory L. Stuart et al.,
Examining a Conceptual Framework of Intimate Partner Violence in Men and Women
Arrested for Domestic Violence, 67 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 102 (2006) at 102 (discussing a survey study of 409 men and women referred to batterer intervention programs). Structural equation modeling was used to analyze interrelationships between
the perpetrator’s gender and a number of measured characteristics; although findings
strongly suggest that problematic alcohol use contributes to the perpetration of domestic violence, authors note that they did not corroborate participants self-reports of
either their own alcohol use and intimate partner violence or their partner’s use of alcohol. Id. See also Gregory L. Stuart et al., The Role of Drug Use in a Conceptual Model of Intimate Partner Violence in Men and Women Arrested for Domestic Violence, 22
PSYCHOL. ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 12–24 (2008) at 12 (discussing results from further
analysis of Stuart et al., Examining a Conceptual Framework, supra, to determine if
problematic drug use is likewise statistically correlated with perpetration of intimate
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evaluator can better recommend appropriate interventions. In
particular, evidence has been found to support the notion that there are
three types of batterers: (1) Family-Only batterers, (2)
Dysphoric/Borderline batterers, and (3) Generally Violent/Antisocial
240
batterers. Family-Only batterers are found in up to 50 percent of
241
242
domestic violence cases, and are primarily violent within the family.
They have few, if any, pathologies, and they are the least likely of all
domestic violence perpetrators to have witnessed or been victimized
243
during their own childhood. They perpetrate the least severe forms of
244
violence/abuse and are described as “normal” by others.
Dysphoric/Borderline batterers are found in approximately 25 percent
of cases and are typically violent within the family, but may also commit
245
general violence. This type of batterer also is likely to have psychiatric
problems, is emotionally volatile, and is likely psychologically distressed,
246
often with depression or anger issues. These batterers may have
substance abuse issues and may have been victims or witnesses of
247
domestic violence during their own childhoods. For these individuals,
batterer intervention programs may need to be combined with
additional mental health services and substance abuse programs to
increase the likelihood of change, improve future behavior patterns, and
248
decrease the rate of recidivism. Generally Violent/Antisocial batterers
are present in approximately 25 percent of cases of domestic violence,
with family violence being only part of the general violence that is
249
Antisocial batterers often have
committed by these individuals.
criminal records, have significant psychiatric problems, abuse
substances, are the most likely to have been victimized or witnessed
domestic violence in childhood, and perpetrate the most severe and
250
chronic violence/abuse. These individuals require criminal justice

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

partner violence for both male and female offenders). Interpretation of conclusions
should take into consideration that measured variables were based on the “perpetrators’ perceptions of partner behavior.” [emphasis in original]. Id.
Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 237, at 481.
Id. at 481–82.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mike Feinerman, Working with People Who Batter (Feb. 15, 2012) (unpublished
PowerPoint presentation).
Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 237, at 482.
Id.
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intervention and intense mental health and substance abuse services, as
251
they are often very dangerous to others.
Partner Abuse Intervention programs seek to change the attitudes
and behaviors of abusive intimate partners. Some studies have suggested
that these programs are helpful in reducing incidences of domestic
252
253
violence, while other studies question the utility of these programs.

251. Feinerman, supra note 248.
252. See, e.g., Julia C. Babcock, et al., Does Batterers’ Treatment Work? A Meta-Analytic
Review of Domestic Violence Treatment, 23 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 1023 (2004);
Martha Coulter & Carla VandeWeerd, Reducing Domestic Violence and Other Criminal Recidivism: Effectiveness of a Multilevel Batterer’s Intervention Program, 24
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 139 (2009) (expounding on a nine-year analysis of recidivism
(as measured by re-arrest rates) of 17,999 batterers assigned to one of six batterers’ intervention programs). Although findings strongly suggest that these Batterer Intervention Programs (BIPs) are correlated with lower rates of re-offense than for individuals who had not completed treatment, this must be considered in light of the
potential confounding fact that the type of individuals who are not diligent with program completion are also the type more likely to reoffend, as well as the consideration
that re-arrest rates are not tantamount to re-offense rates, and may instead reflect a
better ability to avoid detection. Id.; Christopher Eckhardt et al., The Effectiveness of
Intervention Programs for Perpetrators and Victims of Intimate Partner Violence, 4
PARTNER ABUSE 196 (2013) (discussing meta-analysis of 39 randomized or quasiexperimental studies in which the research design compared a particular BIP to a pertinent comparison group). Study authors found that current research in this area is
extremely limited, and that the current available research is often fraught with methodological problems, implementation problems, and other limitations. Id.; Lynette
Feder & David B. Wilson, A Meta-Analytic Review of Court-Mandated Batterer Intervention Programs: Can Courts Affect Abusers’ Behavior?, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CRIMINOLOGY 239 (2005) (examining meta-analysis of 15 research studies (representing four experimental and six quasi-experimental studies) evaluating the effectiveness of post-arrest mandated BIPs (each of which had a rigorous experimental or
quasi-experimental design, as well as a sufficient amount of data to conduct statistical
analysis of effect size); results were mixed, but study authors express concern over
generalizability, bias, and validity of the findings); Nicola McConnell, et al., Caring
Dads Safer Children: Families’ Perspectives on an Intervention for Maltreating Fathers, 7
PSYCHOL. VIOLENCE 406 (2017) (reviewing results of the Caring Dads Safer Children (CDSC) (a weekly intervention program designed to change behavior of abusive
fathers in order to protect partners and children] and data obtained from 121 partners and 26 children of abusive men in England, Northern Ireland and Wales, as well
reports of those men’s attitudes and behavior towards their children). Although the
inferences of this analysis provide evidence to support the notion that CDSC may reduce risks to the family, limitations include the facts that findings are based on a
small sample of children, and that one of the measures used to evaluate fathers’ attitudes has not been evaluated for statistical validity or reliability. Id. Daniel G. Saunders, Group Interventions for Men Who Batter: A Summary of Program Descriptions and
Research, 23 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 156 (2008) (reviewing recent research related to
components, methods, effectiveness, and cultural sensitivity of BIPs). The study’s author concludes that there are few available studies which provide reliable conclusions,
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The reasons behind the small effects in some studies of partner abuse
intervention programs include factors such as: (i) unidentified and
254
untreated substance abuse, (ii) lack of full time employment and
255
256
income, (iii) ethnicity and culture, and (iv) a lack of a “stake in
conformity” wherein individuals who have less to lose and are not in
danger of losing a job, a marriage, or a stable home, are less motivated
257
to conform to the expectations of intervention programs. Whether

253.
254.

255.
256.
257.

although the concepts of matching offender-type to treatment-type, as well as increasing cultural appropriateness, have shown promising results. Id. Katreena L. Scott &
Vicky Lishak, Intervention for Maltreating Fathers: Statistically and Clinically Significant Change, 36 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 9 (2012) (discussing a study of 98 fathers
who had neglected or abused their children or who had exposed their children to
domestic violence in the Caring Dads (CDSC) batterers’ intervention program in
Ontario, Canada, to determine the efficacy of community-based group-treatment for
this population). The amount of change from pre-intervention to post-intervention
was analyzed for statistical significance; although results from this study are encouraging in that they suggest the possibility of effective treatment. Id. Nevertheless, findings need to be interpreted in light of the fact that data obtained came from the fathers’ own unsubstantiated reports. Id. Gabrielle Davis, Custody Evaluators’ Beliefs
About Domestic Violence, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUST. PROJECT (2011) (reviewing meta-analysis of 22 studies on the effectiveness of BIP treatment for adult male domestic
violence perpetrators; authors note a high level of variability in the quality and validity of studies in this area of research, as well as an overall trend of small effect sizes in
studies that have been conducted).
See, e.g., Babcock et al., supra note 252; Eckhardt et al., supra note 252; Feder & Wilson, supra note 252.
LARRY BENNETT ET AL., PROGRAM COMPLETION, BEHAVIORAL CHANGE, AND REARREST FOR THE BATTERER INTERVENTION SYSTEM OF COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS:
FINAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTHORITY 3
(2005), http://www.icjia.state.il.us/assets/pdf/ResearchReports/CookCounty
DVInt.pdf.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36 (demonstrating more effectiveness for Latinx individuals than for whites or
African Americans).
LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND
DILEMMAS (1992) (analyzing studies of the efficacy of mandatory arrest in cases of
domestic violence, demonstrating that arrest does not necessarily reduce the incidence
of domestic violence among unemployed individuals); JEFFREY FAGAN, THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS (1995),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/crimdom.pdf; Richard A. Berk et al., The Deterrent Effect of Arrest in Incidents of Domestic Violence: A Bayesian Analysis of Four Field Experiments, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 698 (1992) (Overview of six studies examining whether arrests for domestic violence discourage future violence and/or protect victims).
Although the majority of data support both of the hypotheses, two of the six do not
support these conclusions, meaning that Bayesian Analysis was conducted only on
studies confirming a given premise. Id.
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culturally-matched intervention programs provide increased efficiency is
258
controversial and more research is needed.
A partner abuse intervention program in Cook County, Illinois,
259
has demonstrated promising results. There has been a 73.4 percent
260
completion rate in the studied programs, and completion of the program has contributed to a reduction in incidences of re-arrest by 63 per-

258. See, e.g., Samuel R. Aymer, A Case for Including the “Lived Experience” of African
American Men in Batterers’ Treatment, 15 J. AFR.-AM. STUD. 352 (2011) (reviewing
literature on the cultural experiences that shape the beliefs and attitudes of African
American men regarding domestic violence, how culturally-promoted chauvinistic attitudes contribute to perpetration of domestic violence, and how consideration of
these societal influences should be incorporated into treatment and intervention for
African American male batterers). Evidence of race-related stress exists to substantiate
the idea that sociocultural influences from African American culture may impact the
likelihood of intimate partner violence. Id. Congruent with Williams, infra, the
study’s author notes that more studies are needed to better understand and address
the needs of this particular population. Id. José Rubén Parra-Cardona et al., “En el
Grupo Tomas Conciencia (In Group You Become Aware)”: Latino Immigrants’ Satisfaction With a Culturally Informed Intervention for Men Who Batter, 19 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 107 (2013) (reviewing a qualitative study of interviews of 21 Latino adult males who participated in batterer intervention programs designed to be culturally informed). Findings are limited by the fact that information gathered from
batterers’ self-reports was not corroborated, and that the study’s small sample size
prevents generalizability of conclusions to greater populations. Id. Bernadine Waller,
Broken Fixes: A Systematic Analysis of the Effectiveness of Modern and Postmodern Interventions Utilized to Decrease IPV Perpetration Among Black Males Remanded to Treatment, 27 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 42 (2016) (exploring findings from a systematic review of studies including African American male offenders’ recidivism and
attrition rates). Although many current interventions have enormous benefit, many
are also disproportionately ineffective for African American individuals as a result of a
failure to properly accommodate considerations related to ethnic and racial sociocultural influence. Id. Oliver J. Williams, Ethnically Sensitive Practice to Enhance Treatment Participation of African American Men Who Batter, 73 FAMILIES IN SOC’Y 588
(1992) (examining whether ethnically sensitive approaches to standard BIPs have an
effect on the success of those interventions for African American males). As the author notes, literature in this area is lacking, but this provides a useful qualitative overview and direction for future research. Id. But see Edward W. Gondolf, Outcomes of
Case Management for African-American Men in Batterer Counseling, 23 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 173 (2008) (examining a quasi-experimental evaluation of an archival
sample of 482 cases of African American adult males who had previously been enrolled in BIPs to determine whether the implementation of case management had an
effect on outcomes of intervention). Although findings suggest that case management
does not lead to a significant improvement on the effects of intervention, multivariate
analysis was unable to control for the characteristics of offenders in either the casemanagement or no-case-management conditions. Id.
259. BENNETT ET AL., supra note 254, at 4.
260. Id.
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261

cent. Issues related to having a “stake in conformity” were the most
262
important correlates of success in the intervention programs.
F. An Evidence-Based Analysis of Fathers’ Rights Group Claims
Relating to Domestic Violence and Custody Issues
The claim by fathers’ rights groups that courts favor mothers over
fathers is based on studies that have found “gender parity” in anonymous surveys wherein women report committing violence against their
partners at the same rate that men report committing violence against
263
their partners. Thus, they reason that while only 50 percent of perpe264
trators are male, 77 percent of those who are arrested are male. From
265
this, they claim that there is a gender bias against men. There is indeed a large scientific literature demonstrating “gender parity” including
266
meta-analyses. The studies on which these meta-analyses and other
literature reviews showing “gender parity” use questionnaires wherein
women’s answers did not differ from men’s answers, apparently because
267
those questions reflected situational couple violence. Many researchers
have made the distinction between situational couple violence and coercive abuse, finding that men are more likely to perpetrate violence in268
volving coercive abuse. As a counter-argument to the evidence of a
coercive abuse distinction, fathers’ rights groups point to studies that
asked about motivation for situational couple violence, and women as
well as men say that they commit violence to try to get their partners to
269
do something (i.e., coerce their partners). However, trying to get

261. Id. at 51–52.
262. Berk et al., supra note 257; Sherman et al., supra note 257; Fagan, supra note 257.
263. See, e.g., STOP ABUSIVE AND VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, PREDOMINANT AGGRESSOR
POLICIES: LEAVING THE ABUSER UNACCOUNTABLE? 6 (2013) [hereinafter PREDOMI
NANT AGGRESSOR POLICIES]. http://www.saveservices.org/pdf/SAVEPredominant_Aggressor.pdf.
264. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS
2 (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf.
265. PREDOMINANT AGGRESSOR POLICIES, supra note 263.
266. John Archer, Sex Differences in Aggression Between Heterosexual Partners: A MetaAnalytic Review, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 651 (2000).
267. See generally Michael P. Johnson et al., Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence in General Surveys: Ex-Spouses Required, 20 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 186
(2014).
268. See, e.g., Suzanne Swan, et al., A Review of Research on Women’s Use of Violence with
Male Intimate Partners, 23 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 301 (2008).
269. Murray A. Straus, Dominance and Symmetry in Partner Violence by Male and Female
University Students in 32 Nations, 30 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 252, 254 (2007).
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partners to do something is not the same as the type of constant surveillance and threats described as coercive abuse by victims of domestic vio270
lence. Even Murray A. Straus, a “gender parity” advocate, admitted
that “the adverse effects of being a victim of domestic violence are much
greater for women than for men” with greater injuries and economic
271
272
vulnerabilities; that women have more reasons to be afraid; that cul273
tural norms sanctioning violence against women must be changed;
and that because of women’s greater injuries and legitimate fear, police
274
and hospital statistics reflect greater levels of abuse of women by men.
Because of these factors, even if there were “gender parity” in initiating violence against intimate partners, greater levels of abuse of women by men would rise to the level of violating the law. Furthermore, recently-developed questionnaires have found differences in levels of
violence perpetrated by men versus women, indicating that the questionnaires which suggested “gender parity” were not well-designed and
275
missed critical ways in which violence is gendered. It is also noteworthy that the concept of “gender parity” focuses only on measuring the
amount of abuse that men and women commit, and does not address
whether family law courts apply the same standards to women as to
men. Nevertheless, fathers’ rights groups allege that courts favor women
over men in divorce and parentage cases without any valid empirical
support, while a careful review of actual court cases (rather than the
questionable calculations suggested by the fathers’ rights group analyses)
276
demonstrate that courts are actually biased against women. Research
found that raising abuse claims worked against women; that fathers were

270. Kimberly A. Crossman & Jennifer L. Hardesty, Placing Coercive Control at the Center.
What Are the Processes of Coercive Control and What Makes Control Coercive?, 8
PSYCHOL. VIOLENCE 196 (2018).
271. Murray A. Straus, Thirty Years of Denying the Evidence on Gender Symmetry in Partner
Violence: Implications for Prevention and Treatment, 1 PARTNER ABUSE 332, 336
(2010).
272. Id. at 347.
273. Id. at 348.
274. Id. at 347.
275. See Sherry Hamby, Self-Report Measures That Do Not Produce Gender Parity in Intimate Partner Violence: A Multi-Study Investigation, 5 PSYCHOL. VIOLENCE (2014).
Examination of wording of items on behavioral checklists and self-report measures
found that earlier-established methods tend to be worded in such a way that they fail
to adequately take into account the high occurrence of false-positives that produce
asymmetrical reflections of victimization scores based on gender. Id. By contrast,
wording that reduces false positives (e.g., qualifiers like “not including horseplay or
joking around”, “when my partner was angry”, or “not joking”) provides more accurate results and gender parity in measurement. Id.
276. Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 228–31.

2019]

DOMESTIC

VIOLENCE

IN

CHILD CUSTODY CASES

55

more likely to win when abuse claims were raised than when no abuse
claims were raised because abuse claims were seen as attempts by mothers to “alienate” fathers from children. Claims of “alienation” trumped
claims of abuse even when courts accepted the evidence of abuse and
were much more likely to be successful when raised by fathers than
when raised by mothers (demonstrating a gender bias in favor of fa277
thers).
The next problematic claim of the fathers’ rights groups is that
mothers routinely falsely allege domestic violence or child abuse. They
have gone so far as to claim that, “In about 70 [percent] of cases, the al278
legation is deemed to be unnecessary or false.” They often base claims
like this on studies like the one conducted by experts Janet R. Johnston,
Soyoung Lee, Nancy W. Olesen, and Marjorie G. Walters in 2005,
which looked at rates in which claims could be substantiated from court
279
records. The unjustified inference is that 100 percent of all cases that
could not be substantiated from court records alone were false, and not
just false, but rather “deemed” to be false (a claim the authors never
280
281
made). These unsubstantiated cases were never deemed to be false.
A comparable methodology on the opposite side of this debate is to look
at conviction rates for false allegations, cases where allegations were
proven to be false. One such study from the United Kingdom found six
convictions for false allegations out of 111,891 cases where there were
allegations of domestic violence, or a false allegation rate of 0.005 per282
cent. Neither of these methods of estimating frequencies of false allegations is a good estimate of the prevalence of false allegations in the
283
population.

277. Id.
278. INCENTIVES TO MAKE FALSE ALLEGATIONS, supra note 14, at 1.
279. Janet R. Johnston et al., Allegations and Substantiations of Abuse in Custody-Disputing
Families, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 283–94 (2005).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 284–85. “Child protection workers substantiated 27 [percent] of allegations
against fathers, suspected another 27 [percent], believed that 1.3 [percent] were false,
and the remainder unfounded.” Id. The authors made a clear distinction here between the 73 percent of allegations that were unsubstantiated and the 1.3 percent
that were deemed to be false. Id. For the fathers’ rights groups to ignore this difference and claim that all 73 percent of allegations were false is not intellectually honest.
282. Alison Levitt, Charging Perverting the Course of Justice and Wasting Police Time in
Cases Involving Allegedly False Rape and Domestic Violence Allegations, CROWN
PROSECUTION SERVICE EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY UNIT 3 (2013).
283. See id. One method ignores all allegations that could not be proven true using unreasonably difficult criteria and the other ignores all allegations that could not be proven
false using unreasonably difficult criteria.
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The actual methodology used by Johnson et al. in Allegations and
Substantiations of Abuse in Custody-Disputing Families was to have three
clinical psychologists and three clinical social workers review court doc284
uments from the divorce proceedings of highly conflicted families.
These trained raters looked for evidence of domestic violence in court
documents such as child protective service reports, self-admissions, eyewitness reports taking into account the credibility of the witnesses, expert testimony, medical records, police reports, arrests, plea bargains,
285
and criminal convictions. The researchers then looked at whether
286
these ratings lined up with allegations. They found that there were allegations against the father in 55 percent of cases, and 41 percent of
287
those cases were substantiated. By contrast, there were allegations
against the mother in 30 percent of cases, and 15 percent of those cases
were substantiated. The actual levels of substantiation are of secondary
interest here because, given the private contexts in which much domestic violence is perpetrated, it is not surprising that many cases could not
be substantiated. The question was whether allegations were well288
founded. Not every case of actual abuse would have child protective
service reports, self-admissions, and eyewitness reports taking into account the credibility of the witnesses, expert testimony, medical records,
police reports, arrests, plea bargains, or criminal convictions. For fathers’
rights groups to then automatically claim that 100 percent of those unsubstantiated cases are false is intellectually dishonest.
The more interesting result from the Johnson et al. study is that,
contrary to the claims of the fathers’ rights groups, not only were there
more allegations against fathers than against mothers, but the allegations
against fathers were substantiated at a higher rate than the allegations
289
290
against mothers. These differences were statistically significant. Furthermore, the motivations that the fathers’ rights groups ascribe to
women (i.e., that it is all part of a “gamesmanship of divorce,” to gain
an economic advantage in the divorce or parentage case, or to get custody) are all based upon anecdotes and arguments that incentives are in

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Johnston et al., supra note 279, at 286.
Id. at 287.
Id.
Id. at 288–89.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 288–89.
Id. at 289.
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291

place for women to do so. They offer no proof that women actually
292
do so.
The fathers’ rights group claim that is most directly relevant to the
policy prescriptions that we advocate in this Article, however, involves
research on the well-being of children under joint versus sole custody.
There have been many studies demonstrating that children are often
better off in joint custody situations (defined in most of these studies as
293
spending at least 25 percent of the parenting time with each parent).
But these studies—even if they looked at the degree of conflict in the
marriage or in the divorce, and even if they looked at violence in the relationship—have not looked at the degree of abusive, coercive control in
294
the relationship. One study published in 2015 by Swedish experts
Malin Bergström, Emma Fransson, Bitte Modin, Marie Berlin, Per A.
Gustafsson, and Anders Hjern, used a large national survey of children
in Sweden to investigate the well-being of children in joint physical custody (“approximately equal”) compared to children living only or most295
ly with one parent and to children in nuclear families. They found
that children in joint physical custody were better off than children living only or mostly with one parent (with children in intact nuclear
296
families best off). A key limitation with this study is that it did not
separate out many of the variables that previous research indicated affects both the viability of joint physical custody and outcomes for chil297
dren. They did not control for parents’ mental health, addictions, vio298
lence, or abuse. This study did look at socio-economic status, but the
study measured it by asking the children to rate their satisfaction with

291. INCENTIVES TO MAKE FALSE ALLEGATIONS, supra note 14, at 2.
292. Id.
293. Robert Bauserman, Child Adjustment in Joint-Custory Versus Sole-Custody Arrangements: A Meta-Analytic Review, 16 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91 (2002).
294. Linda Nielsen, Re-Examining the Research on Parental Conflict, Coparenting, and Custody Arrangements, 23 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 211, 212 (2017).
295. Malin Bergström et al., Fifty Moves a Year: Is There an Association between Joint Physical Custody and Psychosomatic Problems in Children?, 69 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY.
HEALTH 769 (2015) (correlational study of survey results). Primary problems with
this study include the possibility of reverse causation and third variables; of note, this
study had an extremely large sample size (N = 147,839), increasing confidence in results. Id.
296. Id.
297. Family Law Reform Conference Gathers Leading Researchers and Practitioners,
NATIONAL PARENTS ORGANIZATION (Nov. 19, 2014),
https://nationalparentsorganization.org/component/content/article/16-latest-news/
22067-family-law-reform-conference-gathers-leading-researchers-and-practitioners
(last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
298. See Bergström et al., supra note 295.
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their material resources, rather than using objective measures of socio299
economic status. Nevertheless, even using this measure to control for
socio-economic status caused a large reduction in the effect of joint
300
physical custody on positive outcomes for children.
Notwithstanding the weaknesses in this study, fathers’ rights
groups, such as the National Parents Organization, have pointed to
these results to argue that courts should place children in joint physical
301
custody. Meta-analyses of children’s well-being in joint versus sole
custody situations are consistent with the view that children who come
from families where joint custody is a viable option, taking into account
all relevant factors, are better off, but the inference that courts should,
therefore, place children with abusive parents without considering the
abuse is not justified. Joint custody is only likely to be a viable option
when there has not been coercive control in the relationship. Bergström
et al. and the other studies that have looked at this topic have failed to
look at or control for levels of coercive control. The benefits of joint
custody have not been supported and have been shown to be contra302
indicated in these very different types of situations. For example, a
large-scale study of joint physical custody (defined as 35 percent or
more nights with each parent) versus sole physical custody arrangements
in Australia found that children did less well in joint than in sole custo303
dy situations when mothers “expressed safety concerns.”
A number of studies have looked at the degree of “conflict” in the
marriage or post-divorce and how it affects the well-being of children in
304
joint legal custody versus sole legal custody situations. Note that “conflict” cannot serve as a proxy for either situational couple violence or coercive abuse, since the studies failed to distinguish between them. These
studies have generally found that even controlling for such conflict,
305
children are still better off in joint custody situations. Sometimes situational conflict can be reduced post-divorce after decisions are laid out
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 769.
Id.
NATIONAL PARENTS ORGANIZATION, supra note 297.
Linda Nielsen, Shared Physical Custody: Summary of 40 Studies on Outcomes for Children, 55 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 613, 623 (2014).
303. JUDY CASHMORE ET AL., SOCIAL POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, SHARED CARE
PARENTING ARRANGEMENTS SINCE THE 2006 FAMILY LAW REFORMS 52 (2010),
https://www.sprc.unsw.edu.au/media/SPRCFile/2_AG_Shared_Care.pdf.
304. Marjorie Linder Gunnoe & Sanford L. Braver, The Effects of Joint Legal Custody on
Mothers, Fathers, and Children Controlling for Factors that Predispose a Sole Maternal
Versus Joint Legal Award, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 25 (2001); Bauserman, supra note
293.
305. Gunnoe & Braver, supra note 304, at 25; Bauserman, supra note 293, at 91.
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in the parenting decree and the parents have fewer issues to disagree
over, such that children can benefit from joint legal custody arrange306
ments. These studies, however, did not seek to identify situational
couple violence or coercive abuse situations, let alone to control for
307
them. Furthermore, the studies that have tried to control for conflict
shed no light on the benefits of joint versus sole legal custody in divorces that involve coercive control, because victims of coercive control are
often afraid to report conflict when doing so could infuriate the abusive
308
intimate partner and lead to heightened abuse.
Even situational couple violence can harm children. The interactions necessary to coordinate joint custody create new, additional instances where violence can occur, and individuals who resort to violence
to resolve conflicts are more likely to be deficient or abusive parents and
309
poor role models. In situations involving coercive abuse as we have
310
defined it earlier, there is no way to make joint legal custody (joint
decision-making) or joint physical custody (equal or roughly equal parenting time) tenable, because abusers will use continuing interactions to
attempt to undermine the other parent and to continue the coercive
311
abuse.
In 2008 Peter G. Jaffe, Janet R. Johnston, Claire V. Crooks, and
Nicholas Bala published a review of the scientific literature on the different types of domestic violence and situations in which there has been
312
domestic violence and their risks. They then proposed different parenting arrangements that might be possible under these different situa313
tions. Per Jaffe et al., joint legal and joint physical custody is only appropriate in a situation where there has been very low levels of violence,
the violence was situational and is now in the past, the traumas have
been resolved, and there has been a substantial history of successful co314
parenting. They describe another possible parenting arrangement

306. Peter G. Jaffe et al., Custody Disputes Involving Allegations of Domestic Violence: Toward a Differentiated Approach to Parenting Plans, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 502, 511 (2008)
[hereinafter Jaffe et al., Custody Disputes].
307. Kelly & Johnson, supra note 33.
308. See Smith & Coukos, supra note 209.
309. Jaffe et al., Custody Disputes, supra note 306, at 502 (reviewing the most pertinent
research on custody issues in cases involving domestic violence, paying particular attention to the different subtypes of domestic violence and how each subtype affects
custody issues).
310. See supra notes 39, 40 and accompanying text.
311. Jaffe et al., Custody Disputes, supra note 306.
312. Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions, supra note 42.
313. Id.
314. See id. at 511 tbl.2.
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called “parallel parenting” that can be appropriate for situational couple
violence cases (as contrasted with coercive abuse cases) where the domes315
tic violence was moderate to low on potency.
Jaffe et al. provide numerous details on when parallel parenting is
appropriate and how it should be structured to promote the best interests of the child and protect the parent who is a survivor of domestic vi316
olence. Under a parallel parenting arrangement, the parenting plan is
drawn up by dividing decision-making responsibilities between the parents, with different decision-making issues allocated to each parent. The
basic idea is that the parenting plan should provide for clear boundaries
and separation between the parents, and a time-sharing schedule that
requires minimal communication between the parents and seeks to
avoid direct parent-parent contact, but still provide stability and conti317
nuity in the child’s life. The parallel parenting can provide joint or
sole legal and physical custody (if joint, the time-share schedule should
318
meet all of the above described criteria). Each parent’s access to the
child would include unsupervised day or overnight visits, with a range of
319
time sharing between the parents as specified by the court. The access
would also be structured for natural transition times and to minimize
320
disruption to the child’s school, social, and extra-curricular activities.
The court order for access should explicitly detail the times, dates, places
of exchange, holidays, etc., so that after the plan is drawn up, little
communication is required and the parents can avoid as much direct
321
face-to-face contact as possible. The court order on parenting time
would require adherence to the details of the order and not require flex322
ibility or compromise regarding exchanges of the children. The protocols would be in place to avoid conflict and to prohibit threats of any
violence and sabotage between parents. Permanent restraining orders
would remain in place, including restraints from taking the child out of
the area without the other parent’s consent, neutral places of exchange
that are safe and comfortable for the child (such as a neutral relative, visiting center, school, or library) and structured telephone access to the
323
child. The court order on parenting time would also include rules for

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

See id. at 512 tbl.2.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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communicating emergency and other necessary information between
the parents using technology that enables the communications to be
324
monitored by the court. Parents would not be allowed to communi325
cate through the child. Finally, the parenting order would include a
procedure (such as use of a parenting coordinator) for resolving any new
326
issues not addressed in the parenting order.
The authors agree with all of these aspects of parallel parenting as
described by Jaffe et al., but have a concern with their statement that
parallel parenting emphasizes consistent, safe child-care practices within
separate homes, rather than common practices. Without sufficient
common practices within the two separate homes, the child’s life may
become so inconsistent between two households that the child could be
harmed by this lack of consistency. We thus recommend that the goal of
creating adequate common practices also be emphasized under parallel
parenting. To reflect this goal, we recommend that the term “parallel
parenting” be revised to “structured independent parenting time” to
emphasize that the parenting order on parenting time will include adequate details and structure to promote common practices sufficient to
safeguard the child’s emotional and physical well-being. Research has
demonstrated that the absence of a consistent bedtime routine can nega327
tively impact child development and behavior. Similarly, a lack of
uniformity in rules and explanations across settings has also shown to be
328
consistent with the development of child behavioral problems.
In other situations, Jaffe et al. argue that the best evidence to date
on the well-being of children in cases involving domestic violence is sole
329
legal and primary physical custody to the non-violent parent. Jaffe et
al. also addressed how to respond to cases involving higher levels of
situational couple violence, and concluded that in such cases, supervised
exchange may be sufficient to reduce the likelihood of further abuse
330
during the exchange of the child. Per Jaffe et al., there might be some
cases where there has been coercive abuse when supervised visiting time

324.
325.
326.
327.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Jodi A. Mindell et al., Developmental Aspects of Sleep Hygiene: Findings from the 2004
National Sleep Foundation Sleep in America Poll, 10 SLEEP MEDICINE 771, 771–78
(2009); see also Ronald E. Dahl & Daniel S. Lewin, Pathways to Adolescent Health
Sleep Regulation and Behavior, 31 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 175, 175–81 (2002).
328. Alejandra Ros Pilarz & Heather D. Hill, Unstable and Multiple Child Care Arrangements and Young Children’s Behavior, 29 EARLY CHILD. RES. Q. 471, 471–82 (2015).
329. Jaffe et al., Common Misconceptions, supra note 42, at 61–62.
330. Id. at 514.

62

michigan journal of gender & law

[Vol. 26:1

might be sufficient to protect the child, such as when there has been
treatment for substance abuse or acute mental illness and the child
331
wants contact or will gain from the parent’s continued involvement.
In most cases where there has been coercive abuse, however, contact
between the parents or between the abusive parent and the child should
be suspended, until the causes for the coercive abuse have been
332
addressed.
To distinguish between situational couple violence and coercive
abuse, it is best to look beyond singular violent episodes, as both types
333
of domestic violence involve violent episodes. In coercive abuse,
abusers typically blame the victim for the violence as well as the injuries,
hospital or emergency room visits, or 9-1-1 calls; or they use jealousy to
334
justify what happened. Coercive abuse often involves intimidation,
such as looks, actions, or gestures to make the victim afraid, smashing
things or destroying property to send a signal to the victim, abusing pets
to send a signal to the victim, or displaying weapons to send a signal to
335
the victim. Coercive abuse often involves threats: making or carrying
out threats to do something or to hurt the victim, threats to commit
suicide, threats to get the victim to drop charges, or threats to get the
336
victim to do illegal things. There is also often emotional abuse,such as
put-downs or name-calling, humiliating the victim (especially in
public), use of insults to make the victim feel bad about herself or
337
himself, mind games, and guilt trips for common behaviors. Coercive
abusers also often strive to isolate the victim, limit their access and
involvement in the outside world, control what they do, who they see or
338
talk to, what they read, and where they go. They often treat victims as
339
340
servants. The victim of coercive abuse is often afraid of the abuser.
There is often financial abuse, such as not allowing the victim to work
341
outside the home. Bank accounts or other financial assets may only be
in the abuser’s name, such that the victim does not have any access to
331. Id.
332. Id. at 515.
333. Stark, Commentary on Johnson, supra note 35 (reviewing literature on the distinctions
between different types of domestic violence and how domestic violence should not
be viewed as simply a combination of discrete acts, but rather as a pattern of abuse).
334. PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 40, at 3.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
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342

money. Victims are sometimes kept ignorant of family income and
343
denied access to that family income. If the victim has some income of
344
her own, the abuser may take it. If the victim needs money, she may
345
be required to ask for it, or she might be given an allowance.
Abusers in coercive abuse cases also often abuse the judicial
346
system. They might threaten to report the victim to child protective
services or other government agencies when the supposed infraction
347
would not have normally led to such an action. They might threaten
to use the court system to get custody and take the children, not because
they are interested in parenting, but rather to keep the victim in the
348
relationship. They will often use court proceedings over parenting
time and decision-making, not to look out for the welfare of their
children, but rather to further abuse or punish the other parent, or to
349
induce their ex-spouse/partner to return to the relationship. They
might file court petitions that are nominally in the children’s interest,
350
but are better explained as an attempt to coerce the former spouse.
They might request court motions that perpetuate contact with the
mother, allow them to monitor the mother’s actions, and allow them to
351
exert control over the mother. They may likewise use court-ordered
joint decision-making as leverage to get the victim to act as the abuser
wishes or threaten to bring legal action when the abuser is not consulted
352
about commonplace parenting issues. They may withhold consent for
the child to participate in activities such as extracurricular school
activities or procedures, such as counseling or medical procedures, until
353
the victim concedes to the abuser’s demands. They may disrupt court354
ordered visitation schedules as a way to continue coercion or abuse.
They are also often in arrears in court-ordered child support and they

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Smith & Coukos, supra note 209 (reviewing the literature on this phenomenon including government reports and reports from the American Psychological Association).
PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 40, at 3.
Smith & Coukos, supra note 209, at 38.
Id.
Id.
Jaffe et al., Custody Disputes, supra note 306, at 503.
Smith & Coukos, supra note 209, at 38.
Jaffe et al., Custody Disputes, supra note 306, at 503.
Smith & Coukos, supra note 209, at 38.
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355

disobey court orders. They are often controlling and coercive in their
direct interactions with children, such as requiring children to act in
356
ways that are not associated with common good parenting practices.
Finally, coercive abuse often correlates with other behaviors, such as
poor decision-making for him or herself and the children, drug and
alcohol abuse, criminal behavior, abuse of children, failure to comply
357
with court orders, and general disregard for the law. Thus, coercive
abuse can be differentiated from situational couple violence when one
looks at the entire pattern of the relationship and other personal traits.
II. An Examination of the Extent That Identified
Best Practices Are Required by Law
As detailed in Section I, in order to properly take domestic violence
into account in custody cases, professionals who work on custody cases
(family law attorneys, judges, guardians ad litem, child representatives,
and other custody evaluators) should be required to receive special training on the nature and dynamics of domestic violence, preferably as pro358
359
vided in the Wisconsin Guide or other evidenced-based resources.
In addition to this mandatory training, best practices would also include
requiring that guardians ad litem, child representatives, and other custody evaluators properly screen for domestic violence and child abuse and
investigate any allegations of domestic violence or child abuse, per evidence-based training. Finally, guardians ad litem, child representatives,
and other custody evaluators should be required to recommend one or
more protective measures when there is evidence that children have
been exposed to domestic violence or child abuse. The level of protection should be tailored to address past harm experienced and to help
prevent the danger of future serious harms to the child or non-abusive
parent.

355.
356.
357.
358.

Id.
PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 40, at 3.
Conner, supra note 212, at 223, 227.
See GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC ABUSE & END DOMESTIC ABUSE WIS.,
supra note 33.
359. This includes the counter-intuitive nature of domestic violence, its impact on survivors, the danger of serious harm to children from exposure to domestic violence, how
to properly screen for and investigate claims of domestic violence and child abuse,
and many other aspects as detailed in Wisconsin’s Domestic Abuse Guidebook. See
GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC ABUSE & END DOMESTIC ABUSE WIS., supra
note 33.
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Previous research found that when judges received Specialized
Domestic Violence Training and recommendations for some of the Protective Measures from family law professionals, they were more likely to
see the need for at least some of the Protective Measures and to order
and enforce some Protective Measures (i.e., they were more likely to
give mothers sole physical custody, but less likely to restrict fathers’ vis360
itation). This result demonstrates both the benefits of training and the
need to further educate judges on why the remaining Protective
Measures are so important.
This Section reviews the extent to which states have enacted legislation or supreme court rules that require Specialized Domestic Violence
Training, Domestic Violence Screening and Investigation, and Protective Measures in child custody cases. It also identifies gaps among the
states in mandating these evidence-based best practices.
A. To What Extent Do States Require Family Law Judges to
Receive Training on Domestic Violence?
Based upon a review of state legislation and supreme court rules,
361
we have found that only the District of Columbia and 11 states clearly
require, without waiver, that family law judges receive domestic violence
362
363
364
365
training: California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Nevada, New
360. Morrill et.al, supra note 73, at 1097.
361. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1104(c) (Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2019) (“The chief judge,
in consultation with the presiding judge of the Family Court, shall carry out an ongoing program to provide training in family law and related matters for judges . . . and
shall include in the program information and instruction regarding the following: . . . (B) Family dynamics, including domestic violence . . . . (E) Recognizing the
risk factors for child abuse.”); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1732A(f) (Westlaw through
Jan. 11, 2019) (“The chief judge, in consultation with the presiding judge of the
Family Court of the Superior Court, shall ensure that all magistrate judges of the
Family Court receive training to enable them to fulfill their responsibilities, including
specialized training in family law and related matters.”).
362. CAL. R. CT. 10.464(a) (“Each judge . . . who hears criminal, family, juvenile delinquency, juvenile dependency, or probate matters must participate in appropriate education on domestic violence issues as part of his or her requirements and expectations
under rule 10.462. Each judge or subordinate judicial officer whose primary assignment is in one of these areas also must participate in a periodic update on domestic
violence as part of these requirements and expectations.”).
363. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38c(j) (Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2019) (“The
Judicial Department shall establish an ongoing training program for judges . . . to
inform them about the policies and procedures of sections 46b-1, 46b-15, 46b-38a to
46b-38f, inclusive, and 54-1g, including, but not limited to, the function of the
family violence intervention units and the use of restraining and protective orders.
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Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
371
372
Tennessee, and West Virginia. Minnesota requires that domestic

364.

365.

366.

367..

368.

369.

Such training program shall include an examination of the factors that contribute to a
family being at risk for episodes of domestic violence within the family.”).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21A.170 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“The Supreme
Court shall provide, at least once every two (2) years, in-service training programs for
Circuit Judges, District Judges, and domestic relations and trial commissioners
in: . . . (2) Dynamics of domestic violence, effects of domestic violence on adult and
child victims, legal remedies for protection, lethality and risk issues, model protocols
for addressing domestic violence, available community resources and victims services,
and reporting requirements.”).
Admin. Office of the Courts, Judicial Education Overview, NEV. JUDICIARY,
https://nvcourts.gov/AOC/Programs_and_Services/Judicial_Education/Overview
(last visited Feb. 14, 2019) (“Continuing judicial education on the causes, effects,
and dynamics of domestic violence for all District Court judges, Justices of the Peace,
Municipal Court Judges, and Domestic Relations Masters”); see also JUD. EDUC.
REQUIREMENTS: ST. OF NEV. APP. A, https://nvcourts.gov/AOC/Programs_and_
Services/Judicial_Education/Documents/Important_Documents/Judicial_
Education_Requirements/ (last updated Nov. 2018) (stating that “[a]ll District Court
Judges, Justices of the Peace, Municipal Court Judges, and Domestic relations Masters” must have as part of required training “continuing judicial education on the
causes, effects, and dynamics of domestic violence”).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-20b(1) to (2) (Westlaw through L.2018, c. 169 and J.R.
No. 14) (“The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and approve a training course and a curriculum on the handling, investigation and response procedures
concerning allegations of domestic violence . . . . The Administrative Director of the
Courts shall be responsible for ensuring that all judges and judicial personnel attend
initial training within 90 days of appointment or transfer and annual inservice training as described in this section.”).
N.M.R.A. 18-204G(2) (“Annual training for metropolitan, district and appellate
court judges, domestic violence special commissioners and domestic relations hearing
officers shall include appropriate training in understanding domestic violence, as determined by the Judicial Continuing Education Committee.”).
N.Y. CT. R. § 17.4 (“Each judge or justice in a court that exercises criminal jurisdiction, including town and village justices, each judge of the Family Court, and each
justice of the Supreme Court who regularly handles matrimonial matters shall attend,
every two years, a program approved by the Chief Administrator of the Courts addressing issues relating to domestic violence.”).
There is a statute in place requiring the Oklahoma Supreme Court to establish a rule
that requires training that “includes” domestic violence training. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10A, § 1-8-101A (Westlaw through 2d Legis. Sess. of 58th Leg.) (“The Supreme
Court is required to establish by rule, education and training requirements for judges,
associate judges, special judges, and referees who have juvenile docket responsibility.
Rules shall include, but not be limited to, education and training relating to juvenile
law, child abuse and neglect, foster care and out-of-home placement, domestic violence, behavioral health treatment, and other similar topics.”). However, the Supreme
Court rules regarding Mandatory Judicial Continuing Legal Education do not contain any specific requirements regarding domestic violence training. OKLA.
M.C.L.E.R. 1.
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violence training be provided but does not state whether family court
judges are required to attend such training, so it is not included on the
373
list. Texas’ requirements for the training of judges on domestic
violence are unclear in terms of whether a judge in a divorce or
374
parentage child custody case would be included in the requirement.
370. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-100 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“Magistrates,
municipal court judges, family court judges, and circuit court judges shall receive
continuing legal education on issues concerning domestic violence. The frequency
and content of the continuing legal education is to be determined by the South Carolina Court Administration at the direction of the Chief Justice of the South Carolina
Supreme Court.”).
371. TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-12-107 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“All state and
local court administrators, court clerks, and judges, with personnel who are likely to
encounter situations involving domestic violence, shall adopt a policy regarding domestic violence and provide initial and continuing education concerning the dynamics of domestic violence, and the handling and response procedures concerning allegations of domestic violence to all judges and court personnel who are likely to
encounter allegations of domestic violence.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-12-109
(Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“The administrative office of the courts shall establish a policy regarding, and a continuing education curriculum concerning, domestic violence and shall provide continuing education on domestic violence to all
judges and court personnel throughout the state who are likely to encounter situations of domestic violence. The administrative office of the courts may adopt the policy and training curriculum developed by the domestic violence state coordinating
council, and may revise the policy and training curriculum at its discretion.” § 38-12109).
372. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-1104 (Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.)
(“All circuit court judges may and magistrates and family courts [sic] shall receive a
minimum of three hours training each year on domestic violence which shall include
training on the psychology of domestic violence, the battered wife and child syndromes, sexual abuse, courtroom treatment of victims, offenders and witnesses, available sanctions and treatment standards for offenders, and available shelter and support services for victims.”).
373. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.30 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“The Supreme
Court’s judicial education program must include ongoing training for district court
judges on child and adolescent sexual abuse, domestic abuse, harassment, stalking,
and related civil and criminal court issues. The program must include the following:
(1) information about the specific needs of victims; (2) education on the causes of
sexual abuse and family violence; (3) education on culturally responsive approaches to
serving victims; (4) education on the impacts of domestic abuse and domestic abuse
allegations on children and the importance of considering these impacts when making parenting time and child custody decisions under chapter 518; and (5) information on alleged and substantiated reports of domestic abuse, including, but not
limited to, Department of Human Services survey data.” § 480.30).
374. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.110 (2017 Reg. and 1st Called Sess. of 85th Leg.)
(“The court of criminal appeals shall assure that judicial training related to the
problems of family violence, sexual assault, trafficking of persons, and child abuse and
neglect is provided.”). A judge is exempt from the training requirements if the judge
“files an affidavit stating that the judge or judicial officer does not hear any cases
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The training statutes in the District of Columbia, Minnesota,
377
378
Texas, and West Virginia combine domestic violence training with
required training related to forms of abuse. The state of Washington has
tested pilot programs which contain mandatory domestic violence
379
training. Both Georgia and Idaho allow for the creation of courts
focused on domestic violence issues and provide for certain domestic
380
violence training for the judges in those courts. While we did not
engage in a multi-county search within any state for any county level
mandatory domestic violence training, we did discover one in
381
Georgia. We assume there may be other counties in other states that
require domestic violence training for their family law judges.
Arizona is not included in the list of 11 states with mandatory
training of family law judges on domestic violence because there is the
possibility of waiving it, but this waiver is only in limited circumstances
and temporary in nature, so this approach is much better than merely

375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

380.

381.

involving family violence, sexual assault, trafficking of persons, or child abuse and
neglect.” § 22.110. It appears this training is intended for judges in criminal cases or
in child abuse and neglect cases.
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1104(c) (Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2019); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 11-1732A(f) (Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2019).
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.30 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.).
See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.110 (2017 Reg. and 1st Called Sess. of 85th Leg.).
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-1104 (Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary
Sess.).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.12.804 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (stating
that the judges of the superior judicial districts with unified family court pilot programs shall require initial training and continuing training for judges in unified family court regarding “childhood development . . . and mental illness”); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 212.2(n) (LexisNexis through 2019) (repealed 2018) (requiring “[t]raining about
domestic violence” for judges hearing orders of protection in family court).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1409(a) (Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess. of 64th Leg.)
(stating that in Idaho “the district court in each county may establish a domestic violence court,” and if such a court is created, a “committee shall recommend policies
and procedures for domestic violence courts addressing eligibility, identification and
screening, assessment, treatment and treatment providers, case management and supervision, judicial monitoring, supervision of progress and evaluation. The committee shall also solicit specific domestic violence court plans from each judicial district,
recommend funding priorities for each judicial district and provide training to ensure
the effective operation of domestic violence courts.” § 32-1409(a).); GA. COMM’N ON
FAMILY VIOLENCE, GEORGIA DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS BEST PRACTICES (2017).
SUPER. CT. FULTON CTY. FAM. DIV. R. 1000-3 (“Each Judicial Officer shall receive
twenty (20) hours of training, including four (4) hours of domestic violence training.”).
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“recommending” domestic violence training for judges handling child
382
custody cases.
The following five states recommend that judges obtain training on
383
domestic violence but do not absolutely require it: Alabama,
384
385
386
387
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, and Maryland. For example, the
382. Under Arizona law, training of judges on domestic violence is required as part of
New Judge Orientation and can only be waived under limited circumstances. ARIZ.
CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. § 1-302(F)(2) (“Upon request, the chief justice, the chief
judge, the presiding judge of the superior court in each county, or their designees
may grant exemptions to judges and employees of their court for temporary circumstances, including but not limited to: (a) Medical or other physical conditions preventing active participation in educational programs; (b) Extended, approved leave of
absence; (c) Military leave; (d) Extended jury duty; (e) Temporary medical waivers
for defensive tactics courses, in accordance with ACJA § 6-107.”). See ARIZ. SUP. CT.,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TRAINING FOR JUDGES, (2007), http://azmag.gov/Portals/0/
Documents/pdf/cms.resource/RDVC_2007_08-16_DV-Training-for-Judges71064.
pdf?ver=2007-08-16-105700-000.
383. ALA. R. MANDATORY JUD. EDUC. I.1, II.2, http://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/library/
rules/ManJEd.pdf (providing that judicial training credits will be given for programs
that address a variety of topics and domestic violence is an approved topic).
384. GA. COMM’N ON FAM. VIOLENCE, supra note 380.
385. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1409(1) to (2) (West through 2018 2d Reg. Sess. of 64th
Leg.) (stating that each county can establish a “domestic violence court” and that
“[t]he committee shall also solicit specific domestic violence court plans from each
judicial district, recommend funding priorities for each judicial district and provide
training to ensure the effective operation of domestic violence courts”); IDAHO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CTS., IDAHO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CT. POLICIES &
GUIDELINES, ATTACHMENT A https://isc.idaho.gov/dv_courts/DV_Court_Policies_
and_Guidelines_revised_4.15.pdf (last updated April 2015) (“It is critical that a
judge selected to serve on a domestic violence court be highly interested in taking on
the job and willing to be educated on the complex issues surrounding domestic violence.”).
386. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 908(c) (“Judges who, by specific assignment or otherwise, may be
called upon to hear child custody or allocation of parental responsibilities cases
should participate in judicial education opportunities available on these topics, such
as attending those sessions or portions of the Education Conference, presented biannually at the direction of the Supreme Court, which address the topics described in
paragraph (a) of this rule. Judges may also elect to participate in any other Judicial
Conference Judicial Education Seminars addressing these topics, participate in other
judicial education programs approved for the award of continuing judicial education
credit by the Supreme Court, complete individual training through the Internet,
computer training programs, video presentations, or other relevant programs. ILL.
SUP. CT. R. 908(c). The Chief Judges of the judicial circuits should make reasonable
efforts to ensure that judges have the opportunity to attend programs approved for
the award of continuing judicial education credit by the Supreme Court which address the topics and issues described in paragraph (a) [allocation of child custody and
parental responsibility] of this rule.” ILL. SUP. CT. R. 908(c).).
387. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND: ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON
CONTINUING EDUCATION OF JUDGES, MAGISTRATES, AND COMMISSIONERS (2016),
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Illinois Supreme Court Rules state that judges hearing child custody or
allocation of parental responsibilities cases “should” participate in
judicial education opportunities on the topics of domestic violence
issues and child sexual abuse issues, but does not require that such
388
training sessions be provided and attended. Some states require
judicial continuing education without specifying whether it includes
389
domestic violence.
The results of this research, with only 11 states clearly requiring
family law judges to receive training on domestic violence without waiver, reflect a profound failure to apply evidence-based best practices to
achieve the goal of adequately taking domestic violence into account in
child custody cases. Requiring such training is a major part of the law
reform recommended in Section III.
B. To What Extent Do States Require Guardians ad litem,
Child Representatives, or Other Custody Evaluators to Receive Training on
Domestic Violence and to Screen for Domestic Violence in Their
Child Custody Cases?
Based primarily upon a review of the legislation and state supreme
court rules in each state, 13 states clearly require guardians ad litem,
child representatives, or other custody evaluators, without waiver, to receive domestic violence and/or child abuse and neglect training in a
390
391
392
393
child custody case: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho,

388.
389.

390.
391.

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-orders/20160606continuinged
ofjudgesmagistratescommissioners.pdf (stating that the training program “shall focus”
on issues including “domestic violence”).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 908.
For example, the state of Wisconsin requires all judges to complete continuing education. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 33.02. There is a section named “Required programs” that only covers attending the “Wisconsin judicial college, the criminal law-sentencing institute and the prison tour.” WIS. SUP. CT. R. 32.04. Wisconsin also requires Municipal
judges to complete training at a “municipal judge orientation institute, review institute or graduate institute developed by the judicial education office.” WIS. SUP. CT.
R. 33.04. The Maine Commission on Domestic and Sexual Abuse “may make recommendations on legislative and policy actions, including training of the various law
enforcement officers, prosecutors and judicial officers responsible for enforcing and
carrying out the provisions of this chapter, and may undertake research development
and program initiatives consistent with this section.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A,
§ 4013 (Westlaw through 2017 2d Reg. Sess. and 2d Spec. Sess. of 128th Leg.).
ARK. ADMIN. ORD. § 15.1(b)(1) (2016) (Westlaw through 2016).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68555 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“The Judicial
Council shall establish judicial training programs for individuals who perform duties
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398

Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri New Hampshire, New
399
400
401
402
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia. The following states only
403
recommend domestic violence and/or child abuse training: Alaska, Il404
405
406
407
linois, Kansas, Maryland, and Wisconsin.
408
409
410
411
the initial
In Alaska, Arizona, Kansas, and Maryland,
training can be waived. Among the group of 20 states with required or

392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

397.

398.
399.
400.
401.

402.

403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

409.

in domestic violence matters, including, but not limited to, judges, referees, commissioners, mediators, and others as deemed appropriate by the Judicial Council . . . .
The training programs shall include a domestic violence session in any orientation
session conducted for newly appointed or elected judges and an annual training session in domestic violence.”); CAL. R. OF CT. 10.464(a) (Westlaw through Dec. 15,
2018).
Conn. Gen. Stat.
IDAHO JUV. R. 35(e) (2018), https://isc.idaho.gov/ijr35.
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-50 (Westlaw through 2018 Second Regular Session and
First Spec Session of the 120th General Assembly).
ME. R. GUARDIAN AD LITEM R. 2(b)(2)(A)(iv) (Westlaw through amendments received through March 1, 2019).
Minn. Guardian Ad Litem Program Requirements and Guidelines, https://mn.gov/
guardian-ad-litem/assets/GALP%20PROGRAM%20REQUIREMENTS_tcm27364018.pdf (Last revised Dec. 19, 2018).
Standards with Comments for Guardians Ad Litem in Missouri Juvenile and Family
Court Matters, (complete text of an Order entered by the Supreme Court of Missouri en banc on September 17, 1996 establishing standards for GALS in Missouri
courts) http://mija.org/images/resources/publications/GALStds.doc.
N.H. R. CH. GAL 303.02(b)(1)(k), http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rules/state_
agencies/gal300.html.
Become an Attorney for the Child, N.Y. App. Div. 4th Jud. Dep’t.
OHIO SUP. R. 48(D)(11) (Westlaw through amendments received through February
15, 2019).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 1-8-101(A)(1) (LEXIS through Nov. 1, 2013); Guardian
Ad Litem Bd. Laws and Rules §303.02(b)(1)(k) (last visited Mar. 18, 2019)
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rules/state_agencies/gal300.html.
Standard to Govern the Appointment of Guardians Ad Litem Pursuant to Section
16.1-266, Code of Va., Judicial Council of Va., http://www.courts.state.va.us/
courtadmin/aoc/cip/programs/gal/children/gal_standards_children.pdf.
ALASKA R. CINA 11(c) (Westlaw 2006).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 906(c).
KAN. SUP. CT. R. 110A.
MD. RULES ANN. tit. 9, Ch. 200, App. § 4 (Westlaw 2018).
WIS. SUP CT. R. 35.03.
ST. OF ALASKA, GUIDELINES FOR CONT. AND CT. APPOINTED GUARDIANS AD LITEM
IN CHILD IN NEED OF AID PROC. 5–6 (2007), http://doa.alaska.gov/opa/pdfs/
07_contract_gdlines.pdf (The Office of Public Advocacy “may waive all or part of
the initial training requirement for a new guardian ad litem depending on background or experience.”).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1.J (West 2014) (“Attorneys shall provide the judge with
an affidavit of completion of the six (6) hour court approved training requirement
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recommended training on domestic violence or child abuse, the number
412
of hours of initial training for these topics ranged from six to 18. The
413
following are the 20 states where the guardian ad litem, child
representative, or child’s attorney is required or recommended to receive
training on domestic violence or child abuse (with footnotes for each
state containing the language requiring or recommending such
414
415
416
417
418
training): Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,

410.

411.

412.

413.
414.

415.

416.

prior to or upon their first appointment as attorney or guardian ad litem for a child
after the adoption of this rule unless a waiver of this requirement has been obtained
from the presiding judge of the juvenile court in which the appointment is to be
made.”).
KAN. SUP. CT. R. 110A (“The appointing judge may waive the prerequisite education
when necessary to make an emergency temporary appointment. The educational requirements must be completed within 6 months after appointment.”).
MD. RULES ANN. TIT. 9, CH. 200, APP. § 4 (West 2018) (stating that “[u]nless waived
by the court, an attorney appointed as a Child’s Best Interest Attorney, Child’s Advocate Attorney, or Child’s Privilege Attorney should have completed at least six hours
of training that includes the following topics: . . . (e) recognizing, evaluating, and understanding evidence of child abuse and neglect; (f) family dynamics and dysfunction,
domestic violence, and substance abuse”).
ARIZ. ST. JUV. CT. R. 40.1(j) (requiring 6 hours of initial guardian ad litem training);
CAL. ST. FAM. JUV. R. 5.242(c)-(d) (initially requiring “at least 12 hours of applicable
education and training” with an additional requirement that counsel “must complete
during each calendar year a minimum of eight hours of applicable education and
training”); IDAHO JUV. R. 35(e)(1) (requiring “at least 30 hours” of “pre-service training”); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 906 (stating that “[p]rior to appointment the attorney shall
have 10 hours in the two years prior to the date the attorney qualifies for appointment”); KAN. SUP. CT. R. 110A(b)(1)(A) (requiring 6 hours of initial training); LA.
SUP. CT. R. XXXIIL, pt. 3, sub. I, §3(A)(3) (requiring 6 hours of training each year);
OHIO SUP. CT. R. 48(E)(2) (requiring 6 hours of initial training); ME. R. FOR
GUARDIANS AD LITEM 2(b)(2)(B) (requiring 18 hours of initial training); MD. RULES
ANN. tit. 9, Ch. 200, App. § 4 (Westlaw 2018) (requiring 6 hours of initial training).
This list also includes Arizona, a state that requires training but permits waiver of that
requirement in limited circumstances.
ALASKA R. CT. 11(C), (2016) https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/rules/docs/
cina.pdf (“(2) The guardian ad litem should have an understanding of the following
as appropriate to the case: (A) child development from infancy through adolescence;
(B) the impact of child abuse and neglect on the child.”).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1J (West 2014). “All attorneys and guardians ad litem
shall complete at least eight (8) hours each year of ongoing continuing education and
training.” § 40.1(J). The “[e]ducation and training shall be on juvenile law and related topics, such as . . . the effects of the trauma of parental domestic violence upon
children and other issues concerning abuse and/or neglect of children.” § 40.1(J).
However, the initial training requirement can be waived by the court. § 40.1(J).
ARK. ADMIN. ORDER 15.1(B)(1) (2016) (stating that “[p]rior to appointment,” to
represent children “an attorney shall have” initial and continuing training and the
“[i]nitial training must include: . . . Dynamics of abuse and neglect; . . . Family dy-
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Idaho,
Illinois,
Indiana,
Kansas,
Maine,
Maryland,
425
426
427
428
429
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio,
430
431
432
433
Oklahoma, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

417.

418.

419.

420.

421.

422.

423.

namics, which may include but is not limited to, the following topics: substance
abuse, domestic violence and mental health issues”).
CAL. R. OF CT. ANN. § 5.242(C) (West 2018). “[B]efore being appointed as counsel
for a child in a family law proceeding, counsel must have completed at least 12 hours
of applicable education and training which must include all the following subjects: . . . (3) Spec issues in representing a child, including the following: . . . (C)
Recognizing, evaluating and understanding evidence of child abuse and neglect, family violence and substance abuse, cultural and ethnic diversity, and gender-specific issues; (D) The effects of domestic violence and child abuse and neglect on children.”
§ 5.242(C).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. CH. 815(E) § 46B-38C(J) (West 2019). “The Judicial Department shall establish an ongoing training program for . . . guardians ad litem . . . to inform them about the policies and procedures of sections 46b-1, 46b-15,
46b-38a to 46b-38f, inclusive, and 54-1g, including, but not limited to, the function
of the family violence intervention units and the use of restraining and protective orders. Such training program shall include an examination of the factors that contribute to a family being at risk for episodes of domestic violence within the family.” CH.
815(E) § 46B-38C(J).
GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAMS, 35 IDAHO JUV. R. § (E) (2012) (“(1) Each [guardian ad litem] Program shall require that volunteers complete at least 30 hours of required pre-service training and 12 hours of required in-service training per year (2)
Pre-service training shall include the following topics: . . . (C) Dynamics of families
including mental health, substance abuse, domestic violence, and poverty.”).
ILL. SUP. CT. RULE ANN. § 906(C) (West 2018) “Certification requirements may address minimum experience requirements for attorneys appointed by the court to represent minor children.” § 906(C) “In addition, the qualifications may include one or
all of the following which are recommended: (1) Prior to appointment the attorney
shall have 10 hours in the two years prior to the date the attorney qualifies for appointment in approved continuing legal education courses in the following areas: . . . family dynamics, including substance abuse, domestic abuse, and mental
health issues. (2) Periodic continuing education in approved child related courses
shall be required to maintain qualification as an attorney eligible to be appointed.”
§ 906(C).
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-50(B) (West 2018). “‘Guardian ad litem’ . . . means an
attorney . . . who: . . . (3) has completed training appropriate for the person’s role, including training in: (A) the identification and treatment of child abuse and neglect.”
§ 31-9-2-50(B).
KAN. SUP. CT. R. ANN. 110A § (B)(1)(B) (West 2019) “Areas of education [for a
Guardian ad litem] should include, but are not limited to: dynamics of abuse and neglect . . . .” R. ANN. 110A § (B)(1)(Kansas requires initial and continuing training
although initial training can be waived for an emergency temporary appointment. R.
ANN. 110A § (B)(2).
ME. CT. RULES FOR GUARDIANS AD LITEM § 2(B) (West 2018) (stating that guardian
ad litem “must have attended” a core training program which covers the “dynamics
of domestic abuse and its effect on children”).
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424. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-200, app § 4 (Westlaw through all legis. from the
2018 Reg. Sess. of the General Assembly) (“Unless waived by the court, an attorney
appointed as a Child’s Best Interest Attorney, Child’s Advocate Attorney, or Child’s
Privilege Attorney should have completed at least six hours of training that includes
the following topics: . . . (e) recognizing, evaluating, and understanding evidence of
child abuse and neglect; (f) family dynamics and dysfunction, domestic violence, and
substance abuse.”).
425. MINN. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (Nonstatutory) (2015), https://mn.gov/guardian-ad-litem/assets/GALP%20PROGRAM%
20REQUIREMENTS_tcm27-364018.pdf (requiring at least 6 hours of “training on
domestic and family violence”).
426. See Standards supra note 395, at 16.0 (“No person shall be appointed as guardian ad
litem without first completing twelve hours of specialized training. Thereafter, to
continue to be appointed as a guardian ad litem a person shall complete six hours of
specialized training annually . . . . The specialized training shall include . . . Dynamics of child abuse and neglect issues . . . Family and Domestic Violence issues”).
427. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490-C:6 (West 2018). “Court Appointed Special Advocates
(CASA) of New Hampshire shall be accountable to the guardian ad litem board for
complying with the training requirements established by the board under RSA 490C:5, I(d) and for the actions of its volunteer members who are appointed by the court
as guardians ad litem.” § 490-C:6.; see also Office of Prof’l Licensure and Certification, GUARDIAN AD LITEM BD. RULES § 302.02 (stating that training shall
“[e]ncompass instruction in at least the following areas: . . . Domestic violence training”).
428. See N.Y. RULES OF THE CHIEF JUDGE ANN. LAW § 7.1(A) (West 2018) (“Each of the
Appellate Divisions shall by January 1, 1980 promulgate rules pertaining to the establishment and operation of a panel of lawyers qualified for assignment as law guardians
to represent minors in proceedings in Family Court.”); see also N. Y. App. Div., 4th
Jud. Dep’t, Become an Attorney for the Child, https://ad4.nycourts.gov/afc/
prospective. (“When you are accepted to the training program you will be given access to the domestic violence videos on-line. You must view four segments of domestic violence training online to be eligible for designation to a county panel.”Id.).
429. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 48 (West 2018) (stating that the “pre-service course shall include training on all the following topics: . . . (c) Preventing child abuse and neglect
including, but not limited to, assessing risk and safety; (d) Family and child issues including, but not limited to, family dynamics, substance abuse and its effects, basic
psychopathology for adults and children, domestic violence and its effects”).
430. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 107.3(A)(4) (Westlaw through legis. of the Second Reg. Sess.
of the 56th Legislature 2018) (“[T]he Administrative Director of the Courts shall develop a standard operating manual for guardians ad litem which shall include, but
not be limited to, legal obligations and responsibilities, information concerning child
abuse, child development, domestic abuse, sexual abuse, and parent and child behavioral health and management including best practices.”).
431. Standard to Govern the Appointment of Guardians Ad Litem Pursuant to Section16.1-266 I.B.1.f.
432. W. VA. RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR FAMILY COURT. app. § B(1)
(Guidelines for Guardians Ad Litem in Fam. Ct.) (stating that, “Every guardian ad litem shall complete eight (8) hours of continuing legal education credits every two
years provided by the West Virginia Supreme Court comprising of: understanding
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Wisconsin is the only state where the guardian ad litem, child
representative, or custody evaluator is clearly required by supreme court
rule or legislation to screen for domestic violence in the divorce or
434
parentage custody cases on which they are working. Finding only one
state that requires screening to be performed by a professional that
courts rely upon in making child custody decisions is shocking in light
of the prevalence of domestic violence within society and its harmful
impact on children. As explained in Section I, screening for domestic
violence in child custody cases is necessary since many survivors of
domestic violence do not self-report. In addition, it is not difficult or
time-consuming to perform basic screening for domestic violence,
especially when trained on how to do it. Several states suggest that
435
screening should be done but do not clearly require it to be done.
the stages of child development from early childhood through adolescence; recognizing the signs and symptoms of abuse and neglect and their effects upon children; recognizing the signs and characteristics of domestic violence and their effects upon
children”).
433. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 35.03 (2003) (Approval of Guardian Ad Litem Education) (stating
that “[t]he board of bar examiners shall approve, as family court guardian ad litem
education, courses of instruction at a law school in this state and continuing legal education activities that the board determines to be on any of the following subject
matters: . . . 4. The dynamics and impact of family violence”). However, the statute
does not specifically require guardians ad litem to be trained in domestic violence. See
WIS. STAT. § 767.407(4) (Westlaw through 2017 Act 370)) (stating “[t]he guardian
ad litem shall investigate whether there is evidence that either parent has engaged in
interspousal battery, as described in s. 940.19 or 940.20(1m), or domestic abuse, as
defined in s. 813.12(1)(am), and shall report to the court on the results of the investigation.”).
434. See id.
435. In Delaware, the guardian ad litem statute requires the guardian ad litem to represent
the best interests of the child and to “[p]resent evidence to the court in support of his
or her position” DEL. CODE tit. 29, § 9007A(c) (Westlaw through 82 Laws 2019);
DELAWARE COURTS, CHILD ADVOCATE MANUAL 13–15 (2007),
https://courts.delaware.gov/childadvocate/trmanual/Chapter5_073107.pdf. In Georgia, a guardian ad litem is required to ascertain the child’s best interests and “[i]n determining a child’s best interests, a guardian ad litem shall consider and evaluate all of
the factors” that include “(3) Evidence of domestic violence in any current, past, or
considered home for such child” GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-105(b) (Westlaw through
the 2018 reg. and Spec legis. sess. 2014). In Maine, the guardian ad litem has additional powers that can be granted by a court including: “Arranging for the assessment
of any physical, sexual, developmental, and/or emotional risks to or abuse of the child
by utilizing risk assessment tools; evaluations, assessments, and reports; medical records; observation; and interviews with appropriate persons” ME. CT. RULES FOR
GUARDIANS AD LITEM, R. 4. In West Virginia, the court can appoint a [guardian ad
litem] and “[t]he court shall specify the terms of the appointment, including the lawyer’s role, duties and scope of authority.” W. VA. CODE § 48-9-302(a) (Westlaw
through legis. of the 2018 First Extraordinary Sess.); If there are “substantial allega-
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Two states do not require screening but state that screening can be
436
court-ordered. As noted in Section I, there are many reasons why
survivors of domestic violence might not self-report but may in fact
share this information when domestic violence screening is properly
performed. For these reasons, it is problematic that domestic violence
screening by a guardian ad litem does not clearly appear to be a
requirement (and thus unlikely to be performed) in any states other
than Wisconsin.
In summary, research found only 13 states that require guardians
ad litem, child representatives, or other custody evaluators to receive
domestic violence and/or child abuse and neglect training without waiver in child custody cases. Only one state explicitly requires domestic violence screening. These results reflect a disturbing failure to apply evidence-based best practices to achieve the goal of protecting children and
survivors of domestic violence from further harm in child custody cases.
It is critical that these family law professionals receive training on domestic violence and screen for domestic violence in every child custody
case. This goal cannot be achieved without at least clearly mandating
these requirements and providing a mechanism to ensure that the mandated requirements are being performed.

tions of domestic abuse have been made, the court shall order an investigation under
section 9-301 or make an appointment under subsection (a) or (b) of this section,
unless the court is satisfied that the information necessary to evaluate the allegations
will be adequately presented to the court without such order or appointment.” Id.; see
also W. VA. FAM. CT. R. 47 (stating that when “the court is presented with substantial
allegations of domestic abuse, serious allegations of abuse and neglect, serious issues
relating to the child’s health and safety, or allegations involving disproving a child’s
paternity, a guardian ad litem shall be appointed by the court for the children” and
that in regard to “[i]nvestigations by Guardians Ad Litem,” W. Va. Code § 48-9301, § 48-9-302, and the Guidelines for Guardians Ad Litem in Family Court set
forth in Appendix B of these rules shall govern investigations by guardians ad litem”).
436. ME. CT. RULES FOR GUARDIANS AD LITEM (2015), https://mebaroverseers.org/
regulation/bar_rules.html?id=638955 (stating that one of the guardian ad litem’s
“Additional Powers” that require a court order include “(G) Arranging for the assessment of any physical, sexual, developmental, and/or emotional risks to or abuse of
the child by utilizing risk assessment tools; evaluations, assessments, and reports;
medical records; observation; and interviews with appropriate persons); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-9-302 (c) (Westlaw through legis. of the 2018 First Extraordinary Sess.) (stating
that “[w]hen substantial allegations of domestic abuse have been made, the court shall
order an investigation under section 9-301 or make an appointment under subsection
(a) or (b) of this section, unless the court is satisfied that the information necessary to
evaluate the allegations will be adequately presented to the court without such order
or appointment”).
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C. To What Extent Do State Laws Relating to Child Custody Cases
Take Domestic Violence Into Account Consistent with
Evidence-Based Best Practices?
Requiring family law professionals involved in child custody cases
to be trained on domestic violence and to screen for domestic violence is
a necessary, but not sufficient, step to better protect children and parent
survivors of domestic violence. It is also necessary to apply evidencebased practices to the child custody laws in each state. Custody laws
should empower family law judges to make child custody decisions that
protect both children and their parent survivors of domestic violence.
As described in the evidence-based literature review in Section I,
when there is a pattern of coercive abuse, it would be harmful and dangerous to award primary or shared parenting time and shared parenting
decision-making to an abusive parent. A parent who has engaged in a
pattern of coercive abuse is likely to use the parenting time and parenting decision-making as a means to further harm the parent victim of
437
domestic violence, rather than act in the best interests of the child.
There is also evidence that such parents will engage in violence or other
forms of abuse against the other parent during their parenting time with
their children, particularly during the exchange of the children, and in
438
communicating about or with their children. They are also more likely to neglect or directly abuse their children during their parenting time
as a means to punish the other parent or seek to induce that parent to
439
return to them.
For these reasons, it is important that courts order primary parenting time (referred to by some states as “physical custody”) and sole decision-making (referred to by some states as “legal custody”) to the parent
survivor of domestic violence, and order protective measures relating to
the parenting time (referred to by some states as “visitation”) of the par440
ent who has engaged in a pattern of coercive abuse. In this Section, we
review the child custody laws in each state to determine to what extent
their child custody laws recognize and adequately address these dangers
and harms.
The key standard that judges apply in determining physical and
441
legal custody in the custody statutes is the “best interests of the child.”
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

See supra Section I.
See supra Section I.
See supra Section I.
See ABA 50 STATE REVIEW, supra note 10.
See id.
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The “best interests of the child” standard is the term used to encompass
all of the various specific factors noted in the statutes that courts should
consider when determining child custody, and any other factors that
442
might apply to the custody case before them. In recognition of the
harm to children from exposure to domestic violence, according to the
an American Bar Association 50 State Review, domestic violence is a
factor in determining the “best interests of the child” in virtually every
443
state’s custody laws. But, this factor is just one factor. Other factors,
such as the “friendly parent factor” (the extent to which a parent fosters
a cooperative relationship with the other parent when it comes to
making decisions on their children and parenting generally) have been
demonstrated to override the domestic violence factor, especially when
the person accused of domestic violence or child abuse has alleged
444
parental alienation.
1. A Survey of the States
In recognition of the importance of the impact of exposure to
domestic violence on the “best interests of the child,” 21 states and the
District of Columbia have created a rebuttable presumption against sole
or joint legal or physical custody to a parent who has engaged in

442. See id. Although Louisiana does not have domestic violence listed as a factor, it does
have a rebuttable presumption that specifically references “family violence” and
“domestic abuse.” LA. STAT. § 9:364(A) (Westlaw through the 2018 Third
Extraordinary Sess.) (stating that “[t]here is created a presumption that no parent
who has a history of perpetrating family violence, as defined in R.S. 9:362, or
domestic abuse, as defined in R.S. 46:2132, or has subjected any of his or her
children, stepchildren, or any household member, as defined in R.S. 46:2132, to
sexual abuse, as defined in R.S. 14:403(A)(4)(b), or has willingly permitted another
to abuse any of his children or stepchildren, despite having the ability to prevent the
abuse, shall be awarded sole or joint custody of children”).
443. Minnesota does not list domestic violence as a best interest factor, but it does have a
separate rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interest of the child for a
parent who has committed domestic violence to have custody. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.17(b)(9) (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Regular Sess.); South Dakota
does not list domestic violence as a factor, but it does have a rebuttable presumption
based on “assault” or “domestic abuse.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.5 (Westlaw
through the 2018 Reg. and Spec Sess.) (stating that “[t]he conviction or history of
domestic abuse creates a rebuttable presumption that awarding custody to the abusive
parent is not in the best interest of the minor”).
444. Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 328–32.
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445

domestic or family violence, as defined in their statutes. They include:
446
447
448
449
450
451
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware,
452
453
454
455
456
Florida,
Hawaii,
Idaho,
Iowa,
District of Columbia,

445. This information is based upon THE ABA 50 STATE REVIEW, supra note 10, from
which we began our research for this information. We checked the statutes noted in
that review and checked for accuracy and for any updates as of August 30, 2018.
446. In Alabama, there is a rebuttable presumption that applies to “sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody” and as to which parent the child resides with.
ALA. CODE § 30-3-131 (Westlaw through 2018-579) (stating that “[i]n every proceeding where there is at issue a dispute as to the custody of a child, a determination
by the court that domestic or family violence has occurred raises a rebuttable presumption by the court that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interest
of the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody
with the perpetrator of domestic or family violence”); § 30-3-133 (2017) (stating that
“[i]n every proceeding where there is at issue a dispute as to the custody of a child, a
determination by the court that domestic or family violence has occurred raises a rebuttable presumption by the court that it is in the best interest of the child to reside
with the parent who is not a perpetrator of domestic or family violence in the location of that parent’s choice, within or outside the state”).
447. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(g) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the
30th Leg.) (stating that “[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has a
history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other parent, a child, or a domestic living partner may not be awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody,
joint legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child”).
448. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03 D (Westlaw through the First Spec. and Second
Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018) (stating that “[i]f the court determines that a
parent who is seeking sole or joint legal decision-making has committed an act of
domestic violence against the other parent, there is a rebuttable presumption that an
award of sole or joint legal decision-making to the parent who committed the act of
domestic violence is contrary to the child’s best interests”).
449. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(c)(2) (Westlaw through 2018 Fiscal Sess. and Second
Extraordinary Sess. of the 91st Ark. General Assembly) (stating that “[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interest of the child to be placed in the
custody of an abusive parent in cases in which there is a finding by a preponderance
of the evidence that the parent has engaged in a pattern of domestic abuse”).
450. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a) (Westlaw through Ch. 1016 if the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (stating that “[u]pon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has
perpetrated domestic violence against the other party seeking custody of the child or
against the child or the child’s siblings within the previous five years, there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to
a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of
the child, pursuant to Section 3011”).
451. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 705A(a)(b) (Westlaw through 82 Laws 2019) (stating that
“there shall be a rebuttable presumption that no perpetrator of domestic violence
shall be awarded sole or joint custody of any child” and that “there shall be a rebuttable presumption that no child shall primarily reside with a perpetrator of domestic
violence”).
452. D.C. Code Ann. § 16-914(2) (Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2019) (stating that “there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is not in the best interest of the
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461

Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada,
462
463
464
465
466
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas,
467
and Wisconsin.

453.

454.

455.

456.

457.

458.

459.

460.

child or children, if a judicial officer finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an
intrafamily offense as defined in § 16-1001(8) . . . has occurred.” “Intrafamily offense” is defined as “interpersonal, intimate partner, or intrafamily violence.”) D.C.
Code Ann. § 16-1001 (Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2019).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of
the 25th Leg.) (stating that “[e]vidence that a parent has been convicted of a misdemeanor of the first degree or higher involving domestic violence, as defined in s.
741.28 and chapter 775, or meets the criteria of s. 39.806(1)(d), creates a rebuttable
presumption of detriment to the child”).
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46 (a)(9) (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Second Spec. Sess.) (stating that “[i]n every proceeding where there is at issue a dispute
as to the custody of a child, a determination by the court that family violence has
been committed by a parent raises a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to
the child and not in the best interest of the child to be placed in sole custody, joint
legal custody, or joint physical custody with the perpetrator of family violence”).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B (5) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of
the 64th Idaho Leg.) (stating that ‘[t]here shall be a presumption that joint custody is
not in the best interests of a minor child if one (1) of the parents is found by the
court to be a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence as defined in section 39-6303,
Idaho Code”).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(b) (Westlaw through legislation from the 2018 Reg.
Sess.) (stating that “if the court finds that a history of domestic abuse exists, a rebuttable presumption against the awarding of joint custody exists”).
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) (Westlaw through the 2018 Third Extraordinary Sess.)
(stating that “[t]here is created a presumption that no parent who has a history of
perpetrating family violence, as defined in R.S. 9:362, or domestic abuse, as defined
in R.S. 46:2132, or has subjected any of his or her children, stepchildren, or any
household member, as defined in R.S. 46:2132, to sexual abuse, as defined in R.S.
14:403, or has willingly permitted another to abuse any of his children or stepchildren, despite having the ability to prevent the abuse, shall be awarded sole or joint
custody of children”).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31A (Westlaw through Act 450 of the 2018 Legis.
Sess. 2018) (stating that “[a] probate and family court’s finding, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that a pattern or serious incident of abuse has occurred shall create a
rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interests of the child to be placed in
sole custody, shared legal custody or shared physical custody with the abusive parent”).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 subdiv. 1(b)(9) (Westlaw through the end of the 2018
Reg. Sess.) (stating that “the court shall use a rebuttable presumption that upon request of either or both parties, joint legal custody is in the best interests of the child.
However, the court shall use a rebuttable presumption that joint legal custody or
joint physical custody is not in the best interests of the child if domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, has occurred between the parents”).
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-5-24 (9)(a)(1) (Westlaw through the 2018 Reg. and First
Extraordinary Sess.) (stating that “[i]n every proceeding where the custody of a child
is in dispute, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to the child
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and not in the best interest of the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody or joint physical custody of a parent who has a history of perpetrating family violence”).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 125C.230(1) (Westlaw through all 608 Chapters of the Seventy-Ninth Reg. Sess. 2017), (stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in NRS
125C.210 and 125C.220, a determination by the court after an evidentiary hearing
and finding by clear and convincing evidence that either parent or any other person
seeking custody of a child has engaged in one or more acts of domestic violence
against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child creates a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint custody of the child by the perpetrator of the domestic violence is not in the best interest of the child”).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-06.2 (1)(j) (Westlaw through the 2017 Reg. Sess.
of the 65th Legis. Assemb.) (stating that “[i]f the court finds credible evidence that
domestic violence has occurred, and there exists one incident of domestic violence
which resulted in serious bodily injury or involved the use of a dangerous weapon or
there exists a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the
proceeding, this combination creates a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has
perpetrated domestic violence may not be awarded residential responsibility for the
child”).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 109.3 (Westlaw through legis. of the Second Reg. Sess. of
the 56th Leg. 2018) (stating that “[i]n every case involving the custody of, guardianship of or visitation with a child, the court shall consider evidence of domestic abuse,
stalking and/or harassing behavior properly brought before it” and “[i]f the occurrence of domestic abuse, stalking or harassing behavior is established by a preponderance of the evidence, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best
interest of the child to have custody, guardianship, or unsupervised visitation granted
to the person against whom domestic abuse, stalking or harassing behavior has been
established”).
OR. REV. STAT. ANN § 107.137(2) (Westlaw through the emergency legis. of the
2018 Reg. Sess. and all Legis. of the 2018 1st Spec Sess.) (stating that “if a parent has
committed abuse as defined in ORS 107.705, other than as described in subsection
(6) of this section, there is a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interests
and welfare of the child to award sole or joint custody of the child to the parent who
committed the abuse”).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.5. (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and Spec. Sess.)
(stating that “[t]he conviction or history of domestic abuse creates a rebuttable presumption that awarding custody to the abusive parent is not in the best interest of the
minor”).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(b) (Westlaw through the end of the 2017 Reg. and
First Called Sess. of the 85th Leg.) (stating that “[i]t is a rebuttable presumption that
the appointment of a parent as the sole managing conservator of a child or as the conservator who has the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of a child is
not in the best interest of the child if credible evidence is presented of a history or
pattern of past or present child neglect, or physical or sexual abuse by that parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child”).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(2)(d) (Westlaw through 2017 Act 370) (stating that “if
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a party has engaged in a pattern or serious incident of interspousal battery, as described under s. 940.19 or
940.20(1m), or domestic abuse, as defined in s. 813.12(1)(am), pars. (am), (b), and
(c) do not apply and there is a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to the
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It is important to note the varying definitions of “domestic violence,” “family violence,” or other similar terms used in the state statutes
among the 21 states and District of Columbia that have created a rebuttable presumption against custody to the abusive parent. Some states
narrowly define “domestic violence,” “family violence,” or other term
used in the child custody statute that would trigger the rebuttable presumption. For example, the statute might require a criminal conviction
for a crime relating to domestic violence or the grounds for termination
468
of parental rights, as in Florida. This requirement is highly problematic since, for a variety of reasons, it is very rare that domestic violence will
469
lead to a criminal conviction when it occurs. In addition, of the 21
states that create the rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interest of the child to grant legal or physical custody to a parent who has
engaged in domestic violence, some only include instances of physical
violence (or placing someone in reasonable fear of such physical vio470
lence) or sexual assault.

child and contrary to the best interest of the child to award joint or sole legal custody
to that party”).
468. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of
the 25th Leg. 2018) (stating that “[e]vidence that a parent has been convicted of a
misdemeanor of the first degree or higher involving domestic violence, as defined in
s. 741.28 and chapter 775, or meets the criteria of s. 39.806(1)(d), creates a rebuttable presumption of detriment to the child”).
469. Many domestic violence survivors do not report or assist with the prosecution of a
domestic violence related crime due to a variety of reasons, including economic dependence on the abuser or fear of the abuser. A 2015 survey by the National Domestic Violence Hotline found that a quarter of women who had called police to report
domestic violence or sexual assault would not call again in the future, with 80 percent
reporting they feared the police would not believe them or would not do anything
about the violence. TK Logan & Roberta Valente, Who Will Help Me? Domestic Violence Survivors Speak Out About Law Enforcement Responses, THE NATIONAL
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE (April 2015), http://www.thehotline.org/resources/
law-enforcement-responses. From 2006 to 2015, only 56 percent of non-fatal domestic violence incidents were reported to the police according to the Bureau of Justice
statistics. Catalano, supra note 132.
470. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103(4) (Westlaw through all laws of the 2018 Fiscal Sess.
and 2018 Second Extraordinary Sess.) (stating, “‘[d]omestic abuse’ means: (A) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm,
bodily injury, or assault between family or household members; or (B) Any sexual
conduct between family or household members, whether minors or adults, that constitutes a crime under the laws of this state.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2(2) (Westlaw
through legis. from the 2018 Reg. Sess. of the 87th Gen. Assemb.). “‘Domestic
abuse’ means committing assault as defined in section 708.1 [criminal assault] under
any of the following circumstances: (a) The assault is between family or household
members who resided together at the time of the assault; (b) The assault is between
separated spouses or persons divorced from each other and not residing together at
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Indeed, the North Dakota Supreme Court in Zuraff v. Reiger affirmed a ruling by the lower court granting primary residential custody
to the father, despite evidence of domestic violence, because the domestic violence did not cause serious bodily injury, and, therefore, did not
471
trigger a presumption against sole or joint custody to the father. Narrowly defining the kind of abusive conduct that triggers the rebuttable
presumption to either physical violence or physical violence that causes
serious bodily injury is highly problematic. It fails to take into account
evidence of the serious harm to children and the non-abusive parent
from the many other forms of coercive. In addition, this definition for
domestic violence might not be met if the physical violence has not tak472
en place recently, under statutes which add a timing requirement.
Another problem with requiring physical or sexual abuse is that
there may be a lack of evidence of abuse that took place a long time ago.
In addition, as explained in Section I, when there has been a pattern of
coercive abuse, the act of separating alone can be the basis for future
physical violence, even though no recent act of physical or sexual
473
violence has occurred. As the authors have explained in prior articles,
the time of the assault; (c) The assault is between persons who are parents of the same
minor child, regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at
any time; (d) The assault is between persons who have been family or household
members residing together within the past year and are not residing together at the
time of the assault.” Id.; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31A (Westlaw through
Act 450 of the 2018 Legis. Sess.). “For the purposes of this section, ‘abuse’ shall mean
the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between a parent and the other
parent or between a parent and child: (a) attempting to cause or causing bodily injury; or (b) placing another in reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury. ‘‘Serious incident of abuse’’ shall mean the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between a parent and the other parent or between a parent and child: (a) attempting to
cause or causing serious bodily injury; (b) placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or (c) causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat or duress.” Id.; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.705(1) (Westlaw
through the emergency legis. of the 2018 Reg. Sess. and all Legis. of the 2018 1st
Spec Sess.). Abuse means the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between
family or household members: (a) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causing bodily injury; (b) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly placing another in fear of imminent bodily injury.” Id.
471. Zuraff v. Reiger, 911 N.W.2d 887, 892 (N.D. 2018).
472. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (a) (Westlaw through Ch. 1016 of 2018 Reg. Sess.)( stating
that rebuttable presumption applies to “domestic violence within the previous five
years against the other party seeking custody of the child, or against the child or the
child’s siblings”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-06.2 (1)(j) (Westlaw through the
2017 Reg. Sess. of the 65th Legis. Assemb) (stating that the presumption is triggered
when “there exists a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate
to the proceeding”).
473. See supra Section I.
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there is often a looming danger that will likely ignite after a domestic
474
violence survivor leaves a coercively abusive intimate partner. Some
states require more than one act of domestic violence, or one serious
physical injury from the domestic violence, as a precondition to
475
applying the rebuttable presumption. In contrast, some states pick up
and more fully develop the concept of a pattern or history of domestic
violence as the basis for the rebuttable presumption, or in the
alternative, apply the presumption not only for one serious physical
476
injury but also for attempts to cause serious injury. Some states

474. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 69.
475. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.24.150(g)(h) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess.
of the 30th Leg.) (stating that presumption only applies when a “parent has a history
of perpetrating domestic violence,” which exists if “the court finds that, during one
incident of domestic violence, the parent caused serious physical injury or the court
finds that the parent has engaged in more than one incident of domestic violence”);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (A) (Westlaw through the 2018 Third Extraordinary Sess.)
(stating that the presumption is limited to when there is “a history of perpetrating
family violence” which is when the court “finds that one incident of family violence
has resulted in serious bodily injury or the court finds more than one incident of family violence”).
476. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03(D) (Westlaw through the First Spec
and Second Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018) (stating that the presumption
only applies if “a person commits an act of domestic violence” which occurs “if that
person does any of the following: (1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes or
attempts to cause sexual assault or serious physical injury; (2) Places a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious physical injury to any person; (3) Engages
in a pattern of behavior for which a court may issue an ex parte order to protect the
other parent who is seeking child custody or to protect the child and the child’s siblings”); ARK. CODE § 9-13-101 (C)(1)(2) (Westlaw through law pass in the 2018 Fiscal Sess. and the Second Extraordinary Sess. of the 91st Ark. Gen. Assemb.) (providing for rebuttable presumption when there is a “pattern of domestic abuse”); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 32-717B(5) (West 2018) (limiting rebuttable presumption to when
“one (1) of the parents is found by the court to be a habitual perpetrator of domestic
violence”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(b) (Westlaw through legislation from the
2018 Reg. Sess.) (limiting rebuttable presumption to when there is “a history of domestic abuse”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208 § 31A (Westlaw through Act 450 of
the 2018 Leg. Sess. (requiring a “pattern or serious incident of abuse” for the presumption); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (9)(A)(1) (Westlaw through the 2018 Reg.
and First Extraordinary Sess.) (limiting presumption to when there is “a parent who
has a history of perpetrating family violence”). The court may find a history of perpetrating family violence if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, one (1)
incident of family violence that has resulted in serious bodily injury to, or a pattern of
family violence against, the party making the allegation or a family household member of either party.” Id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(b) (Westlaw through the
end of the 2017 Reg. and First Called Sess. of the 85th Leg.) (limiting rebuttable presumption to when there is “a history or pattern of past or present child neglect, or
physical or sexual abuse”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(2)(D) (Westlaw through 2017
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exclude from the presumption situations where both parents have been
477
abusive, but seek to distinguish true mutual fighting from a situation
where one parent is the primary aggressor and the other parent is the
478
primary victim. Excluding from the presumption situations where
both parents have been abusive is appropriate when there is true mutual
fighting. This would be in contrast to the situation where one party is
the predominant aggressor, and the other’s use of violence is primarily
defensive in nature or consists of occasional acts of retaliation. Even
when there is mutual fighting, one state applies the rebuttable

Act 370) (stating that rebuttable presumption applies only when “a party has engaged
in a pattern or serious incident of interspousal battery”).
477. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03(D) (Westlaw through the First Spec and Second
Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018) (stating that “this presumption does not apply if both parents have committed an act of domestic violence”); see also ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(B) (Westlaw through the First Spec and Second Reg. Sess. of
the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018) (stating that “an act of self-defense that is justified under
chapter 4 of this title is not deemed to be an act of domestic violence.”).
478. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 705A(d) (Westlaw through 82 Laws 2019, ch. 2, 4). “In
those cases in which both parents are perpetrators of domestic violence, the case shall
be referred to the Division of Family Services of the Department of Services for Children, Youth and their Families for investigation and presentation of findings.” Id.
“Upon consideration of such presentation, and all other relevant evidence, including
but not limited to, evidence about the history of abuse between the parents and evidence regarding whether [one] parent has been the primary aggressor in the household, the court shall decide custody and residence pursuant to the best interests of the
child.” Id.; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.230(2) (Westlaw through all 608 Chapters
of the Seventy-Ninth Reg. Sess.). “[I]f after an evidentiary hearing held pursuant to
subsection 1 the court determines that more than one party has engaged in acts of
domestic violence, it shall, if possible, determine which person was the primary physical aggressor.” Id. “[I]f it is not possible for the court to determine which party is the
primary physical aggressor, the presumption created pursuant to subsection 1 applies
to each of the parties.” Id. “If it is possible for the court to determine which party is
the primary physical aggressor, the presumption created pursuant to subsection 1 applies only to the party determined by the court to be the primary physical aggressor.”
Id.; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(2) (Westlaw through 2017 Act 370). If “both parties
engaged in a pattern or serious incident of interspousal battery, as described under s.
940.19 or 940.20(1m), or domestic abuse, as defined in s. 813.12(1)(am), the party
who engaged in the battery or abuse for purposes of the presumption under subd. 1.
is the party that the court determines was the primary physical aggressor.” Id. “If the
court must determine under subd. 2. which party was the primary physical aggressor
and one, but not both, of the parties has been convicted of a crime that was an act of
domestic abuse, as defined in s. 813.12(1)(am), with respect to the other party, the
court shall find the party who was convicted of the crime to be the primary physical
aggressor.” Id. “The presumption under subd. 1. does not apply if the court finds
that both parties engaged in a pattern or serious incident of interspousal battery or
domestic abuse but the court determines that neither party was the primary physical
aggressor.” Id.
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presumption in favor of the parent who is determined to be less likely to
479
commit domestic violence again. One state statute does not impose a
rebuttable presumption against custody to a parent who has engaged in
domestic violence, and instead prohibits custody (joint or sole) to a
parent who has been convicted of murder in the first or second degree
480
against the other parent or a sibling.
A slightly larger number of states, however, do not create a
rebuttable presumption against custody by the parent who has
committed domestic violence, with the following 28 states providing
that domestic violence is only a factor in determining the best interests
481
482
483
484
485
of the child: Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,

479. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.24.150(i) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of
the 30th Leg.). “If the court finds that both parents have a history of perpetrating
domestic violence under (g) of this section, the court shall either (1) award sole legal
and physical custody to the parent who is less likely to continue to perpetrate the violence and require that the custodial parent complete a treatment program; or (2) if
necessary to protect the welfare of the child, award sole legal or physical custody, or
both, to a suitable third person if the person would not allow access to a violent parent except as ordered by the court.” Id.; LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(D) (Westlaw
through the 2018 Third Extraordinary Sess.) (stating that “[i]f the court finds that
both parents have a history of perpetrating family violence, custody shall be awarded
solely to the parent who is less likely to continue to perpetrate family violence”);
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-5-24(9)(b)(ii) (Westlaw through the 2018 Reg. and First Extraordinary Sess.) (stating that “[i]f the court finds that both parents have a history of
perpetrating family violence, but the court finds that parental custody would be in
the best interest of the child, custody may be awarded solely to the parent less likely
to continue to perpetrate family violence”).
480. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 1-c(a) (Westlaw through 2019) (stating that “no court
shall make an order providing for visitation or custody to a person who has been convicted of murder in the first or second degree in this state, or convicted of an offense
in another jurisdiction which, if committed in this state, would constitute either
murder in the first or second degree, of a parent, legal custodian, legal guardian, sibling, half-sibling or step-sibling of any child who is the subject of the proceeding”).
481. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (a),(c) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (stating that in making or modifying an order for “custody or care of minor children” the
court must consider “the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child”).
482. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3 (a)(3) (Westlaw through the 2018 Extra Sess. of the Gen.
Assemb.) (listing 17 factors in determining the best interest of the child, with one factor being evidence of family violence).
483. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.7 (b)(11) (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179, of the 2018
Reg. Sess. of the 100th Gen. Assemb.) (stating that in making a decision concerning
the “allocation of parental responsibilities: parenting time” the court must consider
“the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child’s parent directed
against the child or other member of the child’s household”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/602.7 (b)(14) (West 2018) (“the occurrence of abuse against the child or other
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Kentucky,
Maine,
Maryland,
Michigan,
Missouri,
491
492
493
494
Montana,
Nebraska,
New Hampshire,
New Jersey,
New
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485.

486.

487.

488.

489..

490.

491.

492.

member of the child’s household”); and 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.5 (13)(West
2018) (“the occurrence of abuse against the child or other member of the child’s
household”).
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8(7) (West 2018). “The court shall determine custody
and enter a custody order in accordance with the best interests of the child. In determining the best interests of the child, there is no presumption favoring either parent.”
Id. “The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following: . . . (7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.” Id.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3203(A) (Westlaw through the 2018 legis. sess.) (stating that
“[i]n determining the issue of legal custody, residency and parenting time of a child,
the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: . . . (9) evidence of domestic abuse”); “There shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is not in
the best interest of the child to have custody or residency granted to a parent who: (b)
is residing with an individual who has been convicted of abuse of a child, K.S.A. 213609, prior to its repeal, or K.S.A. 21-5602, and amendments thereto.” KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 23-3205 (Westlaw through the 2018 legis. sess.).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (2) (West 2018) http://www.lrc.ky.gov/statutes/
statute.aspx?id=48320 (stating that the court shall consider domestic violence when
making custody decisions).
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1653(3)(L) (Westlaw through the 2017 Second Reg. Sess.
and Second Spec Sess. of the 128th Leg.) (stating that the court must consider “domestic abuse between the parents” and “child abuse”).
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-101.1(b) (Westlaw through all legis. from the 2018
Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (stating that the court must consider “evidence of
abuse by a party against: (1) the other parent of the party’s child; (2) the party’s
spouse”).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (Westlaw through P.A.2018, No. 545 of the
2018 Reg. Sess.,99th Michigan Leg.2018) (“‘[B]est interests of the child’ means the
sum total of the following factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the
court: . . . (k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed
against or witnessed by the child.”).
MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(2) (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Second Reg.
Sess. and First Extraordinary Sess. of the 99th Gen. Assemb.). “When the parties
have not reached an agreement on all issues related to custody, the court shall consider all relevant factors and enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law, including, but not limited to, the following: . . . (6) The mental and physical health of
all individuals involved, including any history of abuse of any individuals involved.”
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1) (Westlaw through chapters effective, Oct. 1, 2017
sess.). “The court shall determine the parenting plan in accordance with the best interest of the child.” Id. “The court shall consider all relevant parenting factors, which
may include but are not limited to: . . . (f) physical abuse or threat of physical abuse
by one parent against the other parent or the child.” Id.
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-2923(6) (Westlaw through the end of the 2nd Reg. Sess.
of the 105th Leg. 2018). “In determining custody and parenting arrangements, the
court shall consider the best interests of the minor child, which shall include, but not
be limited to, consideration of the foregoing factors and: . . . (d) Credible evidence of
abuse inflicted on any family or household member.” Id.
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Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
500
501
502
503
504
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,

493. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:6 (Westlaw through Chapter 379 of the 2018 Reg.
Sess., 2018) (“In determining parental rights and responsibilities, the court shall be
guided by the best interests of the child, and shall consider the following factors: . . . (j) Any evidence of abuse, as defined in RSA 173-B:1, I or RSA 169-C:3, II,
and the impact of the abuse on the child and on the relationship between the child
and the abusing parent.”).
494. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(C) (Westlaw through L.2018) (“In making an award of custody, the court shall consider but not be limited to the following factors: . . . the history of domestic violence, if any; the safety of the child and the safety of either parent
from physical abuse by the other parent.”).
495. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (A-B) (Westlaw through the end of the Second Reg.
Sess. of the 53rd Leg.). “There shall be a presumption that joint custody is in the best
interests of a child in an initial custody determination.” Id. “In determining whether
a joint custody order is in the best interests of the child, in addition to the factors
provided in Section 40-4-9 NMSA 1978, the court shall consider the following factors: . . . (9) whether a judicial adjudication has been made in a prior or the present
proceeding that either parent or other person seeking custody has engaged in one or
more acts of domestic abuse against the child, a parent of the child or other household member.” Id. Although domestic violence is only a factor, the statute does provide that “[I]f a determination is made that domestic abuse has occurred, the court
shall set forth findings that the custody or visitation ordered by the court adequately
protects the child, the abused parent or other household member.” Id.
496. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (Westlaw through 2019) (“Where either party to
an action concerning custody of or a right to visitation with a child alleges in a sworn
petition or complaint or sworn answer, cross-petition, counterclaim or other sworn
responsive pleading that the other party has committed an act of domestic violence
against the party making the allegation or a family or household member of either
party . . . and such allegations are proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the
court must consider the effect of such domestic violence upon the best interests of the
child.”).
497. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2(a) (Westlaw through S.L. 2018-145 of the 2018
Reg. and Extra Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.). “An order for custody of a minor child
entered pursuant to this section shall award the custody of such child to such person,
agency, organization or institution as will best promote the interest and welfare of the
child.” Id. “In making the determination, the court shall consider all relevant factors
including acts of domestic violence between the parties, the safety of the child, and
the safety of either party from domestic violence by the other party.” Id.
498. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(F)(2) (Westlaw through Files 115 to 117, 119,
nd
120, 122 to 154, 156, 158, 159, 162 to 165, 167, 169, 170 and 172 of the 132
Gen. Assemb. (2017-2018),) (“In determining whether shared parenting is in the
best interest of the children, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including,
but not limited to, the factors enumerated in division (F)(1) of this section, the factors enumerated in section 3119.23 of the Revised Code, and all of the following factors: . . . (c) Any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, other domestic violence, or parental kidnapping by either parent.”).
499. 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5328(a) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.
Act 164) (“In ordering any form of custody, the court shall determine the best inter-
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Virginia,
Washington,
West Virginia,
and Wyoming.
As
explained earlier, a statutory approach that makes domestic violence
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503.

504.
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est of the child by considering all relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to
those factors which affect the safety of the child, including the following: . . . (2) The
present and past abuse committed by a party or member of the party’s household,
whether there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and which
party can better provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of the child.”).
15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16(g) (Westlaw through Chapter 2 of the Jan. 2019
Sess.) (“[T]he court, when making decisions regarding child custody and visitation,
shall consider evidence of past or present domestic violence.”).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-15-40(A) (2008) (“In making a decision regarding custody of
a minor child, in addition to other existing factors specified by law, the court must
give weight to evidence of domestic violence.”).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106(A) (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Second
Reg. Sess. of the 110th Tenn. Gen. Assemb.). “In a suit for annulment, divorce, separate maintenance, or in any other proceeding requiring the court to make a custody
determination regarding a minor child, the determination shall be made on the basis
of the best interest of the child.” Id. “The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following, where applicable: . . . (11) Evidence of physical or emotional
abuse to the child, to the other parent or to any other person.” Id.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2(2) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Spec Sess.)
(“In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by ordering joint
legal or physical custody, the court shall consider the following factors: . . . (i) any
history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, or kidnaping.”).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (Westlaw through the end of the 2017 adjourned sess.
and the first Spec. sess. 2018) (stating that in entering “an order concerning parental
rights and responsibilities of any minor child of the parties . . . the court shall be
guided by the best interests of the child and shall consider at least the following factors: . . . (9) evidence of abuse, as defined in section 1101 of this title, and the impact
of the abuse on the child and on the relationship between the child and the abusing
parent.”).
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Reg. Sess. and
2018 Sp. Sess. I) (“In determining best interests of a child for purposes of determining custody or visitation arrangements including any pendente lite orders pursuant to
§ 20-103, the court shall consider the following: . . . (9) Any history of family abuse
as that term is defined in § 16.1-228 or sexual abuse.”).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.191(1) (West 2017) (stating that “[t]he permanent
parenting plan shall not require mutual decision-making or designation of a dispute
resolution process other than court action if it is found that a parent has engaged in
any of the following conduct: . . . (c) a history of acts of domestic violence as defined
in RCW 26.50.010(3)”).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-209(a) (West 2005) (stating that “[i]f either of the parents so requests, or upon receipt of credible information thereof, the court shall determine whether a parent who would otherwise be allocated responsibility under a
parenting plan: . . . (3) Has committed domestic violence, as defined in section 27202.”).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(c) (Westlaw through chapters effective March 15 of
the 2019 Gen. Sess. of the Wyo. Leg.). “The court shall consider evidence of spousal
abuse or child abuse as being contrary to the best interest of the children.” Id. “If the
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only a factor in determining the best interests of the child, versus
creating a rebuttable presumption about what is in the best interest of
the child, fails to adequately take domestic violence into account,
particularly in situations where the domestic violence includes a pattern
509
of coercive abuse. Colorado takes a position in between creating a
rebuttable presumption and providing for domestic violence to be just a
factor in determining the best interests of the child. Colorado’s statute
requires the court to consider as its “primary concern” the safety and
well-being of the child and the abused party when the other party has
510
committed domestic violence.
In addition to a rebuttable presumption to grant sole decisionmaking and primary parenting time to the survivor of domestic violence, courts should also consider whether to order further protective
measures relating to the parenting time of parents who have engaged in
domestic violence. This is due to the large body of evidence that children exposed to domestic violence are in danger of serious and long511
term harm when a protective parent is not being supported. As detailed and documented in Section I, there is a likelihood of further domestic violence if the parents continue to have significant contact with
each other in situational couple violence situations. There is also a likelihood that abuse will escalate after the couple separates when there has
been a pattern of coercive abuse.
To what extent do states, in their child custody laws, require courts
to order restrictions or conditions on parenting time to protect children
and the parent survivor of domestic violence from further harm? Based
on a review of the Resource Center on Domestic Violence: Child Protection and Custody, a Project of the Family Violence and Domestic
Relations Program of the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges (2013) (hereinafter the “NCJFCJ Chart”), and a review of
512
state legislation, the following 34 states expressly and clearly refer to

509.
510.
511.
512.

court finds that family violence has occurred, the court shall make arrangements for
visitation that best protects the children and the abused spouse from further harm.”
Id.
See supra Section I.D.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124 (West 2017).
See supra Section I.
DALTON ET AL., supra note 123. The NCJFCJ Chart is labeled “CONDITIONS ON
VISITATION IN CASES INVOLVING DOMESTIC AND FAMILY
VIOLENCE” and lists 42 states and the District of Columbia with statutory cites
and statutory language. It appears to have excluded states that did not contain the
subject matter of the chart. We have independently researched the laws in the chart
and the additional eight states not in the chart, and the results of this research are included in this article. In some cases, the laws reflected in the chart have been repealed
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domestic violence, domestic abuse, or family violence (including abuse
of the other parent) as a basis to restrict or provide conditions on parenting time to protect the child or parent victim of domestic violence:
513
514
515
516
517
518
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
or the statutory language has been modified. In some cases, the statutory language is
from a state’s order of protection/domestic violence statute rather than from their
domestic relations/divorce statute. Thus, the list of states we present for providing
domestic violence as a basis to restrict or provide conditions on visitation/parenting
time is less than the 42 states listed in the chart. We also found some examples of
states not in the list that provide for domestic violence as a basis to restrict or provide
conditions on visitation/parenting time.
513. ALA. CODE § 30-3-135 (Westlaw through Act 2018-579) (“A court may award visitation by a parent who committed domestic or family violence only if the court finds
that adequate provision for the safety of the child and the parent who is a victim of
domestic or family violence can be made.”).
514. ALASKA STAT. ANN § 25.20.061 (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the
30th Leg.). “If visitation is awarded to a parent who has committed a crime involving
domestic violence, against the other parent or a child of the two parents, within the
five years preceding the award of visitation the court may set conditions for the visitation, including: (1) the transfer of the child for visitation must occur in a protected
setting; (2) visitation shall be supervised by another person or agency and under specified conditions as ordered by the court; (3) the perpetrator shall attend and complete, to the satisfaction of the court, a program for the rehabilitation of perpetrators
of domestic violence that meets the standards set by the Department of Corrections,
or other counseling; the perpetrator shall be required to pay the costs of the program
or other counseling; (4) the perpetrator shall abstain from possession or consumption
of alcohol or controlled substances during the visitation and for 24 hours before visitation; (5) the perpetrator shall pay costs of supervised visitation as set by the court;
(6) the prohibition of overnight visitation; (7) the perpetrator shall post a bond to the
court for the return and safety of the child; and (8) any other condition necessary for
the safety of the child, the other parent, or other household member.” Id.
515. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03(F) (Westlaw through the First Spec and Second
Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018). “If the court finds that a parent has committed an act of domestic violence, that parent has the burden of proving to the court’s
satisfaction that parenting time will not endanger the child or significantly impair the
child’s emotional development.” Id. “If the parent meets this burden to the court’s
satisfaction, the court shall place conditions on parenting time that best protect the
child and the other parent from further harm.” Id. “The court may: (1) Order that an
exchange of the child must occur in a protected setting as specified by the court; (2)
Order that an agency specified by the court must supervise parenting time. If the
court allows a family or household member to supervise parenting time, the court
shall establish conditions that this person must follow during parenting time; (3) Order the parent who committed the act of domestic violence to attend and complete,
to the court’s satisfaction, a program of intervention for perpetrators of domestic violence and any other counseling the court orders; (4) Order the parent who committed the act of domestic violence to abstain from possessing or consuming alcohol or
controlled substances during parenting time and for 24 hours before parenting time;
(5) Order the parent who committed the act of domestic violence to pay a fee for the
costs of supervised parenting time; (6) Prohibit overnight parenting time; (7) Require
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Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
525
526
527
528
529
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,

516.

517.

518.

519.

520.

521.

522.

523.

a bond from the parent who committed the act of domestic violence for the child’s
safe return; (8) Order that the address of the child and the other parent remain confidential; (9) Impose any other condition that the court determines is necessary to
protect the child, the other parent and any other family or household member.” Id.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3100(c) (Westlaw through all laws through Ch. 1016 of 2018
Reg.Sess.) (“If visitation is ordered in a case in which domestic violence is alleged and
an emergency protective order, protective order, or other restraining order has been
issued, the visitation order shall specify the time, day, place, and manner of transfer
of the child so as to limit the child’s exposure to potential domestic conflict or violence and to ensure the safety to all family members.”).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(4)(IV)(e) (Westlaw through laws effective Sept.
1, 2018 of the Second Reg. Sess. of the 71st Gen. Assemb.) (“When the court finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that one of the parties has committed child abuse
or neglect or domestic violence, in formulating or approving a parenting plan, the
court shall consider conditions on parenting time that ensure the safety of the child
and of the abused party.”).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(C)(2) (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the
th
25 Leg.) (“If the court determines that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child, it may order sole parental responsibility and makes such arrangements for time sharing as specified in the parenting plan as will best protected
the child or abused spouse from further harm. Whether or not there is a conviction of
any offense of domestic violence or child abuse or the existence of an injunction for
protection against domestic violence, the court shall consider evidence of domestic
violence or child abuse as evidence of detriment to the child.”).
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-7(a) (Westlaw through the 2018 Reg. and Spec Legis. Sess.)
(“A judge may award visitation by a parent who committed domestic or family violence only if the court finds that adequate provision for the safety of the child and the
parent who is a victim of domestic or family violence can be made.”).
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-476 (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Second
Spec Sess.) (“(10) A court may award visitation to a parent who has committed family violence only if the court finds that adequate provision can be made for the physical safety and psychological well-being of the child and for the safety of the parent
who is a victim of family violence; (11) In a visitation order, a court may” listing several protective measures including supervised parenting time and supervised exchanges).
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8.3 (West 2017) (“If a court finds that a noncustodial
parent has been convicted of a crime involving domestic or family violence that was
witnessed or heard by the noncustodial parent’s child there is created a rebuttable
presumption that the court shall order that the noncustodial parent’s parenting time
with the child must be supervised.”).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.320(2) (West 2011) (“If domestic violence and
abuse . . . has been alleged, the court shall, after a hearing, determine the visitation arrangement, if any, which would not endanger seriously the child’s or the custodial
parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health.”).
LA STAT. ANN. § 9:364(E) (Westlaw through the 2018 Third Extraordinary Sess.)
(“If the court finds that a parent has a history of perpetrating family violence, the
court shall allow only supervised child visitation with that parent”).
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Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
535
536
537
538
North Carolina,
North Dakota,
Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania,

524. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1653(6) (Westlaw through the 2017 Second Reg.
Sess. and Second Spec Sess. of the 128th Leg.) (“Conditions of parent-child contact
in cases involving domestic abuse. The court shall establish conditions of parent-child
contact in cases involving domestic abuse . . . . In an order of parental rights and responsibilities, a court may: [statute lists six specific conditions on parenting time and
a general catch all).
525. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-101.1(c) (Westlaw through 2018 Sess.) (“If the
court finds that a party has committed abuse against the other parent or the party’s
child, the party’s spouse, or any child residing within the party’s household, the court
shall make arrangements for custody or visitation that best protect (1) the child who
is the subject of the proceeding; and (2) the victim of the abuse.”).
526. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208 § 31A(i) (LEXIS through Act 450 of the 2018 Leg. Sess.)
(“Imposing any other condition that is deemed necessary to provide for the safety and
well-being of the child and the safety of the abused parent.”).
527. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(k) (Westlaw through 2018 Leg. Sess.) (“Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed by
the child.”).
528. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175 (Subd. 1a)(a) (Westlaw through 2018 Sess.) (“If a parent requests supervised parenting time under subdivision 1 or 5 and an order for protection under chapter 518B or a similar law of another state is in effect against the
other parent to protect the parent with whom the child resides or the child, the judge
or judicial officer must consider the order for protection in making a decision regarding parenting time.”).
529. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(9)(d)(ii) (Westlaw through the 2018 regular and first
extraordinary session) (“A court may award visitation by a parent who committed
domestic or family violence only if the court finds that adequate provision for the
safety of the child and the parent who is a victim of domestic or family violence can
be made.”).
530. MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.410(2)(6) (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Second
Regular Session and First Extraordinary Session of the 99th General Assembly)
(“Custody and visitation rights shall be ordered in a manner that best protects the
child and any other child or children for whom the parent has custodial or visitation
rights, and the parent or other family or household member who is the victim of domestic violence from any further harm.”).
531. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-2934(2) (Westlaw through the end of the 2nd Regular
Session of the 105th Legislature 2018) (“When making an order or parenting plan
for custody, parenting time, visitation, or other access in a case in which domestic
abuse is alleged and a restraining order, protection order, or criminal no-contact order has been issued, the court shall consider whether the best interests of the child,
based upon the circumstances of the case, require that any custody, parenting time,
visitation, or other access arrangement be limited to situations in which a third person, specified by the court, is present, or whether custody, parenting time, visitation,
or other access should be suspended or denied.”).
532. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.230(1)(b) (Westlaw through the end of the 2nd Regular Session of the 105th Legislature 2018) (“Findings that the custody or visitation
arrangement ordered by the court adequately protects the child and the parent or
other victim of domestic violence who resided with the child.”).
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Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas Vermont, Washington,
544
545
546
Wisconsin, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Providing specific stat-

533. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:6(1)(j) (Westlaw through 2018 Sess.) (“Any evidence
of abuse, as defined in RSA 173-B:1, I or RSA 169-C:3, II, and the impact of the
abuse on the child and on the relationship between the child and the abusing parent.”).
534. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(B)(9) (Westlaw through the end of the Second Regular
Session of the 53rd Legislature) (“If a determination is made that domestic abuse has
occurred, the court shall set forth findings that the custody or visitation ordered by
the court adequately protects the child.”).
535. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2(b) (Westlaw through S.L. 2018-145 of the 2018
Regular and Extra Sessions of the General Assembly) (“Any order for custody shall
include such terms, including visitation, as will best promote the interest and welfare
of the child. If the court finds that domestic violence has occurred, the court shall enter such orders that best protect the children and party who were the victims of domestic violence, in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 50B-3(a1)(1), (2), and
(3).”).
536. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-29(2) (Westlaw through the 2017 Regular Session
of the 65th Legislative Assembly and results of the Nov. 6, 2018, election) (“If the
court finds that a parent has perpetrated domestic violence and that parent does not
have residential responsibility, and there exists one incident of domestic violence
which resulted in serious bodily injury or involved the use of a dangerous weapon or
there exists a pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the
proceeding, the court shall allow only supervised parenting time with that parent unless there is a showing by clear and convincing evidence that unsupervised parenting
time would not endanger the child’s physical or emotional health.”).
537.. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 111.1(3) (Westlaw through legislation of the Second Regular
Session of the 56th Legislature 2018) (“The court may award visitation by a noncustodial parent who was determined to have committed domestic violence . . . if the
court is able to provide for the safety of the child and the parent who is the victim of
that domestic violence.”).
538. 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5328(a)(2) (Westlaw through 2018 Regular
Session Act 164) (“The present and past abuse committed by a party or member of
the party’s household, whether there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an
abused party and which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards and
supervision of the child.”)..
539. tit. 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (g)(1) (2018) (“[T]he court, when making decisions
regarding child custody and visitation, shall consider evidence of past or present domestic violence. Where domestic violence is proven, any grant of visitation shall be
arranged so as to best protect the child and the abused parent from further harm.”).
540. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-15-50(A) (Westlaw through 2018 Act No. 292) (“A court may
award visitation to a person who has been found by a general sessions, magistrates,
municipal, or family court to have committed domestic violence . . . or in cases in
which complaints were made against both parties, to the person found by a general
sessions, magistrates, municipal, or family court to be the primary aggressor . . . only
if the court finds that adequate provision for the safety of the child and the victim of
domestic violence can be made.”).
541. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(c) (Westlaw through 2017 Regular and First
Called Sessions of the 85th Legislature)(“The court shall consider the commission of
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utory support to impose protective conditions and restrictions on parenting time based upon domestic violence is a strong way to take domestic violence into account in child custody cases. It would help empower domestic violence survivors to protect themselves and their

542.

543.

544.

545.

546.

family violence or sexual abuse in determining whether to deny, restrict, or limit the
possession of a child by a parent who is appointed as a possessory conservator.”); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(d)-(d)(1) (Westlaw through 2017 Regular and First
Called Sessions of the 85th Legislature)(“The court may not allow a parent to have
access to a child for whom it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1)
there is a history or pattern of committing family violence during the two years preceding the date of the filing of the suit or during the pendency of the suit.”); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(d-1)-(d-1)(2) (Westlaw through 2017 Regular and First
Called Sessions of the 85th Legislature) (“Notwithstanding Subsection (d), the court
may allow a parent to have access to a child if the court: (1) finds that awarding the
parent access to the child would not endanger the child’s physical health or emotional
welfare and would be in the best interest of the child; and (2) renders a possession order that is designed to protect the safety and well-being of the child and any other
person who has been a victim of family violence committed by the parent and that
may include a requirement that”)(proceeding to list four protective measures including supervised parenting time and supervised exchanges of the child).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665a(a) (Westlaw through all acts of the Adjourned Session
of the 2017-2018 Vermont General Assembly and all acts of the First Spec Session of
the Adjourned Session of the 2017-2018 Vermont General Assembly 2018) (“If
within the prior ten years, one of the parents has been convicted of domestic assault
or aggravated domestic assault against the other parent, or has been found to have
committed abuse against a family or household member . . . the court may award
parent-child contact to that parent if the court finds that adequate provision can be
made for the safety of the child and the parent who is a victim of domestic violence.”).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(2)(a) (Westlaw through Chapter 4 of the 2019
Regular Session) (“Visitation with the child shall be limited if its found that the parent seeking visitation has engaged in any of the following conduct: . . .(iii) a history
of acts of domestic violence as defined in RCW 26.50.010(3)”).
WISC. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(6)(g) (Westlaw through 2017 Act 370) (“If the court
finds . . . that a party has engaged in . . . domestic abuse . . . And the court awards periods of physical placement to both parties, the court shall provide for the safety and
well-being of the child and for the safety of the party who was the victim of the battery or abuse. For that purpose the court . . . shall impose one or more of the following appropriate”) (proceeding to list seven specific protective conditions on parenting
time and an eighth catch all).
W. VA. CODE § 48-27-509(a) (Westlaw through legislation of the 2018 First Extraordinary Session) (“A court may award visitation of a child by a parent who has
committed domestic violence only if the court finds that adequate provision for the
safety of the child and the petitioner can be made.”).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(c) (Westlaw through March 15 of the 2019 General
Session) (“The court shall consider evidence of spousal abuse or child abuse as being
contrary to the best interest of the children. If the court finds that family violence has
occurred, the court shall make arrangements for visitation that best protects the children and the abused spouse from further harm.”).
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children from further harm. But as noted earlier in the context of states
with rebuttable presumptions against custody to an abusive parent,
some of these states narrowly define domestic violence, which can reduce the ability of domestic violence survivors to obtain protective con547
ditions or restrictions on parenting time.
In addition to these 34 states, four other states’ custody laws could
be construed to be referring to domestic violence as a basis to impose
protective restrictions or conditions on parenting time, but the language
in their statutes is not as clear as in the statutes of the 34 states noted
548
549
550
above. These four states are: Arkansas, Oregon, New York, and
551
Virginia.

547. See supra notes 446-467 and accompanying text.
548. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(c)(1) (Westlaw through the 2018 Fiscal Session and
the Second Extraordinary Session of the 91st Arkansas General Assembly) (If a party
to an action concerning custody of or a right to visitation with a child has committed
an act of domestic violence against the party making the allegation . . . the circuit
court must consider the effect of such domestic violence upon the best interests of the
child . . . together with such facts and circumstances as the circuit court deems relevant in making a direction pursuant to this section.”).
549. As previously noted, Oregon creates a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the
best interests and welfare of the child to award sole or joint custody of the child to a
parent who committed abuse against a family or household member. OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 107.137(2) (Westlaw through 2018 Regular Session). In OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 107.101 (Westlaw through 2018 Regular Session), “It is the policy of this
state to: . . . (5) Consider the best interests of the child and the safety of the parties in
developing a parenting plan.” OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.101 (Westlaw through
2018 Regular Session). While this language does not explicitly refer to “domestic violence” or other forms of intimate partner abuse, when it refers to the “safety of the
parties” (which parties would typically be the parents) it seems likely it is including
safety concerns due to domestic violence. This would then serve as the basis to condition parenting time by directing courts to consider the safety of the parents when determining how parenting time should be structured.
550. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (Westlaw through L.2019) (In any action or proceeding brought . . . (3) for a divorce . . . . Where either party to an action concerning custody of or a right to visitation with a child alleges . . . the other party has
committed an act of domestic violence against the party making the allegation or a
family or household member of either party . . . and such allegations are proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, the court must consider the effect of such domestic
violence upon the best interests of the child, together with such other facts and circumstances as the court deems relevant in making a direction pursuant to this section
and state on the record how such findings, facts and circumstances factored into the
direction.”). The statutory language does not make clear whether the direction referred to in this statute includes denial of or restriction of the right to visitation.
551. VA. CODE ANN. §20-124.3 (Westlaw through 2018 Regular Session) (“In determining best interests of a child for purposes of determining custody or visitation arrangements including any pendente lite orders pursuant to §20-103, the court shall
consider the following: . . . 9. Any history of family abuse as that term is defined in
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The 34 states that have expressly and clearly required or authorized
their courts to condition or restrict the parenting time of a parent who
engages in domestic violence much better enable domestic violence survivors to protect themselves and their children from further abuse and
harm than do the following 12 states that fail to do so in their divorce
552
553
554
555
or parentage statutes: Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois,
556
557
558
559
560
561
Iowa, Kansas, New Jersey, Montana, Ohio, South Dakota,
562
563
Tennessee, and Utah.

552.

553.

554.

555.

556.

§16.1-228 or sexual abuse.”). The reference to “visitation arrangements” could include ordering protective measures due to the family violence, which would include
domestic violence. But the statute is not clearer.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(a) (Westlaw through P.A. 14-3) (discussing the
court’s ability to “award custody to either parent or a third party . . . subject to such
conditions and limitations as it deems equitable,” without specifically referencing
domestic violence as a basis for such conditions or limitations).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 728(a) (Westlaw through 82 Laws 2019) (requiring
courts to “permit and encourage the child to have frequent and meaningful contact
with both parents unless the Court finds, after a hearing, that contact of the child
with 1 parent would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair his or
her emotional development,” and further stating that “[t]he court shall specifically
state in any order denying or restricting a parent’s access to a child the facts and conclusions of such a denial or restriction,” without expressly referencing domestic violence as a basis for such a finding).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717E (Westlaw through First Reg. Sess. of 65th Leg.) (failing to mention domestic violence in this section where it refers to cases in which a
court has ordered supervised parenting time or supervised exchanges or transfers of
the children). But see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(5) (Westlaw through First Reg.
Sess. of 65th Leg.) (mentioning a presumption that joint custody is not in the best
interests of a minor child if one of the parents is found to be a habitual perpetrator of
domestic violence, but not directly referencing a need for restrictions on parenting
time based upon domestic violence).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/603.10(a) (Westlaw through P.A. 99-90) (explaining
that “[a]fter a hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a
parent engaged in any conduct that seriously endangered the child’s mental, moral, or
physical health or that significantly impaired the child’s emotional development, the
court shall enter orders as necessary to protect the child,” and specifying a nonexhaustive list of eight specific restriction on parenting time, plus a ninth catch-all,
without express reference to domestic violence as the kind of conduct that would
trigger this finding); but see id. at (a)(8) (“requiring a parent to complete a treatment
program for perpetrators of abuse . . . or for other behavior that is the basis for restricting parental responsibilities under this Section,” and thus opening the door for
the argument that such abuse could be the basis for restricting parenting time).
While the Iowa Code requires courts to “consider, in the award of visitation to a parent of a child, the criminal history of the parent if the parent has been convicted of a
sex offense against a minor,” IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41A (Westlaw through Feb.
19, 2019), and provides that courts shall not “[a]ward visitation rights to a child’s
parent who has been convicted of murder in the first degree of the child’s other parent, unless the court finds that such visitation is in the best interest of the child,”
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2. Illinois: A Case Study
Another way to evaluate the different approaches to taking domestic violence into account in child custody laws is to consider two specific
states and the ability of a domestic violence survivor in each state to pro-

557.

558.

559.

560.

561.

562.

563.

IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41B (Westlaw through Feb. 19, 2019), there was no express
reference to domestic violence as the basis for conditions or restrictions on visitation
or parenting time under the Iowa Code.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3208 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (explaining parents
are entitled “to reasonable parenting time unless the court finds, after a hearing, that
the exercise of parenting time would seriously endanger the child’s physical, mental,
moral or emotional health,” without referencing domestic violence as a basis for this
finding).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4.1 (Westlaw through L.2019, c. 35) (specifying sexual assault
of a child as a basis to deny visitation rights); compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4
(Westlaw through L.2019, c. 35) (listing domestic violence as a factor for determining custody, but not as a basis to condition or restrict parenting time).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-218 (Westlaw though chapters effective, Oct. 1, 2017
sess.) (explaining “if the court finds that in the absence of the order the child’s physical health would be endangered or the child’s emotional development significantly
impaired, the court may order supervised visitation by the noncustodial parent,”
without referencing domestic violence as a basis for supervised visitation).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051(D) (Westlaw through Files 115 to 117, 119,
120, 122 to 154, 156, 158, 159, 162 to 165, 167, 169, 170 and 172 of the 132nd
Gen. Assemb. 2018) (listing factors to be considered when determining whether to
grant parenting time to a parent pursuant to this section, none of which directly refer
to domestic violence, although one factor addresses criminal convictions involving an
act that resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected child).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §25-4A-10 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and Spec Sess.) (“Supreme Court to promulgate guidelines for noncustodial parenting time.”). This contains no reference to domestic violence in its charge to the South Dakota Supreme
Court to promulgate guidelines to be used statewide for minimum noncustodial parenting time in divorce or any other custody action or proceeding. Id.
TENN. CODE. ANN. §36-6-301 (Westlaw through the end of the 2018 Second Reg.
Sess, of the Tenn. Gen. Assemb.) (“If the court finds that the non-custodial parent
has physically or emotionally abused the child, the court may require that visitation
be supervised or prohibited until such abuse has ceased or until there is no reasonable
likelihood that such abuse will recur.”). There is no reference to domestic violence as
the basis for supervising or prohibiting visitation. Id.
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-34.5 (Westlaw through the 2018 Second Spec. Sess.).
(Under the “Supervised parent-time” heading: “Considering the fundamental liberty
interests of parents and children, it is the policy of this state that divorcing parents
have unrestricted and unsupervised access to their children. When necessary to protect a child and no less restrictive means is reasonably available however, a court may
order supervised parent-time if the court finds evidence that the child would be subject to physical or emotional harm or child abuse . . . from the noncustodial parent if
left unsupervised with the noncustodial parent.”) There is no reference to domestic
violence being the basis for ordering supervised parenting time. Id.
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tect themselves and their children from further harm. Illinois broadly
defines what conduct constitutes domestic violence and can trigger an
order of protection, and it provides very protective temporary orders on
564
child custody under its orders of protection. However, the child custody laws in Illinois that apply in a divorce or paternity action are quite
565
different. The child custody laws in Illinois that apply in a divorce or
paternity action make it very difficult for survivors of domestic violence
to obtain needed protections for themselves and their children.
A parent perpetrating domestic violence is just one of many factors
that courts are required to consider when determining the best interests
of the child for purposes of ordering custody in a divorce or parentage
566
case in Illinois. There is no rebuttable presumption in Illinois against
joint or sole decision-making or primary or significant parenting time to
a parent who engages in domestic violence as there are in 21 other
states. And, because there is evidence that courts accord much more
weight to the “friendly parent” factor (which parent better fosters a

564. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(1) (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018 Reg.
Sess.) (“‘Abuse’ means physical abuse, harassment, intimidation of a dependent, interference with personal liberty or willful deprivation”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/
214(b)(5)—(6) (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (each section contains a rebuttable presumption that awarding physical care and possession of
the minor child, or the temporary allocation of parental responsibilites and decisionmaking, respectively, to a respondent in an order of protection who has engaged in
“Abuse” would not be in the minor child’s best interest); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/
214(b)(7) (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (provides that:
“the court shall restrict or deny respondent’s parenting time with a minor child if the
court finds that respondent has done or is likely to do any of the following: (i) abuse
or endanger the minor child during parenting time; (ii) use the parenting time as an
opportunity to abuse or harass petitioner or petitioner’s family or household members; . . . (iv) otherwise act in a manner that is not in the best interest of the minor
child.”). Id.
565. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.5, /602.7, /603.10 (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of
the 2018 Reg. Sess.).
566. See CH. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 602.5(C)(13) (Westlaw through P.A. 1001179 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.). § 602.5 is entitled “Allocation of parental responsibilities: decision-making” and provides: “(c) Determination of child’s best interests. In
determining the child’s best interests for purposes of allocating significant decisionmaking responsibilities, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, without limitation, the following: . . . (13) the occurrence of abuse against the child or
other member of the child’s household.” Id.; CH.750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 /
602.7(B)(14) (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.). § 602.7 is
entitled “Allocation of parental responsibilities: parenting time” and provides: “In determining the child’s best interests for purposes of allocating parenting time, the
court shall consider all relevant factors, including, without limitation, the following: . . . (14) the occurrence of abuse against the child or other member of the child’s
household.” Id.
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positive relationship of the child with the other parent), than the factor
567
of domestic violence, not having a rebuttable presumption against
custody to a parent who has engaged in domestic violence makes it less
likely that a court will accord appropriate weight to the domestic
568
violence.
As discussed in Section I, there is substantial evidence that judges
place more weight on the “friendly parent” factor and claims of alienation than they do to claims of domestic violence, and even claims of direct abuse of the child. Judges in a divorce or paternity case often view
569
claims of domestic violence skeptically and wonder whether the parent alleging the domestic violence is lying or exaggerating, either to gain
an economic advantage in the divorce or parentage case or out of animus. This has been documented to lead judges to treat a protective parent as an alienating parent and to order child custody in line with what
570
the abusive parent has sought, rather than the abused parent. As explained in Section I, when a parent is a survivor of domestic violence,
especially a pattern of coercive abuse, it is not appropriate for a court to
require that parent to “cooperate” with the abusive parent. This is because the abusive parent often uses parenting time and decision-making
as a means to further abuse the other parent rather than act in the best
interests of the child. Furthermore, the contacts necessary to cooperate
571
can lead to dangerous interactions and abusive communications.
Another key problem with domestic violence being just a factor,
versus creating a rebuttable presumption, is that judges and the professionals they rely upon fail to realize how harmful repeated and/or severe
domestic violence by one parent against the other parent is to children.
With a rebuttable presumption, a court would have to accord significant
weight to domestic violence in its child custody decisions.

567. See Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 315, 331.
568. See CH. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 602.5(C)(11) (Westlaw through P.A. 1001179 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) and CH. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 602.7(B)(13)
(Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.) (both including as a factor
“the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child.”).
569. One anecdote on this is quite telling. One author of this Article, Stark, presented on
the topic of taking domestic violence into account in child custody cases in a training
session for child representatives. The first question she received, from a family a law
judge also in attendance, was: How can we know when a person claiming domestic
violence is telling the truth and not making the claim to get a better deal in the divorce?
570. Meier & Dickson, supra note 2, at 328, 331.
571. See supra, Section I.D.
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In an extreme example of what can go wrong without a rebuttable
presumption against custody to a parent who has committed domestic
violence, an Illinois appellate court affirmed child custody to a father
convicted of voluntary manslaughter for strangling to death the mother
572
of his children. Upon release from prison, the father brought an action for child custody against the maternal aunt and uncle who had
573
been caring for their two nieces while the father was incarcerated. The
case is also an example of what can go wrong when judges and other
family law professionals involved in custody decisions fail to be trained
on the nature and dynamics of domestic violence and its harmful impact
on children.
There was ample evidence in the case described by the appellate
court that the father, James, had been violent with the mother, Carol,
and with their children, Dana and Tracy, in ways that were harmful to
the children and deadly to the mother. Carol had filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and obtained an ex parte order of protection on
December 21, 1984, based upon her sworn allegation that the day before, James had grabbed and thrown her in a violent manner to the floor
574
and struck her. A neighbor of James and Carol who baby-sat for the
children testified at the custody case that on the evening James killed
Carol, the children ran into her house and begged her to go over to their
575
house because James was choking Carol. Both children were crying
576
and screaming. The neighbor further testified that when she went to
the house James told her that there had been a fight but that everything
577
578
was all right. The children then went inside the house with James.
The witness also testified that Dana had told her about another fight between Carol and James, at which point the other daughter, Tracy, told
579
Dana she should not have said anything to her. Another person who
had known Carol and James for many years—and had a child of the
same age—testified that prior to December 1984, she observed Dana
580
with a black eye and both children with bruises on their buttocks. The
marks were black and blue and Carol showed her a paddle that had been

572.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.

In re Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d 976, 987 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 977.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
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broken. This witness also testified that she observed injuries on Carol,
but had not personally witnessed the incidents in which these injuries
582
were inflicted. One of Carol’s brothers testified that he observed
bruises on Carol’s arm and knee but had no personal knowledge as to
how these were inflicted. He testified that Carol was afraid of James and
that as a result she appeared very uneasy, scared, and nervous, and she
583
also was losing weight.
James testified at the custody case that he observed Carol and a
man sitting in a pick-up truck hugging and kissing the night of the killing, but upon his return at home he did not say anything to her about
584
what he had observed and instead telephoned his father. He stated
that later Carol told him he could not take the children out for the
585
evening as they had planned. James stated that he insisted that he was
going to take them out as planned, while Carol again stated that he was
586
not going to take them. James stated at the time of his arrest and testified that Carol grabbed him and began choking him; he grabbed her
and pushed her back; she came at him again and he grabbed her neck
and choked her and then threw her down to the floor; he told the children to stay out in the living room because he did not want them to see
what was happening; Carol got up again and started choking him; he
kept choking her until she fell down a second time and began bleeding
through the nose; he called his father who advised him to call the para587
medics; and she was pronounced death at the hospital.
To a person trained on the nature and dynamics of domestic violence, these statements would not be credible. In light of the evidence of
Carol’s prior injuries, and her statement to her brother of her fear of her
husband, it was highly unlikely that she would have initiated violence
against him. There was no reference to any evidence presented by James
that Carol had ever attacked and injured him before. There was no evidence discussed in the opinion on any wounds to James from Carol trying to strangle him, or of the size and weight of each parent and how
that impacted the likelihood that Carol could have strangled James or
put him in reasonable fear that she could do so. And yet, notwithstand588
ing this, and voluntary manslaughter conviction, the court’s descrip581.
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.

Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 977–78.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 978.
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tion of what happened that night implied that this was a mutual
fighting situation. For example, the court stated: “Other than the tragic
circumstances [emphasis added by the authors] which resulted in the
589
death of Carol, James has an unblemished record.” It is also odd that
the court found that James had an unblemished record in light of the
emergency order of protection granted against him the day he killed his
wife.
In determining who should have custody of the children upon
James’ release from prison, the trial court applied the following six best
590
interests of the child factors using the standard under Illinois law:
a. “the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody”
This case balanced the wishes of a parent who strangled and killed
the other parent, against the wishes of the maternal aunt and uncle of
the children with whom the children had been living in a peaceful and
healthy home without domestic violence while the father was incarcerated.
b. “the wishes of the child as to his custodian”
There was testimony that the two girls loved their father and their
aunt and uncle, with one child stating she preferred their father and the
other ultimately stating a preference for the aunt and uncle, but wanting
591
to be with her sister no matter what. At first blush it might seem puzzling that the children expressed a desire to live with their father, without describing any fear. After all, they had seen their father strangling
their mother. They had also been punished by their father with corporal
punishment that left bruise marks visible to others.
It appears there are several possible reasons for the children not
expressing fear to live with their father after he returned from prison.
Although the children had in fact seen or heard some of what happened
on the night their father killed their mother (testimony of the neighbor
the children ran to her crying and screaming that their father was
choking their mother), what they were told later by their paternal
grandmother appears to have been a sanitized/normalized version of
589. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 986.
590. 750 I.L.C.S. 5/602, IL ST ch. 750, § 5/602 (repealed by P.A. 99-90, § 5-20, eff.
Jan. 1, 2016).
591. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 982.
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what their father had done. The paternal grandmother testified that she
told the children it was wrong that their mother would not let them go
592
out as they had planned to (i.e., the mother was at fault for the fight).
The father testified in the custody case that if his children asked him
about what happened to their mother, he would tell them that their
mother and he “had an argument; that there was pushing and shoving;
593
and he ‘took her (Carol) to the floor.’” This is an unlikely story by the
father of mutual fighting, and the father’s attempt to justify and
normalize the deadly domestic violence he perpetrated that killed their
mother.
c. “the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent, his
siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s
best interests”
There was little testimony noted in the appellate decision that focused on this factor. James’s counsel stipulated that the aunt and uncle
were proper custodial parents for the children. There was little discussion of the father’s relationship to his children.
d. “the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community”
There was remarkably positive evidence of how the children were
doing after their mother was killed by their father, while living with
their aunt and uncle. There was testimony from a child mental health
specialist who performed a psychiatric evaluation that “[t]he children
had benefitted from their placement with the Tranels. The Tranels han594
dled the children well.” The principal of the school testified that the
595
children had adjusted well to the school.
e. “the mental and physical health of all individuals involved”
There was little discussion and no evidence of any issues with the
mental and physical health of the aunt and uncle. The child mental
health specialist hired to evaluate the mental and physical health of the
592. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 981.
593. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 982.
594. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 983. (Eugene and Debra Tranel, Carol’s brother and sister-inlaw, were award custody of Tracy and Dana while James was incarcerated.)
595. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 979.
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children did not find either child suffering from any diagnosable psychi596
atric illness. The same mental health specialist met with the father and
597
reported that he was shy, anxious, and a bit of a “perfectionist.” It is
unclear what testing the mental health specialist ran to determine the
mental and physical health of the children and the father. The expert’s
observation that the father was a “perfectionist” might be more accurately perceived as being coercively controlling by someone trained on
domestic violence, depending upon what exactly was happening in the
home when things were not done precisely in the way the father expected.
f. “the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child’s
potential custodian, whether directed against the child or directed
against another person but witnessed by the child”
The trial court’s ultimate ruling to provide custody to the father,
and the appellate court’s review of this ruling, placed very little weight
upon evidence presented that the mother had been the victim of physical violence by her husband (both the night she was strangled to death
598
by her husband and the evidence of physical violence before then).
There was also little weight placed or concern raised with the level of
599
corporal punishment that the father inflicted on his children. This is
the case even though the father acknowledged that he was the sole person to discipline the children, and there was evidence that his discipline
was sometimes performed in ways that left bruise marks. There was no
exploration of the circumstances, the need to discipline the children in
this fashion to determine, or if the corporal punishment was reasonable
or abusive under the law.
In affirming the trial court’s decision, the appellate court noted
that the determination of child custody rests largely within the broad
discretion of the trial court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless the award is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence
600
or unless the court abused its discretion. The key evidence that the
appellate court focused on when affirming the trial court were: (i) the
wishes of the “sole surviving parent” (an ironic way to describe a hus-

596.
597.
598.
599.

Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 983.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 983.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 987.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 986 (“The attempt to show that James was an abusive parent
is not supported by the evidence.”).
600. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 986.
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band who has strangled his wife to death) who was determined to be a
fit parent; (ii) the wishes of the children (per the appellate court, while
the aunt and uncle used best efforts to provide for the children, still the
children felt they did not receive equal treatment with their cousins);
(iii) the recommendation of the child representative for custody to the
father; and (iv) that psychological testing that did not argue against
601
placing the child with the father.
In terms of the best interest factor relating to physical violence, the
appellate court stated: “While the court did hear testimony regarding
the circumstances of Carol’s death, that is still only one of the factors . . . had the legislature wished to make this factor all controlling, it
602
could have done so by appropriate legislation.” The appellate court
stated that another court had already punished James for the wrong he
committed in the criminal case, but this case involves a decision as to
the custody of his children where the key focus is on what is in the best
603
interests of the children. The appellate court, the trial court, and the
attorney for the children failed to see how being ordered to live with a
father who engaged in prior violence against the mother, and then deadly domestic violence against her in the presence of the children, would
not be in the best interests of the children. The appellate court seemed
to buy into the father’s story that the killing was an accident as a result
of mutual fighting by referring to James killing Carol as the “tragic cir604
cumstances which resulted in the death of Carol.” By misunderstanding what likely happened here, that the father engaged in repeated violence against Carol, placing Carol in fear of James, rather than mutual
fighting, the court failed to appreciate the likelihood that the children
would be exposed to further violence by their father with future inti605
mate partners. This in turn led the court to fail to see the connection
of James’s violence future harm to the children.
This case is a good illustration of the need for judges and child representatives to be trained on the nature and dynamics of domestic vio-

601.
602.
603.
604.
605.

Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 987.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 987.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 987.
Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d at 970.
As explained in Section I, those who perpetrate a pattern of coercive abuse often continue to do so after separation. This can be the case even when there is an order of
protection in place. “Among jail inmates convicted of family violence, 45 [percent]
had been subject to a restraining order at some point in their life.” Matthew R. Durose et al., Family Violence Statistics: Including Statistics on Strangers and Acquaintances, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 3, June 2005, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fvs08.pdf.
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lence, its harmful impact on children, and best practices to protect children and the non-abusive parent from further harm. This training
should include how to distinguish a mutual fighting situation from a
domestic violence situation where one person is the victim and the other
is the primary aggressor. This case is also an example of why courts need
a rebuttable presumption against sole or joint custody to a parent who
has engaged in a pattern of coercive domestic violence. Creating this rebuttable presumption against granting primary parenting time to a parent who engages in domestic violence will help courts apply appropriate
weight to this type of harmful conduct. It can also help children who
have been exposed to domestic violence learn that such conduct is not
acceptable for them to live with or to engage in when they grow up. It
should also make it less likely they will be exposed to further domestic
violence, especially if the parenting time of the parent who engages in
domestic violence is conditioned on the ordering of protective measures
designed to reduce the children’s exposure to further domestic violence.
As explained in Section I, even when the parent survivor of domestic violence is granted primary parenting time and sole decision-making,
evidence-based best practices would counsel the ordering of protective
restrictions or conditions on the parenting time of the abusive parent
tailored to the nature of the domestic violence that has occurred. But,
under Illinois law, the burden of proof of showing harm to the child is
606
on the parent seeking protective measures. There is no presumption of
serious harm to children from exposure to domestic violence, as is consistent with the large body of data discussed in Section I, and as articu607
lated in some states’ child custody laws. As noted earlier, this forces
the survivor of domestic violence to bring in an expert to testify on the
body of data (noted in Section I) of the serious harms that children experience from exposure to domestic violence. A typical survivor of domestic violence would not know how to do that or be able to afford to
do that.
The Illinois statute fails to explicitly refer to domestic violence in
the section establishing the standards for restricting parenting time, in
608
contrast to the 35 states that do. This failure to even refer to domestic
606. See In re Marriage of Fields, 283 Ill. App. 3d 894, 904–05 (1996) (holding, in a case
involving allegations and evidence of sexual assault of a minor by her father, that the
custodial parent carries the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that visitation with the non-custodial parent would seriously endanger the child).
607. See CH.750 ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 5/603.10 (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the
2018 Reg. Sess.) (detailing restrictions of parental responsibilities).
608. CH.750 ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 5/603.10 (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018
Reg. Sess.). However, §603.10(a)(8) refers to orders that include “requiring a parent
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violence as a basis for ordering restrictions on parenting time makes
arguing for such a result even more difficult. Section 603.10(a) of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act provides that the
court shall enter orders as necessary to protect the child “if the court
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent engaged in any
conduct that seriously endangered the child’s mental, moral, or physical
health or that significantly impaired the child’s emotional
609
development.” Section 602.7 states: “it is presumed both parents are
fit and the court shall not place any restrictions on parenting time as
610
defined in Section 600 and described in Section 603.10, unless it
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent’s exercise of
parenting time would seriously endanger the child’s physical, mental,
611
moral, or emotional health.”
In light of these serious gaps in taking domestic violence into account in the statutory standards set for allocating parenting decisionmaking and parenting time, and of requiring or even permitting restrictions on parenting time, it is highly unlikely that a family law judge
would order any type of protective measures that could be construed as
restrictions on parenting based solely upon a parent’s commission of
domestic violence against the other parent. This is the case especially if
the judge and the family law professionals they rely upon lack adequate
training on domestic violence and on the danger of serious harms to
children when it is occurring. And as noted earlier, under Illinois law,
judges, guardian ad litem, and child representatives are not required to
receive training on domestic violence. Instead, the Illinois Supreme
612
Court Rules only recommend such training. Family law judges in Illinois historically have not ordered significant restrictions or conditions
on parenting time, such as supervised parenting time, based solely on
exposure to domestic violence. However, there have been cases in which

609.
610.

611.
612.

to complete a treatment program for perpetrators of abuse” CH.750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§5/ 603.10(A)(8) (West 2018). By providing this as an example of an order for the
protection of a child implies that parents who commit such abuse can be subject to
this type of order when such abuse is considered to seriously endanger a child’s mental, moral, or physical health, or significantly impair the child’s emotional development (the standard set forth for orders as necessary to protect the child).
750 ILCS 5/603.10.
CH. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 603.10 (Westlaw through P.A. 100-1179 of the 2018
Reg. Sess.). It is important to note that the restrictions listed in 603.10 do not include only supervised parenting time, but also includes less invasive conditions such
as the exchange of children through an intermediary and the restraining of a parent’s
communication with or proximity to other parents or the child.
750 ILCS 5/602.7.
See supra notes 386 and 404.
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they might order supervised parenting time when a parent is engaged in
613
direct physical abuse or sexual abuse of their child.
3. Arizona: A Case Study
The state of Arizona falls on the other end of the spectrum in terms
of legal protections to domestic violence survivors and their children in
custody cases. Like Illinois, Arizona broadly defines domestic violence in
614
its custody laws. However, unlike Illinois, Arizona is among the 21
states whose laws create a rebuttable presumption against primary parenting time or joint or sole decision-making to a parent who has engaged in domestic violence. Equally important, under Arizona law, once
a court finds that domestic violence has occurred, the court places the
burden on the parent who has committed the domestic violence to
prove that any parenting time to them will not endanger the child or
615
significantly impair their child’s emotional development. Indeed, even

613. The author listed first on the heading of this piece has worked with many family law
attorneys in Illinois. Many of these attorneys have reported to her that it is conventional wisdom that judges will not order restrictions on parenting time, and in particular, supervised visitation, based solely on the children being exposed to domestic
violence, but might due to direct abuse of the child, in particular, proven sexual abuse
of the child.
614. The Arizona custody law expansively defines domestic violence to include any one of
the following: “(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes or attempts to cause
sexual assault or serious physical injury. (2) Places a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious physical injury to any person. (3) Engages in a pattern of
behavior for which a court may issue an ex parte order to protect the other parent
who is seeking child custody or to protect the child and the child’s siblings.” A.R.S.
§ 25-403.03D. To give a sense of how the standard for an order of protection is satisfied, which in turn affects the definition of domestic violence under § 25403.03(D)(3), see, Ralph v. Alberti, 2015 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 1643 (father regularly
and excessively sent the mother harassing text messages and acted in a threatening
manner to her at the time of exchanges of the children, had been arrested with large
amounts of weapons and narcotics, had threatened her, had in the past threatened suicide, and vandalized her property and stalked her, leading the court to find that there
had been significant domestic violence or child abuse pursuant to § 25-403.03 due to
the father’s threatening, intimidating and harassing behavior under A.R.S. § 25403.03(D)(2) and (3), that this evidence of domestic violence is contrary to the best
interest of the children, and that the father had not met his burden of proof to the
court’s satisfaction that his unsupervised parenting time will not endanger the children nor significantly impair the child’s emotional development).
615. AZ REV. STAT. § 25-403.04(F) (Westlaw through the First Spec. and Second Reg.
Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018). “If the court finds that a parent has committed
an act of domestic violence, that parent has the burden of proving to the court’s satisfaction that parenting time will not endanger the child or significantly impair the
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when the parent satisfies the burden to show that some form of parenting time will not endanger their child or significantly impair the child’s
emotional development, under Arizona law, the court must then “place
conditions on parenting time that best protect the child and the other
616
parent from further harm.” The combination of these laws in Arizona
should make it much easier for a survivor of domestic violence to obtain
court orders with features designed to protect them and their children
from further abuse through the parenting time and parenting decisionmaking of the parent who has perpetrated domestic violence.
The Arizona statute lists nine conditions on parenting time that a
court may order when a parent has engaged in domestic violence: (1)
exchanges of the child in a protected setting; (2) supervised parenting
time and the conditions during that parenting time; (3) order the person who committed the domestic violence to attend and complete a
program of intervention for perpetrators of domestic violence; (4) abstain from alcohol or controlled substances during parenting time and
for 24 hours before parenting time; (5) to pay a fee for the costs of parenting time; (6) prohibit overnight parenting time; (7) require a bond
from the parent who committed the domestic violence for the child’s
safe return; (8) order that the address of the child and the other parent
remain confidential; or (9) impose any other condition that the court
determines is necessary to protect the child, the other parent and any
617
other family or household member. These conditions enable a court
to tailor its order of protective measures to address the specific forms of
abuse that have occurred already or are likely to occur in the future.
In many respects, the child custody laws in Arizona are the complete opposite of the child custody laws in Illinois. And, in light of these
differences in laws, it is far more likely for a court to order one or more
of the protective measures described above under Arizona law than under Illinois law when a parent commits domestic violence.

child’s emotional development.” Id. “If the parent meets this burden to the court’s
satisfaction, the court shall place conditions on parenting time that best protect the
child and the other parent from further harm.” Id.
616. Id.
617. AZ REV. STAT. § 25-403.04(F) (Westlaw through the First Spec. and Second Reg.
Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018). “If the court finds that a parent has committed
an act of domestic violence, that parent has the burden of proving to the court’s satisfaction that parenting time will not endanger the child or significantly impair the
child’s emotional development.” Id. “If the parent meets this burden to the court’s
satisfaction, the court shall place conditions on parenting time that best protect the
child and the other parent from further harm.” Id.
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It should also be noted that in Arizona, training judges on issues related to domestic violence is required as part of New Judge Orientation
and can only be waived under very limited, temporary-in-nature cir618
cumstances. Under Illinois law, such training of judges is only rec619
ommended—not required. Thus it is far more likely that family law
judges are trained on domestic violence in Arizona than in Illinois. Arizona law also requires attorneys and guardians ad litem to receive training that would include domestic violence, but provides that such train620
ing can be waived without clarifying the basis for a waiver. So, dedepending upon the basis accepted for waiving this requirement and
how often it is waived, it is unclear to what extent Arizona’s required
training on domestic violence for guardians ad litem leads to more training than in Illinois where such training is recommended but not required. As discussed earlier, training on domestic violence is very important for judges, and the family law professionals they rely upon, to
make decisions consistent with the nature, dynamics, and realities of
domestic violence and its impact on children. But legislation that is
based upon best practices for taking domestic violence into account
could be another way to provide “training” to judges and other family
law professionals. Such legislation should also help lead to better outcomes. The best approach would be to combine required training with
protective laws that properly take domestic violence into account.
III. Necessary Law Reforms to
Implement Evidence-Based Best Practices
Based upon the Literature Review in Section I and the summary
and analysis of laws among the states in Section II, we recommend the
following law reforms:

618. See Ariz. Admin. Code of Jud. Admin. § 1-302(F)(2) (2016) (stating that “[u]pon
request, the chief justice, the chief judge, the presiding judge of the superior court in
each county, or their designees may grant exemptions to judges and employees of
their court for temporary circumstances, including but not limited to: (a) Medical or
other physical conditions preventing active participation in educational programs; (b)
Extended, approved leave of absence; (c) Military leave; (d) Extended jury duty; (e)
Temporary medical waivers for defensive tactics courses, in accordance with ACJA
§ 6-107.”; see also DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TRAINING FOR JUDGES, supra note 382.
619. See supra note 386, ILL. SUP. CT. R. 908(c).
620. See supra note 409, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1.J (Westlaw through the First Spec.
and Second Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Third Leg. 2018).

michigan journal of gender & law

112

[Vol. 26:1

1.

Each state should require its family law judges, child representatives, guardians ad litem, and custody evaluators to
receive initial training on domestic violence and continuing training each year to cover the topics in Section I and
in the Wisconsin Guidebook and to incorporate evolving
evidence-based best practices.

2.

Each state should require its child representatives,
guardians ad litem, and custody evaluators to screen for
domestic violence in each of their custody cases using the
best practices noted in Section I.

3.

Each state’s child custody laws should define “domestic
violence” broadly, as in the CDC definition, and should
also take into account the subcategories of: (a) “situational
couple violence,” which may include mutual violence that
is situational in nature and far more likely to end once the
couple is no longer living together if contacts between the
parents are minimized, and (b) a pattern of coercive
abuse, which can include physical or sexual violence, and
other forms of coercive abuse as described in Section I,
which abuse is far more likely to continue or escalate after
the separation.

4.

Each state’s child custody laws should provide for a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint decision-making and
primary parenting time is not in the best interests of children and should not be granted to a parent who has engaged in domestic violence when it includes a pattern of
coercive abuse against the other parent.

5.

Each state’s custody laws should provide that for cases involving situational couple violence, there is a rebuttable
presumption to structure parenting time under the concept of “parallel parenting” as detailed in Jaffe et al. and
described in Section I of this article (minimal contacts between the parents), but with a stronger emphasis on the
goal of requiring more common practices within the two
households as necessary for the child’s physical and emotional well-being (this type of parenting plan, which
would include further parenting time details to achieve
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this goal, could be called “structured independent parenting time” to better capture this emphasis).
6.

Each state should provide in its child custody laws that if
a parent engages in a pattern of coercive abuse, that parent has the burden of proving to the court’s satisfaction
that any parenting time with that parent will not endanger the child or significantly impair the child’s emotional
development. If the parent meets this burden to the
court’s satisfaction, the court shall place conditions on
parenting time that best protect the child, the other parent, and other members of the household, from further
harm. The child custody law should then require the
court to determine which conditions should be placed on
the parenting time of the parent who has engaged in domestic violence, to protect the child, other parent, and
other members of the household, from further harm. The
child custody law should include a list of protective features from which the court may choose so the court can
tailor the protections ordered to prevent further domestic
621
violence and address the harms already experienced.

7.

The burden of proof in finding that domestic violence has
occurred for purposes of child custody decisions should
be preponderance of the evidence, as in other civil cases.
The burden of proof should be on the party alleging the
abuse. The burden of proof to rebut the presumptions described in suggested reforms 4 and 5 above should be on
the party seeking to rebut those presumptions.

While not the focus of this article, the law reforms proposed should
also cover situations of direct abuse of children, if they are not already
621. The law reform described in paragraph six is already the approach under the child
custody laws in Arizona. While only a few other states expressly place the burden of
showing no endangerment or significant impairment to the child from parenting
time on the parent who has engaged in domestic violence, a large number of the statutes among the 34 states that clearly identify domestic violence as a basis to condition
or restrict parenting time word this in a way that in fact presumes this harm and directs the court to address it. For example, the statutes in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia state: “A court may award
visitation by a parent who committed domestic or family violence only if the court
finds that adequate provision for the safety of the child and parent who is a victim of
domestic or family violence can be made.” See supra Section II.C.
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adequately covered in the child custody laws, since there is a strong
body of evidence that children suffer serious harm as a result of directly
experiencing physical, sexual, and emotional abuse, committed by a par622
ent.
The studies reviewed in Section I support the above described law
reform proposals. The 50-state review of laws in Section II supports the
need for these reforms to address the gaps between evidence-based best
practices and current laws in place among the 50 states and the District
of Columbia.
As with any law reform, legislators will be concerned about the
costs in implementing the reforms proposed. However, the costs for the
screening and training described can be contained by the fashion in
which it is implemented. The screening for domestic violence by child
representatives, guardians ad litem, and custody evaluators can be completed as discussed in Section I by adding a few important questions to
the interviews they normally perform. The act of screening for domestic
violence should not add any costs to the process. When allegations of
domestic violence come up through this screening, this would lead to
extra efforts of investigation, which will add to the time and cost of the
process for recommending custody arrangements. But this follow-up is a
cost to prevent harm that would be no different than following up on
any other alleged harms or unsafe conditions for children (such as allegations that a parent was intoxicated while caring for their child). And
the cost to society in not screening for and protecting survivors of domestic violence and their children would far exceed the extra costs in
623
time in investigating the allegations. Furthermore, the domestic violence training recommended for judges, guardians ad litem, child repre622. PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPTY AFTER CHILD ABUSE: THE TREATMENT OF
ADULTS AND CHILDREN WHO HAVE EXPERIENCED SEXUAL ABUSE, VIOLENCE, AND
NEGLECT IN CHILDHOOD (Daniel McQueen et al. eds., Karnac 2008); Alexandra
Cook et al., Complex Trauma in Children and Adolescents, 35 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS
390 (2005); Tara Richards et al., Intimate Partner Violence and the Overlap of Perpetration and Victimization: Considering the Influence of Physical, Sexual, and Emotional
Abuse in Childhood, 67 J. CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 240 (2017); Jerusha Sanjeevi et
al., A Review of Child Sexual Abuse: Impact, Risk, and Resilience in the Context of Culture, 27 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 622 (2018).
623. According to the CDC, the lifetime per-victim cost from intimate partner violence is
$103,767 for women and $23,414 for men, with a lifetime economic cost to the U.S.
population of $3.6 trillion, based on 32 million women and 12 million men who are
victims of intimate partner violence during their lives. The $3.6 trillion in economic
cost estimate includes: $2.1 trillion (59 percent) in medical costs, $1.3 trillion (37
percent) in lost productivity among victims and perpetrators, $73 billion (two percent) in criminal justice costs, and $62 billion (two percent) in other costs, such as
victim property or loss. Intimate Partner Violence: Consequences, supra note 27.
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sentatives, and custody evaluators could be added to the existing annual
training they receive. The training could be arranged by those who already organize such training conferences in collaboration with those
who have been extensively trained on domestic violence as it relates to
custody decision-making. Building on what already exists can reduce the
added expenses from providing this essential training.
The recommendations on reforming child custody laws are nuanced and balanced. For certain situational couple violence, “parallel
624
parenting” time as described in Jaffe et al. is recommended, but with
the adjustments we recommended in Section I. We call this parenting
625
time arrangement “structured independent parenting time.” For former couples who have engaged in mutual, situation based violence, but
who have a good relationship with their children, this approach facilitates the goal of promoting safe and healthy parent-child relationships.
With fewer opportunities to communicate, the former couple should
have fewer conflicts that are harmful to their children and themselves.
However, when there is evidence of a pattern of coercive abuse,
which is likely to continue and even escalate after the couple separates,
heightened protections are recommended. In these situations, a series of
law reforms should lead judges to order sole decision-making and primary parenting time to the survivor of this kind of domestic violence,
with restrictions and conditions on parenting time for the parent engaged in this kind of domestic violence, tailored to the likely further
abuse or violence that would occur if the protections were not in place.
Courts should be required to consider whether ordering various types of
preventative programs for parents who commit domestic violence would
help reduce the likelihood of further domestic violence and whether ordering therapeutic programs for parent survivors of domestic violence
and their children would help address the harms from prior domestic
violence.
Courts and other family law professionals may be concerned with
their ability to make the distinction between situational couple violence
and a pattern of coercive abuse. But, this underscores the need for initial

624. The parallel parenting time we recommend would be based upon what was described
in Jaffe et al., 2008, supra note 306, but with a greater emphasis on a parenting plan
that provides the details necessary to create common practices in the two independent
households as needed for the child’s emotional and physical welfare. We refer to this
modification of parallel parenting as “structured independent parenting time.”
625. See supra Section I (discussion of structured independent parenting time that also
emphasizes some common practices during parenting time); supra note 327 and accompanying text (support for this need in the context of consistent bed time routines); supra note 328 and accompanying text (uniformity in rules and explanations).
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and continuing domestic violence training to help these professionals
make the best decisions possible for children and their parents when
there is evidence of abuse and violence in the family. It is anticipated
that fathers’ rights organizations and their advocates will generally object
to the proposed law reforms that take domestic violence into account in
child custody cases and to better enable the non-abusive parent to
protect themselves and their children from the danger of further
domestic violence. They will likely claim that mothers often make up
abuse allegations for financial gain and to alienate the children from
their father, that judges already favor mothers in custody cases, and that
children benefit from equal parenting time. However, as detailed in
Section I, data do not support the claims that women often make up
allegations of abuse and that courts favor women over men in custody
cases. The data collected reflects the contrary. Judges place too much
weight on alienation claims and fail to credit or place proper weight on
evidence of domestic violence and child abuse. And, as detailed in
Section I, there is substantial evidence that children are harmed from
parenting time with a parent who engages in domestic violence.
Fathers’ rights advocates may also claim that the proposed law reforms violate a parent’s rights to their children. But the law reforms
proposed are based in large part upon existing laws in many states. In
addition, the law reforms proposed that would have the strongest impact on parenting would be triggered only by a pattern of coercive
abuse, the type most likely to continue even after the couple separates.
For cases of mutual, situational, domestic violence, if the parents have
good relationships with their children, the proposal provides for the mutual, and less invasive protective measure of parallel parenting (using a
structured, independent parenting time plan), to reduce the likelihood
of future domestic violence and facilitate significant parent-child time
with each parent. Thus, the law reforms proposed should not be construed as impermissible violations of parental rights.
Conclusion
Promoting the best interests of children and protecting them from
serious endangerment in the context of a divorce or parentage case has
become highly politicized and gendered. There are claims by fathers’
rights groups that mothers often falsely accuse fathers of domestic violence to gain leverage in custody cases, to procure financial advantage,
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or to alienate the fathers from their children. They also claim that
children do better when fathers are equally involved in their children’s
627
lives, but that judges favor mothers over fathers in custody cases. Fathers’ rights groups have engaged in a nationwide effort to reform the
custody laws to create a presumption of equal parenting time, with no
628
exception when one of the parents has engaged in domestic violence.
In the meantime, domestic violence survivors and their advocates claim
that the needs of survivors of domestic violence and their children to be
safe and free from further abuse are not being met in custody cases, that
their claims of abuse are not being believed, and that the harm to their
children from being exposed to domestic violence is not recognized and
629
addressed by judges.
This Article presented a literature review to assess treatment of domestic violence and best practices for taking domestic violence into ac630
count in child custody cases. Our key findings include:
(i) domestic violence can cause serious, long-term harm to
children, and there is a strong co-occurrence of domestic
violence with physical injury to children, and child abuse;
(ii) judges favor fathers over mothers in custody cases (granting
the custody in the fashion the fathers seek over what the
mothers seek) by placing greater weight upon claims of alienation by fathers over claims of domestic violence by
mothers, especially when the judges are not trained on domestic violence and hold traditional gender norms and believe the world is a just place;
(iii) the long-term harms to children from domestic violence
can be mitigated when protective factors are present or
pursued, which include supporting the non-abusive parents
in their efforts to protect themselves and their children
from further domestic violence;
(iv) to effectuate this support, family law professionals must be
thoroughly trained on both the basics of domestic violence
and the many counter-intuitive nuances of domestic
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.

See supra Section I.
See supra Section I.
See supra Section I.
See supra Section I.
See supra Section I.
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violence, with custody evaluators, guardians ad litem, and
child representatives needing to screen for domestic
violence in all of their custody cases;
(v) a key component of this training is learning how to
distinguish situational couple violence, which might be
able to be safely addressed through “parallel parenting”
type custody orders, from situations where there has been a
pattern of coercive abuse based upon a general goal of
control in all matters, and which will likely continue and
escalate after separation; and
(vi) in cases with a pattern of coercive abuse there should be a
rebuttable presumption that courts order sole decisionmaking and primary parenting to the non-abusive parent,
and protective conditions and restrictions being placed on
631
the parenting time of the coercively abusive parent.
The review of state custody laws in the United States reflects substantial gaps between the practices and rules that evidence-based policies
632
suggest, and the actual laws in place in most states. Only one state requires custody evaluators, guardians ad litem, or child representatives to
633
screen for domestic violence. Only 11 states clearly require without
waiver that family law judges—and only 13 states clearly require without waiver that custody evaluators, guardians ad litem, or child repre-

631. See supra Section I. This proposal focuses on the situations where the domestic violence constitutes a pattern of coercive abuse or situational couple violence as we have
defined these terms, and seeks to supplement and enhance existing statutory protections in child custody cases in those two situations. If the act(s) of domestic violence
do not fit within those two categories, then they should be addressed under existing
statutory standards relating to best interests of the child, any rebuttable presumptions
on custody based upon domestic violence as defined in those statutes, the standard
for the ordering of restrictions or conditions on parenting time due to domestic violence (if so referenced in the statute), or under the general standard for such restrictions or conditions on parenting time as worded in the applicable state. Having
said that, we recommend that state legislation that clearly empowers courts to order
restrictions or conditions on parenting time as necessary and appropriate to promote
the safety and well-being of the child and the safety of the parent victim of domestic
violence should be the norm, and states with legislation, like in Illinois, that require a
higher level of harm before a court can order restrictions or conditions on parenting
time should be modified to conform with this norm.
632. See supra Section II.
633. See supra Section II.
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634

sentatives—receive training on domestic violence. Only 21 states and
the District of Columbia created in their custody statutes a rebuttable
presumption against sole or joint custody to a parent who has engaged
635
in domestic violence as defined in their statutes. And, while 34 states
clearly and explicitly refer to domestic violence (or domestic abuse or
family violence against the other parent) as a basis to condition or re636
strict parenting time of a non-custodial parent, some of these states’
statutes that create rebuttable presumptions, or refer to domestic violence as a basis to condition or restrict parenting time, narrowly define
domestic violence or do not require, but only permit, the court to order
637
any conditions or restrictions. These gaps in the law, and in requiring
domestic violence screening and training, contribute to poor custody
decision-making by judges to the detriment of the safety and welfare of
638
domestic violence survivors and their children. Nuanced and balanced
law reforms would align the laws with evidence-based best practices for
639
taking domestic violence into account in child custody cases. If enacted and implemented, these law reforms should lead to safer, healthier,
and better outcomes in child custody cases for families throughout the
United States.

634. See supra Section II. Our searches relating to required training focused on custody
statutes and state supreme court rules. It is possible that additional states require such
training but from other sources of law; see also supra note 422 (Indiana requires training on child abuse and neglect but not on domestic violence).
635. See supra Section II.
636. See supra Section II.
637. See supra Section II.
638. See supra Section II.
639. See supra Section III.

